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2A b s tra c t
The p o s i t i o n  t h a t  the  pe tro leum  in d u s t r y  occup ies  today  i n  the  
Economy of the  v a r io u s  p roducing  and consuming c o u n t r i e s ,  and the  i n t e r ­
r e l a t i o n s  of th e se  c o u n t r i e s  b a sed  or d e r iv e d  from t h e  o i l  b u s in e s s  has 
g iven  t h i s  i n d u s t r y  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r .  The p e tro leu m  in d u s t r y ,  
however, was s u b je c te d  to  c e r t a i n  changes by th e  t r a n s f e r e n c e  of i t s  c e n tre  
of g r a v i ty  from the  W estern Hemisphere to  th e  E a s te rn ,  w i th  the  emergence of 
th e  l a t t e r  as th e  major sou rce  of o i l  e x p o r ts .  The U n ited  S t- . te s  by 
i t s e l f  had e x e r te d  a pow erfu l in f lu e n c e  over th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o i l  
i n d u s t r y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  over p r i c e s  and over the  p r ic in g  system  used  w hile  i t  
was a n e t  e x p o r te r  of o i l ,  t h  t  i s ,  up to  1948. The in f lu e n c e  on p r i c e s  
managed to  p e r s i s t ,  however, up to  th e  m i d - f i f t i e s  due t o  the  v a r io u s  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  even ts  t h a t  fo llow ed: the  Korean war (1 9 5 0 ) ,  th e  n a t i o n a l i z a ­
t i o n  of the  I r a n i a n  o i l  i n d u s t r y  (1953.), --*id the  Suez c r i s i s  (1956-1957).
I t  i s  on ly  a f t e r  the  U n ited  S ta te s  e s t a b l i s h e d  v o lu n ta ry  c o n t r o l s  i n  1957 and 
l a t e r  i n  1959 mandatory q u o ta s ,  when m arket fo rc e s  began  to  p lay  a dominant 
p a r t  i n  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  in d u s t r y .
There  i s  l o g i c a l l y  a p a r a l l e l  l in e  of th o u g h t w ith  r e s p e c t  to  the  
Venezuelan o i l  i n d u s t r y .  I t  had a ls o  been under the  in f lu e n c e  of the  
American i n d u s t r y  u n t i l  1959 > and s in c e  th en  V enezuela  has a l s o  been 
r e c e iv in g  the  im pact of m arket f o r c e s .  However, t h i s  c o u n try  has been 
s u s c e p t ib le  to  the  s t r o n g e s t  im pact having  the  h ig h e s t  p ro d u c t io n  c o s t
3amongst the  m ajor e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s ,  ..nd t h u s ,  under the  p r e v a i l i n g  
com p e ti t iv e  s i t u a t i o n ,  has been losing n o s i t i o n  i n  w orld  ;,v r k e t s  7 /ith  
r e s p e c t  to  Middle E a s te rn  and f r i c a n  so u rc e s .  However, ' le n e z u e la  
b e l ie v e s  th  t  vh t h  th e  c r e a t i o n  of 0 ,1  0C , c o m p e ti t io n  among sources 
can be p re v e n te d ,  and t h a t  v d th  a c o o r d in ■ied  p o l ic y  among O .P .E .C . 
members, th ey  can  become i n s u l a t e d  from the  e f f e c t s  of c o m p e ti t io n  among 
o i l  companies. I  b e l ie v e  t h a t  the  weakness o f  t h i s  th e o ry  l i e s  i n  th e  
f i r s t  assum ption .
. ; i th  th e  p r e s e n t  work I  hope t o  c l a r i f y  i n  some degree th e  s i t u a t i o n  
of the  pe tro leum  i n d u s t r y  i n  V enezuela , and i t s  p o s i t i o n  w i th in  th e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  scene . N eedless to  s a y ,  t h i s  w i l l  in v o lv e  many p o l i t i c a l  and 
s o c i a l  c o n s id e r a t io n s ,  b u t  because  th ey  a re  so e n ta g le d  w ith  th e  
economics o f  the  pe tro loum  i n d u s t r y ,  they  v / i l l  be u n av o id a b le .
TO M  MOTHER ivilD HER SON-IN-LAW 
WITH RECOGNITION AM) GRATITUDE
5.loknowledf e '.no n t  s
I  r n s h  to  acknowledge mr utm ost g r a t i t u t d e  to  trio C e n tr a l  Bank of 
V enezeula  f o r  having g iv en  me the o p p o r tu n i ty  end f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s ta n c e  
to  mako t h i s  s tudy . To Dr, Crrmon C„ L a s i , head of th e  P e tro leum  and 
Mining D iv i s io n  of t h i s  i n s t i t u t e ,  I  am a ls o  g r e a t l y  in d e b te d ,  f o r  h e r  
moral su p p o r t  and f o r  hav ing  "persuaded” me to  jo in  th e  Pe tro leum  S e c t io n  
through  which I  was i n i t i a t e d  i n  t h i s  f i e l d .  From the M in is t ry  of Mines 
and Hydrocarbons of Venezuela., I  wish to  thank Dr. A l i r i o  P a r r a  f o r  h i s  
advice  and a s s i s t a n c e  on many o c ca s io n s ,  and Miss E th e l  B randt who 
k in d ly  p ro v id e d  me w ith  s t a t i s t i c s  and d a ta .  There a re  no words to  
exp ress  my g r a t i tu d e  to  P ro fe s s o r  E d i th  Penroso to  whom I  s h a l l  always 
be in d e b te d  f o r  the  t r a i n i n g  she has g iven  me and f o r  h e r  p a t ie n c e  as 
she s u p e rv is e d  my work. To Dr. Biplabkukumar Das G-upta I  am a ls o  very  
g r a t e f u l  f o r  h i s  encouragement a t  e l l  t im e s ,  end f o r  h i s  advice  and 
h e lp  d u r in g  d i f f i c u l t  moments. And l a s t  b u t  by no means l e a s t ,  I  wish 
to  acknowledge to  " S h e l l  O i l  Company" in  London, my g r a t i t u d e  fo r  
p e rm i t t in g  me to  use t h e i r  e x c e l l e n t  l i b r a r y ,  -nd to  i t s  ve ry  e f f i c i e n t  
s t a f f  who were always r-.-ady to  lend  a h e lp in g  nund.
Merely as a p re c a u t io n  I  want to  emphasize- t h a t  the  views e x p re ssed  
i n  t h i s  work a re  e n t i r e l y  my own, and th e r e f o r e  do n o t  r e p r e s e n t  those  
of any of the  i n s t i t u t i o n s  m entioned above.
6T ab 1 e of _C_on t  e n t  s
P a r t  One: B as ic  F e a tu re s  and H i s t o r i c a l  Background _o f^ th e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O il  In d u s t ry
PAGg
CHAPTER ONE  ................ . ...............................      . ......... 9
C h ief  Focnomic C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O il  
I n d u s t r y .  S ta g es  of the  P e tro leum  In d u s t ry .  The Changing 
P a t t e r n  of Demand and Supply.
CHAPTER TWO ........................         37
B r i e f  Account of the  E v a lu t i -m  of th e  P r i c in g  System used  
by th e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O i l  Companies*. A) The G u lf  o f  Mexico 
B asing  P o in t ;  B) The V enezuelan Basing P o in t ;  C) The 
P e r s i a n  Gulf B asing  P o in t .  The R e la t iv e  F a l l  of Middle 
E a s te rn  E.O.B. P r i c e s .
CHAPTER THREE  ......................    57
S ig n i f ic a n c e  of P o s ted  P r i c e s ,  R e a l is e d  P r i c e s ,  and Tax 
R eference  P r i c e s .  T ax a tio n  on th e  O il  I n d u s t r y  i n  U*P,B.G,
C o u n tr ie s ,
7PAGE
P a r t  Two: V e nezue la  i n  the  Frame-.ork j j f  the-_ I n t e r n e t i  o r a l  
O i l  In d u s t r y
CHAPTER FOUR . . . . . ............... ............... . . . . ............     83
The B eg inn ings  of the  O i l  In d u s t r y  i n  V enezuela . C h a r a c te r i s ­
t i c s  o f  the  V enezuelan O il  I n d u s t r y  and i t s  P o s i t i o n  i n  the  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  In d u s t ry .  The S ig n if ic a n c e  of th e  O i l  In d u s t ry  
i n  the  V enezuelan  Economy. V e n e z u e la 's  P e tro leum  P o l ic y .
The "C orporac ion  Venezolana de P e t r o le o 11. The P e tro -c  hem ica l 
I n d u s t r y  i n  V enezuela .
C IE PT Ij^ jO T  o . .  o „ ,  b „ ,  ,  . .  o .  q ,  ,  o . d .  c » o 0 , 0 o o . . .  .  .  .  * b .  o ,  .  6 .  14.6
V e n e z u e la 's  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M arkets . The D e t e r i o r a t i o n  of 
V e n e z u e la 's  P o s i t i o n  as the  " io r ld 's  Major E x p o r te r  of Petroleum :
A) Domestic Reasons; B) E x te r n a l  Reasons. The P a t t e r n  of 
V e n e z u e la 's  P e tro leum  E x p o r ts ;  S p e c ia l  R eference  to  F u e l  O i l .
CHAPTER S IX ...................................... ........................ . ..........................................  193
The Form ation  of the  O rg a n iz " t io n  of Pe tro leum  H x ro r t in a  Coun­
t r i e s  (O .P .E .C .)  0 0P ,E .C of s Of f o r t s  to  In c re a s e  Members1 
Sh-:-re of O i l  Income. Venezuela as a Member of G .F .E .C .
CHAPTER SEVEN . . .............................  . . ..........................................  217
C o n c lu s io n s .
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................         ?S2
gAgT__I
B asic  F e a tu re s  
and
H i s t o r i c a l  Background 
of th e
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O il  In d u s t ry
9CHAPTER ONE
C hief Economic C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O i l  In d u s t ry :
V e r t i c a l  I n t e g r a t i o n ,  O lig o p o ly , High C a p i ta l  In v e s tm e n ts ,  Economics of S c a le ,  
Large I n i t i a l  In v e s tm e n ts ,  S tages of the  Pe tro leum  I n d u s t r y .  The Changing 
P a t t e r n  of Demand and Supply.
I  Ch i e f  Economic Ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s_ of  the t y n t e rna. t i o n a l  0 i l  I^ n d u s t r y , 
Ver t iceJ-_In te g r a t i o n  
The o i l  i n d u s t r y  i s  composed of f i v e  d i f f e r e n t  s t a g e s :  e x p lo r a t io n ,
p ro d u c t io n ,  t r a n s p o r t ,  r e f i n i n g  and m ark e tin g . However, th e  major o i l  
companies seem, to  have fav o u re d  v e r t i c a l  I n t e g r a t i o n  as a viay of c o o rd in a t in g  
th e se  and of making the  p ro c e s s  of "production*1, u s in g  th e  term in  the  w id e s t  
s e m e ,  i . e .  from w e l l  to  consumer, q u i te  e f f i c i e n t .  T /ithout im plying t h a t  
these  s ta g e s  could  no t ha,ve been , or cou ld  no t be developed  by se p a ra te  comp­
a n ie s  o r  co n ce rn s ,  u s in g  " lo ng -te rm  c o n tra c ts ' '  ( l )  to  a s s u re  the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
of the  n e c e s sa ry  in p u ts  of each s tag e  and the  o u t l e t s  f o r  th e  in te rm e d ia te  and
f i n a l  p ro d u c t ,  th e  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n  i s  t h a t  c h a r a c te r i z e d  by v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t :
lo v
I t  was through  v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  t h a t  some companies managed to  e x e r t  
t h e i r  supremacy in  the  o i l  b u s in e ss  by r e s t r a i n i n g  c o m p e ti t io n  from the 
sm a lle r  companies t h a t  had no access  e i t h e r  to  crude o i l  o r  to  markets. (2)
But we must r e c o g n is e ,  however, t h a t  i t  was a l s o  a nay o f  secu r in g  an o u t l e t  
f o r  the  v a s t  r e s o u rc e s  of crude o i l  f o r  th o se  i n  the  p roducing  stage, and 
of secu r in g  an even f low  of in p u t  in  the  r e f i n e r i e s  and of supply ing  a market 
w ith  f i n i s h e d  p ro d u c ts  r a t h e r  e f f i c i e n t l y  f o r  th ose  in  th e  r e f in in g  s ta g e .  
V e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  seems to  be defended by th e  oml i n d u s t r y  on th e  grounds
(1) Pe n r  o s e , E , ; "monopoly and Compe t i t i on i n  th e  I n t e r n a t io n a l  .. P e t r ol  yum 
I n d u s t r y " , The Year Book of V orld  A f f a i r s ,  1964 , - page* 157.
(2) H a r ts h o rn ,  J a c k ;  "O il t y t y t y t y 5 an& Lover m e n t s " , 1962, page 109.
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t h a t  e f f i c i e n t  o p e ra t io n ss req u ire  a con tinuous and secu re  flow  of s u p p l i e s ,  
and b ig  f i rm s  w ith  l a r g e  and f a r - f l u n g  m arkets and heavy in v es tm en ts  cannot 
a f f o r d  to  be e n t i r e l y  dependent on o th e r s .  One m ajor o i l  company a l l e g e s  
t h a t  s in ce  th e  c a p i t a l  investm ent r e q u i r e d  a t  each s ta g e  of the  o i l  in d u s t r y  
i s  l a r g e  " i t  i s  i n e v i t a b l e . . . . t h a t  o p e ra to r s  shou ld  s e e k , . . .  an a rrangem ent 
whereby t h e i r  in v es tm en t in  each s tag e  of the  i n d u s t r y  can be p ro p e r ly  
c o -o ra in a te d  w ith  t h a t  a t  o th e r  s ta g e s  so as to  ensu re  optimum employment of 
c a p i ta . l  o v e r a l l ,  th e re b y  keeping c o s ts  as  low as p o s s i b l e .  The p u r s u i t  of 
th ese  very  n a tu r a l  aims in  a c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e  i n d u s t r y  has le d  to  a. l a r g e  
measure of v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n " . ( 3 ) According to  t h i s  same so u rce , 
a p p ro x im atley  7 0 /  o f th e  in d u s t ry  i s  com ple te ly  i n t e g r a t e d  v e r t i c a l l y ,  and 
" th e re  i s  a co n tin u in g  tendency  f o r  more r e c e n t l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  companies to  
seek p a r t i a l  or complete i n t e g r a t i o n " * ( 4 )
On the  w hole , th e  a c t i v i t i e s  of the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o i l  in d u s t r y  have been 
l a r g e l y  in  the  hands of e ig h t  f u l l y  i n te g r a t e d  companies g e n e r a l ly  r e f e r r e d  
t o  as "Majors" t h a t  managed to  a c q u ire  a h igh  degree  of c o n tro l  of the in d u s t ry  
These companies f i v e  American and th re e  European, a re  as fo l lo w s :
1) S tandard  O il  .of New J e r s e y .
2) Mobil O il  Company
3) S tandard  O il  Company of C a l i f o r n ia
4) The Texas O il Company
5) G-ulf O il  Company
6) Royal Dutch./Shell
( 3 ) S h e l l  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Petro leum  Company, London; "C u rren t  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
O il  P r i c in g  P roblem s", A ugust, 1963> page 3«
(4) I b i d  3 page 3 .
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7) B r i t i s h  Petroleum
8) Compagnie E ra n c a is  dcs P e t r o l e s .
j o i n t  o p e ra t io n s  a re  common between th e se  companies and t h e i r  a f f i l i a t e s  
in  most p a r t s  of the  world* Only among the  f i r s t  seven they  ho ld  (b) 
ap p ro x im a te ly  73?- of the  world p ro d u c t io n  ( 6 ) ,  633 of r e f in in g  (7 )> and 
m arket some 64% of th e  o i l  so ld  to  consumers. (8) f u r th e r m o r e , th ey  a re  
a l s o  " o f t e n  c lo s e ly  a s s o c ia t e d  th rough  j o i n t  ownership of s u b s id i a r i e s  and 
th rough  long term supp ly  or m aketing agreem ents” . (9) The a s s o c i a t io n  
th rough  j o i n t  ownership a ls o  seems to  be- a way by which the  o i l  companies have 
chosen t o  u n d e rta k e  c e r t a i n  in v e s tm e n ts .  There have been agreem ents between 
companies whereby a s u rp lu s  of cany k in d  h e ld  by one concern  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  
a re a  cou ld  be ns o ld  t o  the  c o m p e ti to r  in  exchange f o r  su p p l ie s  of an e q u iv a le n t  
v a lu e ” i n  a n o th e r  a re a  where the  form er m ight be sh o r t?  t h a t  r e s u l t  i n  sav ing  
of c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i tu re  " to  th e  advantage of b o th  companies concerned" . (10)
Although the  o l i g o p o l i s t i c  n a tu re  s t i l l  ho lds  f o r  the  o i l  i n d u s t r y  we must? 
however? make the o b s e rv a t io n  t h a t  i t  has l o s t  i t s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of be ing  a 
t i g h t  o l ig o p o ly  w ith  the  e n t ry  of th e  in d ep e n d en ts ,  and tod ay  i t  i s  b e t t e r  to  
r e f e r  bo i t  as an "o l ig o p o ly  w ith  a f r i n g e " ,  ( l l )
C. High C a p i ta l  Inves tm en ts
As a n o th e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of th e  o i l  i n d u s t r y  wo have t h a t  i t  i s  one of 
h igh  c a p i t a l  in v e s tm e n ts .  At the  end of 1964 th e re  had been $  135s625 m i l l i o n  
(g ro ss  f i g u r e )  in v e s te d  i n  f i x e d  a s s e t s  o u ts id e  of the  S in o -S o v ie t  b loc
(b) O utside of H otth  America and the  S o v ie t  Bloc (196b)*
(6) Pe tro leum  P re ss  S e r v ic e ,  November 1966, page 415*
(7) I b i d .
(8) MI-
(9) P en ro se , 35, "f i d d l e _East_ Oi l :  The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  D i s t r i b u t io n  of  P r o f i t s
and I n come, Taxes" , Economic a, August I9 6 0 , page 204.
(10) O d e ll ,  P ; "An _Bc Gnomic G-eography of O i l " London 1963 > page 113*
(11)Term used  by David Owens. See "Crude O il  P r i c e s :  The k%xt Eive_?Yba r s  i n
C om petitive  A spects  of O il  O p e ra t io n s" ,  I n s t i t u t e  of P e tro leum , London 195S 
page lo b .
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( se e  t a b l e  I  -  l )  . Of t h i s  amount, app rox im atley  50% had been a l l o c a t e d  in  
the  U n ited  S t a t e s ,  and 701' were i n  the  V esto rn  Hemisphere a lo n e ,  Venezuela 
p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  th e  g lo b a l  f ig u r e  w ith  5?- and th e  Middle E as t  w ith  4%. I t  
would a l s o  seem i n t e r e s t i n g  to  p o in t  out v /estern  Europe’ s p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of 
l i f e  i . i  t h i s  f i g u r e  s in c e  i t  r e f l e c t s  th e  im portance and the  development o f the  
r e f i n i n g  and m arke ting  s ta g e s  i n  the  a re a ,
V ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e  d i f f e r e n t  s ta g e s  o f  the  o i l  i n d u s t r y ,  we f in d  t h a t  
n e a r ly  50% of th e s e  g ro ss  in ves tm en ts  a re  a l l o c a t e d  i n  the  p ro d u c t io n  s ta g e ,  
fo l lo w ed  by 17% i n  r e f i n i n g ,  l6 f."- i n  T ran sp o r t  and 15% i n  m ark e ting . This i s  
a breakdown of the  t o t a l  f i g u r e  which a ls o  r e f l e c t s  r a t h e r  a c c u r a te ly  the  
s i t u a t i o n  of the  d i f f e r e n t  p roducing  a r e a s .  F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  and as we can 
see in  t a b l e  I  -  1 , t h i s  i s  no t the  case o f  W estern  Europe and th e  Ea,r E as t  
(h ig h ly  in f lu e n c e d  by Japan) s in c e  th e s e  two re g io n s  a re  n o t  c h a r a c te r iz e d  as 
p ro d u ce rs  b u t  r a t h e r  as  heavy consumers and co n seq u en tly  have t h e i r  pe tro leum  
in d u s t ry  b ased  on r e f i n i n g  and marketing*
T7ith r e s p e c t  t o  the  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of American inves tm en t in  th e  pe tro leum  
in d u s t r y  o u ts id e  of the  U nited  S t a t e s ,  we f in d  t h a t  a t  the  end of 1964 i t  had 
reached  a f i g u r e  o f $>3>325 m i l l i o n  which was e q u iv a le n t  t o  36% of the  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o i l  i n d u s t r y  o u ts id e  of the  American b o rd e r .  Canada v/as th e  
co u n try  t h a t  had had m ajor a t t r a c t i o n  f o r  American C a p i ta l  4>250 m il l io n )  
a l th o u g h  V enezuela , t h a t  came c lo s e  behind  4>100 m i l l i o n ) ,  had the  in d u s t ry  
w ith  the  h ig h e s t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of American i n t e r e s t s  (64%)* (se e  t a b l e  1 - 2 )  
A nother f a c e t  of the  o i l  industry*  s inves tm en t p a t t e r n  i s  g iv en  by the  
a l l o c u t i o n  of n e t  in v e s tm e n ts .  A nalysing  the  s i t u a t i o n  from t h i s  p o in t  o f  
view, we co n tin u e  g iv in g  the  V e s te rn  Hemisphere p reponderance  over the  
E a s te rn ,  b u t  we f i n d  t h a t  Venezuela f a l l s  below the  Middle E as t  and A f r ic a  
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2 s S .e .. 0
A'aer i e an IiiY^ t m e.nt  _ i ii th e  Pa t  r o l e  uni 
Indus try_ Out  s id e  t h e Unitocl , S t a t e s ^ l ) 
(DGcenber 31 , i% 4 )
M il l io n P e rce n tag e  of
D o l la r s Domestic I n d u s t r
Canada 4,250 61.8
VEKHSZUELA 4,100 a - 3
O ther W estern Hemisphere 2,125 2 7 .4
W estern  Europe 3,950 25 .9
A fr ic a 1,075 26 .1
Middle E a s t 2,475 4(3.8
F a r  E a s t 2 ,075 31-3
F o re ig n  F lag  Tankers 3,275 2 6 .4
T o ta lca:jcr=ii2TC5rcs=3 23,325 3 6 .1
( 1 ) Cross Inves tm en t i n  F ixed  A s s e ts ,
Source: Chase M anhattan Bank; " C a p i ta l  In ves tm en ts  of the  World Pe tro leum
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f i g u r e  o f  n e t  i m  estm ents  f o r  the  end of 1964 i s  o f  $^73,475 m i l l io n  of which
6 l $  wxs a l l o c a t e d  i n  th e  W estern Hemisphere* and 26/1 in  th e  E a s te rn .  (12)
V enezuela p a r t i c i p a t e d  in  t h i s  f i g u r e  w ith  3%*
D. E ononis,s of f c a l e
Economies of s c a le  a re  a l s o  p r e s e n t  i n  th e  pe tro leum  in d u s t r y  s in ce  the
d e c rea se  i n  u n i t  c o s ts  which r e s u l t s  as th e  s c a le  of o p e ra t io n s  in c r e a s e s ,
c o n s t i t u t e s  a s tn  iding in c e n t iv e  to  employ b ig  u n i t s ,  (13)
I n  crude o i l  p ro d u c t io n ,  l a r g e - s c a l e  o p e ra t io n s  makes i t  p o s s ib le  f o r  a
company to  "assume r isk s ,  t h a t  would be beyond the  c a p a c i ty  and re s o u rc e s  o f a
sm all f i r m " , and to  app ly  more advanced te c h n o lo g ic a l  methods and r e s e a rc h  to
e x p lo r a t io n  and developm ent, ( 14) In  t h i s  sense  we can u n d e rs tan d  t h a t  the
l a r g e r  the  a re a  i s  under e x p lo r a t io n  in  a f i e l d  t h a t  h o ld s  o i l  d e p o s i t s , the
h ig h e r  w i l l  be the  p r o b a b i l i t y  of suoaess, and t h i s  su c c e s s ,  i f  achieved., i s
what f i n a l l y  pays o f f  the expense undertaken  u n t i l  t h a t  moment. In  p ro d u c t io n
g r e a t  economies a re  a l s o  g a in e d ,  bu t we must c l a i r f y ,  t h a t  what cb -° ra c te r ix e s
the  p ro d u c t io n  s tag e  i s  an "economy of h ig h - l e v e l  o u tp u t" ,  (lf>) Once the
o i l  b- g in s  t o  f lo w , the  h ig h e r  the  ou tpu t th e  low er t o t a l  average  c o s t  p e r
u n i t  :.t w i l l  be u n t i l  m arg inal c o s t  comes to  c o in c id e  w ith  average  c o s t ;
(see  diagram I  No, l ) , In  o th e r  words, economies can be reached  in  the
only
producing  s ta g e  of the  i n d u s t r y ,  b u t /u p  to  the  l i m i t  g iv en  by the  m arg inal 
c o s t  i u n c t io n  s in c e  th e  s iso  of any r e s e r v o i r ^  no n a t t e r  hove l a r g e  I t  may 
b e ,  has been " l im i t e d  b3>* natuDre" and beyond t h i s  l i m i t  i t  can no t v'j  f u r t h e r
f l2 )  The rem aining  p e rc en ta g e  i s  u n a l lo c a te d ,
( l3 )  Thompson and. P e t e r s ;  "The St ru c tu re  o f  the  O il  I n d u s t r y " , page 57,
I n s t ,  of P e tro leum , London 1953.
( ik )  C0 I s s a w i  and M* Yeganeh, "The Economics o f  Mid d le  East e r n O i l ” ; New 
York, P 0A0 P ra e g e r ,  1962, page 84 .
( 15 ) • wlelmnn, M .; :tI 4 p J :rQrI f  ,,QI1_. Ou tlo o k "  i n  Marion Clawson ( e d i t o r )
••.N a tu ra l^R esou rc e s  a nd I n t e r n a t io n a lJ D ^yelopme^nt" , B a lt im o re ,  The 
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expanded. (l5A)
I n  r e f i n i n g ,  in v es tm en t p e r  u n i t  of c a p a c i ty  " f a l l s  sharply*1’ w ith  in c re a s e  
in  s c a le  up to  a c o n s id e ra b le  l e v e l , ( l 6 ) Issaw i and Yeganeh found t h a t  i n  the  
U nited  S t a te s  i t  had been  e s t im a te d  t h a t  inves tm en t p e r  b a r r e l  o f c a p a c i ty  f e l l  
from $1 ,3 00  f o r  a r e f i n e r y  w ith  10,000 B/D c a p a c i ty ,  to  $833 f o r  one of 33*000 
B./D c a p a c i ty ,  $ 6 l0  f o r  one of 100,000 B/D, and $?4-5 f o r  one of 200,000 B/D 
due to  th e  drop i n  u n i t  f i x e d  c o s ts  and of la b o u r  re q u ire m e n ts .  ( 17) I n  f a c t ,  
an o i l  r e f i n e r y  seems to  have the  minimum c a p a c i ty  req u ire m e n t  o f 13*000 
b a r r e l s  d a i l y  of th ro ugh pu t below which i t  would be " h a rd ly  economic*' to  
b u i ld .  (18)
Tankers and p i p e l i n e s  a l s o  a llo w  la rg e  economies o f  s c a l e .  With r e s p e c t  
to  ta n k e rs  i t  has been e s t im a te d  t h a t  compared w ith  a 16,600  to n  ta n k e r  (av erag  
s i z e  during  th e  w a r ) ,  th e  sav ing  i n  t r a n s p o r t  c o s t  p e r  to n  i s  about kOr f o r  
a 43*000 to n n e r ,  50y- f o r  an 85,000  to n n e r ,  and 60/: f o r  one of over 100,000  tons 
d.w* (19) T h is  i s  so because  b u i ld in g  c o s ts  p e r  to n  d e c re a se  w ith  s i z e ,  and 
power req u ire m e n ts  and f u e l  consumption in c re a s e  l e s s  th a n  p r o p o r t io n a te ly  
w ith  s i z e .  (20) According t o  th e  s p e c ia l i z e d  p r e s s ,  b u i ld in g  c o s ts  i n  1964 
were £50 t o  £55  p e r  to n  f o r  a 1 9 , 5^0 to n n e r ,  £4-0 f o r  a 4-0 ,000  to n n e r  and £32 
f o r  th e  l a r g e s t  s i z e  v e s s e l s .  (21) P ip e l in e s  a l s o  a re  capable  of economics of 
s c a le  w ith  an in c r e a s e  in  t h e i r  d iam ete r  s in c e  such an in c re a s e  r e s u l t s  i n  a 
much l a r g e r  p r o p o r t io n a te  in c r e a s e  i n  volume and th u s  g iv e s  f o r t h  a consequent 
f a l l  i n  u n i t  c o s t s .  In  t h i s  r e s p e c t  i t  has been c a l c u l a t e d  t h a t  a 24- in ch
(15A) Adelman, M; "The Supply and P r ic e  of Natur a l  _Uasi?, Oxford: B lack w e ll ,
1962 , page 1 5 ,
(1 6 ) C. I s s a w i  and M. Yeganeh, Op G i t , page 8 4 *
(17) I b i d ,
(18) H a r tsh o rn ,  J ;  Op C i t , page 68 ,
( 19) Pe tro leum  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  November i 960 , page 405
(20) Newton, W.L. ; The Long Term Development of the  Tanker P r e i g h t hark e ty  
J o u rn a l  o f th e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  P e tro leum , September 1964* page 2l)4.
(21) P e t roleum  P re s s  S e r v ic e , May 1964* page 172.__________________ _____________ _
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p ip e l in e  can c a r ry  t h i r t y  t im es as much o i l  as a 6 inch  l i n e .  (22)
jjh Large  I n i t i a l  Inyestm en ts
The o i l  i n d u s t r y  i s  a ls o  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by be ing  one t h a t  r e q u i r e s  la rg e  
in v es tm en ts  b e fo re  o u tp u t  can b e g in  in  commercial q u a n t i t i e s .  I t  i s  a common 
b e l i e f  t h a t  in  g e n e ra l  th e  c o s t  of e n t r y  f o r  a newcomer i s  very  h ig h  k23)> 
a l th o u g h  i t  seems t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  a l t o g e t h e r  in a c c e s ib le  e i t h e r .  I n  t h i s  sense 
P r o f e s s o r  Adelman seems to  imply t h a t  t h i s  e n t ry  fe e  i s  n o t  as  l a r g e  as i t  i s  
made t o  b e l ie v e  and c i t e s  the  case  of the  Japanese  A rab ian  O il Company t h a t  
e n te re d  the  b u s in e s s  i n  1958 by r a i s i n g  the  " r a t h e r  sm all  sun1’ of $610 m i l l io n .  
(24) T his indeed  was a f o r tu n a t e  case  bu t because i t  was c h a r a c t e r i s e d  b ' 
such good fo r tu n e  and be ing  " the  r e l a t i o n  between inves tm en t and b a s ic  new 
c a p a c i ty  u n p re d ic ta b le "  ( 25) ,  I  doubt t h a t  i t  cou ld  be taken  as the  g e n e ra l  
y a r d s t i c k .
To secu re  con cess io n s  in  many of the  c o u n tr ie s  w i th  o i l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  or 
to  e s t a b l i s h  a m arketing  concern  in  any of the  o i l  consuming re g io n s  of the 
world "very  l a r g e  i n i t i a l  inves tm en ts  a re  g e n e r a l ly  r e q u i r e d " .  (26) F i t b  
r e s p e c t  to  th e  co n cess ions  t h a t  vrere g ra n te d  in  Venezuela during  1956-1957
( th e  p e r io d  when new comers were a l l  anxious to  g e t  I n to  the  b u s i n e s s ) ,
The s p e c i a l i z e d  c re s s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  s t a t e s  t h a t  payments i n  bonuses were made 
to ta l l in g  682 m i l l io n  d o l l a r s  f o r  56 concess ions  o f  which "on ly  3 concess ion s  
can be l a b e le d  s ta n d  out su c c e s s e s ,  and 3 more b a r e ly  s u c c e s s f u l" .  ( 27)
B esides th e s e  h igh  e x p e n d i tu re s  which have to  be u n d e rta k en  b e fo re  o u tp u t
(22) T h p ^ S t a t i s t , A p r i l  22, 1950 (O il  supp lem en t) .
( 23) H a r tsh o rn ,  J ;  Op C i t , page 103«
( 24) Adelman, M. ; " The F o rId  O il O u tlook" , page 91*
( 25) Adelman, M. ; "Th_e_ For Id  Oi l  Outloojc '1, page 59.
(26) H a r ts h o rn ,  J .  ; Op^jkt* page i0 3 .
( 27) Pet_rol e um P re s s  S e r v ic e , October k> 1965* page 5.
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can be o b ta in ed  th e r e  a re  a l s o  heavy s o c i a l  overhead c o s t s  which a re  n e ce ssa ry  
i n  o rd e r  to  develop  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  and comunit3;r f a c i l i t i e s  i n  underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s .  many roads have to  be a d e , housing  programmes developed, 
s a n i t a r y  and h e a l th  p r e r e q u i s i t e s  seen t o ,  and th e  e s ta b l is h m e n t  of h o s p i t a l ,  
sc h o o l ,  and a m e n it ie s  b e fo re  a petro leum  s e t t l e m e n t  can b e g in  to  f u n c t io n .  I  
became aware of the  g r e a t  inves tm en t taken  under t h i s  head ing  during  a v i s i t  
to  Cardon i n  W estern  V enezuela , b u t  11 :e In  Cardon, t h i s  i s  common to  the  r e s t  
of the  p rodu c in g  s i t e s  in  L a t in  America and a l s o  of A f r ic a  and th e  f i d d l e  E a s t .
Not only  th e  f i r s t  s ta g es  of th e  o i l  in d u s t r y  r e q u i r e  a l a rg e  e n tran ce  
f e e ,  b u t  a l s o  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  r e f i n i n g  and m arketing  r e q u i r e s  l a r g e  sums to  
i n i t i a t e  o p e ra t io n s .  (28) fu r th e rm o re ,  i n  r e f i n i n g  i t  has been a l l e g e d  t h a t  
th e  c o s t  has even in c re a s e d  due to  the  i n t r o d u c t io n  of more complex methods of 
p ro c e s s in g .  (29) We must conclude th e n ,  t h a t  in  s p i t e  of the  d i f f e r e n c e  of 
o p in io n s  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  the  o i l  i n d u s t r y ’ s e n tra n c e  f e e ,  we can a c c e p t  w itho u t 
much h e s i t a t i o n  t h a t  I t  i s  h ig h .
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,"5_8tages of the) P e t to1eum_ In d u s t  ry  
iy,_JExp^or^tion
E xplor a t  io n  i s  th e  i n i t i a l  s tag e  in  the  pe tro leum  in d u s t ry  and i t  c o n s i s t s  
in  the  se a rc h in g  f o r  o i l  i n  an a re a  which g e o lo g ic a l ly  seems fa v o u ra b le  to  the 
fo rm a tio n  and accum ula tion  of hydrocarbons. T his s ta g e  i s  c a r r ie d  out through 
a s e r i e s  of methods ran g in g  from th e  s im p le s t  and most econom ical, l i k e  the  
f i r s t  g e n e ra l  a p p r a i s a l  made by the g e o lo g i s t ,  to  th e  most com plica ted  and 
expensive  te c h n iq u e s .  The r e s u l t s  o b ta in ed  by th e  fo rm er methods w i l l  induce 
o r  r e s t r a i n ,  w hatever the  case  nay b e ,  th e  use of th e  l a t t e r .  G e n e ra lly  
sp eak in g , th e  methods used in  t h i s  s tag e  of th e  I n d u s t r y  tire d iv id ed  in to  
g e o lo g ic a l ,  g o e p h y s ica l  and geochem ical, (30) The p r e l im in a r y  rec o n n a is san c e  
b '  th e  g e o lo g i s t  u s u a l ly  ta k e s  a f u l l  y e a r  and only  th e n  i t  i s  fo l low ed  by 
su r fa c e  g e o lo g ic a l  mapping and a i r  pho tog raphy . G eophysica l tech n iq u es  
measure f r a c t i o n a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  the  e a r t h ' s  g r a v i t a t i o n a l  or m agnetic  f i e l d s  
and the  use of se ism ic  methods capable  of echosounding a re  a ls o  of normal u se .  
The geochem ical p rocedu re  r e s o r t s  to  th e  chem ical a n a l y s i s  of su r fa c e  samples 
from the  more fa v o u ra b le  s i t e s  in  o rd e r  to  v e r i f y  t h e i r  com position  and th en  
determ ine  i f  th e re  i s  any p resence  of hydrocarbons. d l l  th ese  methods however, 
can only  a s s e s s  th e  p r o b i b i l i t y  t h a t  o i l  may be found in  a c e r t a in  a r e a ,  so 
once a p robab le  a re a  has been de te rm ined , the  only  way to  v e r i f y  the  p resen ce  
of o i l  i s  to  d r i l l .
However, fa v o u ra b le  g e o lo g ic a l  c o n d it io n s  a re  no t  s u f f i c i e n t  to  induce 
a s i g n i f i c a n t  e x p lo ra to ry  programme. P o l i t i c a l  c o n s id e r a t io n s  must be tak e n  
in to  account as w e ll  as the  supp ly  and demand p a t t e r n  of the. in d u s t r y .
(30) F o t h e r g i l l ,  C u b ;  "O il E x p lo r a t i on jfc th e d s '' i n  "Handbook of the  Petro leum  
I n d u s t r y " ;  E d .:  G. S e l l  and H.A, f io s s e t t ;  London, page 21,
22
E x p lo ra t io n  has been a way by which the  petro leum  in d u s t r y  has a t t e n e t e d  to  
ensure  i t s e l f  of adequate  s u p p l ie s  fo r  f u tm  o development ( 3 l )  ? t o  f i n d  b e t t e r  
lo c a te d  r e s e r v e s  w it .  r e s p e c t  to  th e  consuming c o u n t r i e s , t o  f i n d  lower co s t  
o i l  t h a t  tvould be co re  economical t o  produce even w ith  the  a d d i t i o n a l  
expense o f  e x p lo r a t io n  and devolopeinnt, and to  o b ta in  a g r e a t e r  degree  of 
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  in order to  o b ta in  a s t ro n g e r  b a rg a in in g  p o s i t i o n  w ith  r e s p e c t  
to  the  p roducing  c o u n t r ie s  and to  secu re  the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of the o i l  i n  case of 
the  c lo su re  o f  any p a r t i c u l a r  so u rc e .
R eserves
R eserves  can be c o n s id e re d  as the  i n d u s t r y ’ s s to c k  room and the in v e n to ry  
may vary  w i th -' th e  r e s u l t s  o f  e x p lo r a t io n  and by the methods used  to  e s t im a te  
th e  o i l  i n  s i t u . I n  t h i s  way we f i n d  t h a t  r e s e rv e s  co u ld  in c re a s e  as a 
r e s u l t  of e x p lo r a t io n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  when new te c h n iq u e s  a re  a p p l ie d ,  and a l s o  
as a r e s u l t  of a d i f f e r e n t  method of e s t im a t in g  th e  amount o f  r* sou rces  in  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  r e s e r v o i r .  However, a new or b e t t e r  method of e s t im a t in g  r e s e r v e s ,  
or a r e v i s i o n  of p a s t  e s t im a te s ,  could a ls o  le a d  to  a r e d u c t io n .  B road ly  
sp eak in g ,  th e r e  a re  two ty p es  of r e s e r v e s :  l )  p roved r e s e r v e s ,  and 2) p ro b ab le
r e s e r v e s .  (32)
Proved .reserves a re  the  amount of o i l  found as a r e s u l t  of d r i l l i n g  which 
can be produced econom ically  under-‘P re se n t  te ch n o lo g y . P robab le  r e s e r v e s ,  on 
th e  otl e r  hand i s  a much w ider concept s in c e  i t  i s  an g s t im u li  of the  t o t a l  
pe tro leum  r e c o v e r a b le ,  b o th  from c u r r e n t  proved r e s e r v e s  and from re s e r v e s  t h a t  
w i l l  be econom ica lly  e x p lo i t a b l e  i n  the  f u tu r e  c o n s id e r in g  p robab le  tec h n o lo g io a  
*
(31) The degree  of t h i s  m o t iv a t io n  w i l l  of course  va ry  f o r  th e  d i f f e r e n t  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  the  i n d u s t r y  acco rd ing  to  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  s to c k s .
(32) Adelman, M .; ‘’The, /[pylc^O iJ^^utljook” , page 66,
p ro g ro s s  and f u t u r e  d i s c o v e r i e s .
R eserves  a re  q u a n t i f i e d  by an amount of b a r r e l s  o r  to n s  in  sjl.tu a t  a 
c e r t a i n  p e r io d ,  b u t  one o f  the  most im p o rtan t  y a r d s t i c k s  used  by the  in d u s t r y  
i s  the  r e s e r v e - p r o d u c t io n  r a t i o  which enab les  us to  c a l c u l a t e  the  t h e o r e t i c a l  
d u ra t io n  of the  r e s e rv e s  exp ressed  in  y e a rs  a t  the  c u r r e n t  r a t e  of p ro d u c t io n .  
This r a t i o  v a r i e s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  the  v a r io u s  producing c o u n tr ie s  
b u t  we s h a l l  see t h i s  l a t e r .
B. Produc t i o n
A lthough the  term. "P roduc tion"  i s  sometimes usod i n  a. more g e n e ra l  way 
in c lu d in g  a c t i v i t i e s  p r i o r  to  the  a c tu a l  p ro ce ss  of e x t r a c t i n g  th e  c i l  from the 
ground ( i . o .  e x p lo r a t io n  and developm ent) , we w i l l  use i t  hero  to  r e f e r  to  t  e 
s tag e  of e x t r a c t io n  o n ly .
C onsidering  th e  l i f e  cyc le  of an o i l  w e l l ,  we can d iv id e  the p ro cess  of
o i l  p ro d u c t io n  i n to  two d i s t i n c t  p h ases :  t ) p r im ary  re c o v e ry ,  and B) secondary
re c o v e ry .  (33) The f i r s t  co rresponds to  the  i n i t i a l  p e r io d  of e x t i n c t i o n  and
i s  c h a r a c te r i z e d  by the  n a tu r a l  d r iv e  of the  o i l  flow ing  to  the  su r fa c e
b a s i c a l l y  on i t s  own a cc o rd .  This i s  due to  the  p r e s s u r e  of the  r c s c r v i o r
formed, by th e  p resen ce  of n a t u r a l  gas which u s u a l ly  accompanies the  o i l .
th e  o i l
Thus when the  p re s s u re  in  the  o i l  r e s e r v i o r  i s  h i g h / " w i l l  gush to  th e  su r fa c e  
a t  a ve ry  h ig h  r a t e " .  (34) The second phase or secondary  re c o v e ry ,  c h a r a c t e r ­
i z e s  th e  p ro d u c tio n  s ta g e  when the  w e l l ’ s n a tu r a l  d r iv e  or p r e s s u re  lias been 
e x h au s ted , and th e r e f o r e  "complex tech n iq u es"  such as f l u i d  i n j e c t i o n  w ith  gas 
o r  w a te r  a re  used in  o rd er  to  b r in g  the  o i l  up to  th e  s u r f a c e .  (33) The use 
of th e se  tec h n iq u e s  i s  r e f e r r e d  to  as " a r t i f i c i a l  l i f t " ,  however, when th ey  a rc  
a p p lie d  e a r l y  i n  a w e l l ’ s p roducing  l i f e ,  i t  i s  reg a rd ed  as "p re s su re
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m aintc nano c " .  (36)
The f i r s t  p h a se ,  i . e .  when the  o i l  flows on n a t u r a l  d r iv e ,  i s  obv iou s ly  
th e  p e r io d  o f  a lower c o s t  of p ro d u c t io n .  T h is  c o s t ,  hovc-vor, w i l l  r i s e  as 
more e la b o ra te  forms of secondary  reco v ery  a rc  u sed . T h e re fo re ,  as p re s su re  
i s  g r a d u a l ly  l o s t ,  th e  r a t e  o f  o i l  p ro d u c tio n  w i l l  a l s o  tend  to  f a l l .  But 
t h i s  i s  t r u e  no t  on l3r of the  f i r s t  p h ase , bu t a l s o  of the  s. cond, Every 
tim e p re s s u re - te c h n iq u o s  a re  a p p l i e d ,  tho  rr-to of ou tpu t w i l l  r i s e  hu t  only 
to  g r a d u a l ly  f a l l  a g a in .  T his in t ro d u c e s  us t o  one o:f tho b a s ic  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s  o f  o i l  p ro d u c t io n  which i s  the  p ro d u c t io n  d e c l in e  cu rv e . (37)
During tho  f i r s t  phase o f  p ro d u c t io n  when tho  o i l  i s  o b ta in ed  by the  
n a tu r a l  d r iv e  o f  th e  w e l l ,  th e re  i s  an " u l t r a  s h o r t"  p e r io d  during  which 
" th e  more b a r r e l s  p roduced , the  low er the  c o s t  p e r  u n i t "  i t  w i l l  r e n d e r .  (36) 
( i n  diagnam I -  No 1 ,  page 1 7 ,  t h i s  u l t r a - s h o r t  p e r io d  would be OR on X a x i s ) .  
However, i n  the  r e g a in in g  l i f e  of th e  f i e l d  when the  p ro d u c t io n  d e c l in e  
curve i s  c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  th e  s i t u a t i o n  ( f r o n  MBH onwards) f;. <arginal c o s t  i s  a 
r i s i n g  f u n c t io n  of o u tp u t " • I n  o th e r  words, " th e  g r e a t e r  i s  tho o u tp u t  the  
h ig h e r  i s  the  c o s t  of a d d i t i o n a l  o u tp u t" .  (3°)
T h is  l i n e  of th o u g h t  as  p re s e n te d  by P r o f e s s o r  u d c lu a n ,  sowas to  q u a l i f y  
the  o i l  i n d u s t r y  as one o f  in c r e a s in g  c o s ts  i n  o p p o s i t io n  to  tho  no t so 
unusua l b e l i e f  of the  c o n t r a r y ,  (40)
(36) Ib id*
(37) hdelr-ian, 2a. $ The "ro r ld  O il  O utlook , page 41 .
(38) I b i d ,  page — .....—  ■
(39) Sid.
(40) Dr. P au l Pranked i n  h i s  ’: Essen t  l a  jus y f  Pet_rol_eunin (Chapman and Pi a l l ,  
London 1946, page 17) had c h a r a c te r i z e d  t h e  o i l  i n d u s t r y  as be ing  a 
n a tu r a l  monopoly. Being a c a p i t a l  i n te n s iv e  i n d u s t r y  " i t  i s  im p e ra tiv e"  
he s a id ,  " t h a t  th e  o p e ra to r  e x t r a c t s  the  maximum from a producing  w e ll  
because  h i s  c o s t  pe r  b a r r e l  d e c rea se s  r a p i d l y  as ou tpu t  in c r e a s e s " .  
T h e re fo re ,  n o t  be ing  a s e l f - a d j u s t i n g  in d u s t r y ,  and because  of the  poor 
.■rice e l a s t i c i t y  of c ru d e ,  agreem ents between p roduce rs  have, always 
been tho ugh t t o  be necessa ry "  i n  o rd e r  to  av o id  a s i t u a t i o n  of " g l u t " .
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I t  docs seem obvious however* t h a t  ’’i f  the  expenses Per  u n i t  of tirao 
-ore f i x e d  ( and .a jfo j ’t i o r i  i f  th ey  a re  in c re a s in g  a s  in  f a c t  they  a re )  , and 
i f  p ro d u c t io n  p e r  u n i t  of t in o  doorcases*  th en  th e  p ro d u c t io n  c o s t  p e r  
a d d i t i o n a l  u n i t  in c r e a s e s  the  g r e a t e r  i s  th e  t o t a l  p ro d u c t io n " .  ( h i )
C_._ T ramso o r t  a t  io n
T r a n s p o r t a t io n  In  th e  pe tro leum  in d u s t r y  can bo c l a s s i f i e d  in to  th r e e  
d i s t i n c t  phases as o i l  moves to  th e  f i n a l  conr.Ui.aers, (42) f i r s t *  "nd most 
im p o r ta n t  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  volume end d is tan c e*  i s  tho  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  o f  crude 
o i l  from tho source  of p ro d u c t io n  to  th e  r e f i n e r i e s .  Kext we have tho  
movement o f  p ro d u c ts  from the  r e f i n e r i e s  to  tho m ark e tin g  area* and th i rd *  
tho  d i s t r i b u t i o n  to  th e  v a r io u s  r e t a i l e r s .  V/e can p e rc e iv e  tho im portance 
of tho  t r a n s p o r t  s ta g e  i/hen wo r e a l i z e  t h a t  over 5Of- o f  th e  volume of i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  seaborne t r a d e  i s  me.de up of p e tro leu m , ( 43)
As we s h a l l  see l a t o r  w ith  more d e ta i l *  th e r e  a.re two main ro u te s  t h a t  
may bo d e te c te d  in  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  movement of p e tro leu m . The most im p o r tan t  
i s  th e  one t h a t  o r i g i n a t e s  i n  the  middle E as t  and. i s  bound t o  '-'e s t e r n  Europe* 
and th e  o th e r  from Venezuela t o  North America. Next to  th e s e  th e re  a re  o th e r  
im p o rtan t  movements of o i l :  from the  "Addle 'f a s t  to  th e  E ar  Eu;-t and to  North
America * and from V enezuela and N o rth e rn  A fe r ic a  to  W estern  Europe.
The t r a n s p o r t  roouire.monts of tho  pe tro leum  i n d u s t r y  a re  f u l f i l l e d  
.mainly by ta n k e rs  and p ip e l i n e s  a l th o u g h  th e  prime f u n c t io n  of tho  l a t t e r  i s  
fito  take  t  .e o i l  t o  th e  n e a r e s t  conven ien t  lo ad in g  p o i n t  f o r  ocean t r a n s p o r t -  
a t i o n 5, and from the  im port t e rm in a l s  of the  me/in consuming a re a s  to  the  
r e f i n e r i e s .  (44) The c o s t  o f ocean t r a n s p o r t  has been  reduced  c o n s id e ra b ly
A&elman, M. ;iTho_ pm).ri d  O il Outlook*’ * page 43*
(42) Odell* P . ; Op^Cit, page 145*
(43) U nited  Nab io n s ;  n S t a t i s t i c a l p  Yearljoola -  19 5 4 '5 * page 401.
(44) Odell* P . ;  Op G i t ,  page 16#.
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by the  i n c r e a s in g  s iz e  of ta n k e rs  (see  page 18 ) . B efore  the  second w orld  
war a 12,000 to n  v e s s e l  was of a s ta n d a rd  s i z e ,  and in  1945 a- 24,000 to n  sh ip  
was c o n s id e re d  a su p e r  t a n k e r ,  (45) Today th ey  a re  over 100,000 t o n s ,  and a 
200,000 ta i ik e r  seems to  have been f o r e c a s te d .  (46)
Tho expansion  of ta n k e r  c a p a c i ty  a f t e r  th e  Suez c r i s i s  a l s o  gave way to  
low er f r e i g h t  r a t e s  and th e re b y  c o n t r ib u te d  to  a low er C .I .F .  p r i c e  of o i l  
f o r  th e  v a r io u s  im p o rtin g  c o u n t r i e s .  i s  we s h a l l  a l s o  soo, t h i s  reduced  the  
com petitive, advantage  of o i l  p roducing  reg io n s  t h a t  had. been en joy ing  f r e i g h t  
advantage  over o th e r s  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  such consuming c e n te r s  as ’"e s t e r n  Europe 
and th e  U nited  S t a t e s  and in c re a s e d  co m p e ti t io n  'w ith in  the  i n d u s t r y .
D, R e f in in g
The r e f i n i n g  s ta g e  can be d e f in e d  as the  p ro c e ss  by which crude o i l  
i s  t ra n s fo rm e d  in to  a "wide ran g e '1 of end p ro d u c ts  which become s u i t a b l e  f o r  
u se .  However, t h i s  p ro c e s s  has* been  h ig h ly  s u s c e p t ib l e  to very s p e c i a l i z e d  
tech n o lo g y  t h a t  h a s  p e rm i t te d  to  u t i l i z e  most of the  crude  f e d  to  th e  r e f i n e r y ,  
thus  red u c in g  waste to  a n e g l ig ib le  amount, and to  make th e  r e f i n e r y  p a t t e r n  
more f l e x i b l e  acco rd in g  to  th e  demand of a p a r t i c u l a r  m arket a re a .  (47)
In  the  r e f i n i n g  p r o c e s s ,  the  s im p le s t  tech n in u e  I s  t h a t  known as " d i s t i -  
l o t i o n " , which i s  the  " b o i l in g  o f f  th e  d i f f e r e n t  f r a c t i o n s  o f  t^e  crude o i l " , 
b u t  i t  a l s o  u t i l i z e s  more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  .methods such as the rm al crack ing  which 
i s  " the  t r e a tm e n t  of su rp lu s  s e p a ra te d  p ro d u c ts  under h igh  tem p era tu re  and 
p re s s u re  " In  o rd e r  t o  "co n v e r t"  th e se  i n t o  o th e r  p ro d u c ts  o f  which th e r e  are 
not enough to  s a t i s f y  the  m arke t. (48) However, the  r a t i o  of c rack ing
j  ^ y -  |ja r r ; j_s j  " D i s t r i b u t i o n  of Pe tro leum  and i t s  P ro d u c ts " ,  Handbook of 
th e  Pe tro leum  I n d u s t r y ,  page 86.
(46) O d e l l ,  P . ;  Q)c Cit , page 156.
(47) H a r ts h o rn ,  J . ;  0 p _ C i t , page 69-
( 48 ) I b i d , page 6 7 ,
and reform ing c a p a c i ty  to  to ta l1, r e f i n i n g  c a p a c i ty  i s  u s u a l ly  h ig h e r  in  r e f i n ­
e r i e s  where th e r e  i s  an ou tpu t  ‘p a t t e r n  t h a t  f a v o u rs  a l ig h t - n r o d u c t  y i e l d  
(su c h  as th o se  of th e  United S t a t e s ) ,  sance t h i s  technlwsfue i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s u i t a b l e  to  o b ta in  th e  l i g h t e r  type  p ro d u c ts  such as g a s o l i n e . ( 49 )
One of the  p o s t  im p o rtan t  economic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the  r e f i n i n g  s ta g e ,  
i s  t h a t  i t  p roduces a vride range of d i f f e r e n t  p roducts  under a sy s te u  of p o in t  
c o s t s .  In  o th e r  words "one cannot have any of the  f i n a l  p ro d u c ts  w ith o u t  
th e  whole c o s t"  no r  have one p ro d u c t (a l th o u g h  one can o b ta in  a l a r g e r  p ro ­
p o r t io n  o f  i t )  and e l im in a te  the r e s t .  ( 50 ) hue t o  t h i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  and 
to  the  v a r io u s  d eg rees  of p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  th e  d i f f e r e n t  p r o d u c t s , a very  
p a r t i c u l a r  p r i c e  schedu le  f o r  th e se  was g e n e r a l i s e d  which does not p a r t i c u l a r l y  
fav o u r  some c o u n t r i e s .  7/e s h a l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  p o in t  i n  a fo l lo w in g  c h a p te r .
B J I a r k e  t i n g
Once th e  p rev io u s  s ta g e s  of the  o i l  i n d u s t r y  have p ro v id ed  a range of 
p ro d u c ts  s u i t a b l e  f o r  u se ,  th e  t a s k  now7 i s  t o  g e t  t - e s e  where th e r e  a re  
consumers ( a c t u a l  and p o t e n t i a l )  In  th e  'u a n t i t i e s  t h a t  th e se  a re  p re p a re d  to  
buy. S ince  th e  o a jo r  markets a re  so f a r  from th e  p roducing  a r e a , even in  one 
coun try  such as  th e  vhalted  S t a t e s ,  a h ig h ly  o rg a n ise d  war’re t in a  system had to  
be developed in  o rd e r  to  s a t i s f y  demand e . f f i c ie - - t ly  and secu re  th e  o u t l e t  f o r  
the o i l .
. h i s  f u n c t io n  has been g e n e r a l l y  in  the 'rands of th e  p r i v a t e  o i l  companies 
bu t  th e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  t h i s  s ta g e  has a ls o  been  th e  n u ta t io n  of the producing  
c o u n t r i e s ,  a r o le  which th ey  in te n d  to  f u l f i l  th ro u g h  t h e i r  own n a t io n a l  o i l  
companies once th e y  have gainst? ex perien ce  and p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  th e  p rev io u s
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s ta g e s  of th e  i n d u s t r y .  The p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  the  l a t t e r  s ta g e s  o f  th e  o i l  
in d u s t r y  lias been a major p re o c c u p a t io n  of th e  p roducing  c o u n tr ie s  " p a r t l y . . .  
as a way of ta k in g  in c r e a s in g  r e s p o n s a b i l i t y  fo r  the  develop.::ent of th e  
c o u n t r ie s ;  n a t i o n a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  bu t l a r g e l y . . .  as one of the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of 
in c r e a s in g  th e  governm en ts’ share  In  th e  p roceeds o f  o i l " .  (51) Thus we 
see how th e  n a t i o n a l  o i l  company of V enezuela , the  !i Corpora c i  or Venezolana de 
P e t ro le o "  ( C .V .P . ) ,  e ag e r  to  b eg in  I t s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  t h i s  s t a g e ,  was 
g ra n te d  by decree  a 33k sh a re  of the  i n t e r n a l  m arket f o r  pe tro leum  p ro d u c ts ,
( 52) Although a h ig h e r  f i n a n c i a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o p e ra t in g  in  the  l a t t e r  
s ta g e s  of th e  i n d u s t r y  in  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  sphere  cou ld  be d o u b tfu l  ( 53) ;  
an e n tra n c e  to  th e  m arketing  s ta g e  In  t h e i r  own dom estic  m arkets would 
p robab ly  p e rm it  th e se  c o u n t r i e s  to  g a in  more knowledge of the  whole 
b u s in e s s  and thus  a c t  w i th  b e t t e r  judgement acco rd in g  to  th e  d i f f e r e n t  
s i t u a t i o n s  th ey  'would want to  fac e  or would have to  f a c e  in  the  f u t u r e .
( 51) H a r ts h o rn ,  J . ;  Op Git , page 304.
( 52 ) R epub lic  of V enezuela , bo c ree Ho AS?, November 1964 .
(53) H a r ts h o rn ,  J . ;  0;p_Cit, page 364 .
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I I I  JThe _ Chan^in£ P a t t e r n  of •.1u p p I ,* nd I)e*m. ?iU
E ver s in ce  th e  U n ited  S t ' t o o  o s t - .b l i . l ie  1. i s r l i  P. t .  ,. *_. .r ly  1 8 6 0 's  
as th e  w o r ld 's  major o i l  produce o, t in  Wr s i  v“n H lisp-: , b a c - . , i  tho 
c h ie f  source  of p e tro leu m  from 1 ch •* ' r v- i ?  .*'• 1 •- '-’our ' ib.-. u c r ld  mere 
se rv ed  f o r  n e a r ly  a century., ( !34) I t  hvS only  ' r u n  i n  the  p a s t  f i f t e e n  
y e a r s  t h a t  the  c e n t r e  of g r - .v i t /  of the  o i l  i n d u s t r y  beg.'n to  s h i f t  from 
the  be s t e r n  Hemisphere to  the  P a s t e r n ,  and today -re f in d  t h - t  tho  
uncomi o r t a b l e  s i t u a t i o n  of the  in d u s t r y  r e s u i t i n g  from  the  en co u n te r  of 
opposing  - r e s s u r e S j  i . e .  market f o r c e s  and p ro d u ce rs  i n t e r e s t s ,  i s  n o th in g  
more th an  the E . s t e r n  hem isphere c la im in g  h e r  supremacy i n  tho  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
scene ,
With r e s p e c t  to  p roven r e s e rv e s  of crude  o i l ,  re f i n d  th- t  i n  1940 
73'/° vero  lo c a te d  i n  the  '7e s t e r n  Hemisphere and 27 a  i n  th-- 1 a s t e r n .  The 
United S t a t e s  a lone counted  "ith  63,6 a t  t  -is t im e . However, by 1965 the 
p ro p o r t io n s  had changed c o n s id e ra b ly .  In  th e  a s t e r n  Hemisphere th ese  
e s t im a te s  'had f i l l e r .  to  j u s t  over 181- -nd those  of the U n ited  S t a t e s  to  9aw 
The E a s te r n  Hemisphere had in c re a s e d  i t s  p r t i c . 1.0 t . io r  to  -md the  
23. d d ie  l a s t ,  -which only hi.-,.a 3.% o£ '•ov..-. i \  se rvo s  c f  '1940, hoc.-me
t
the  most p r o l i f i c  .* re  a -ri t h  C-2% of t -v  c r l  7 1 c r e s e rv e  s . (s< • t;:.b le  I  - 4 )
P ro d u c t io n  has a l s o  h id  a ;c --or 'd . f t  f ro t  ve s ir  -n J. r the  E a s te rn  
Hemisphere. I n  1938 the  .e s t e r n  -Vmi -n e™' -cocu t e l  •'•or 77  J o f the  w o r ld 's  
pe tro leu m  o u tp u t ,  b u t  by 1965 t h i s  p ro p o r t io n  had been reduced to  44, a  
fu r th e rm o re ,  i n  1964 p ro d u c t io n  from the m iddle I h s t  su rp a ssed  t i n t  o f the  
U nited  States f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e , and since  th e n ,  has boon the w o r ld 's
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major p roducing  a r e a ,  c o n t r i b u t in g  i n  19^5 w ith  a p p ro x im ate ly  28% of world 
p r o d u c t io n , ( s e e  T ab le  I  -  5)
There  has a l s o  been  a major change w ith  th e  l o c a t i o n  of r e f i n i n g
c a p a c i ty  d u r in g  t i e  l a s t  f i f t e e n  y e a r s .  However, the  s h i f t  t h a t  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s e d  th e  r e f i n i n g  s t  ■ge was from the  o i l  p roducing  c o u n t r i e s  to  the m ajor 
consuming r e g i o n s , ( s e e  Table 1 - 6 ) .  I n  the co rrespon d in g  to b le  we have 
d iv id e d  th e  a re a s  by such a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  b u t  s e p a r a t in g  the U n ited  S t a t e s  
i n  th e  a n a ly s i s  b e in g  b o th  a major p ro duce r  and consumer. In  t h i s  way 
we f i n d  t h a t  i n  1940 the  major p roducing  c.re-rs had a g r e a t e r  p r o p o r t io n  
of th e  v7orldf s r e f i n i n g  c a p a c i ty ,  even i f  wo exclude  th e  U nited  S t a t e s  
which a t  t h i s  tim e had more th a n  h a l f  of i t .  However, by 19&5 th e  change 
had ta k e n  p iece  and we f i n d  t h a t  the  major consuming a re a s  ( a l s o  e x c lu d in g  
th e  U n ited  S t a t e s ) ,  i . e .  W estern Europe and Japan , had a c q u ire d  a 30% 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of th e  w o r ld 1s r e f i n i n g  c a p a c i ty .
There a re  v a r io u s  re a so n s  f o r  t h i s  change of which th e  most im p o r ta n t  
p ro bab ly  a re  the  fo l lo w in g  s ix :  (55)
1) Many o f  the  m arke ts  f o r  r e f i n e d  p ro d u c ts  had expanded enough to  a llo w
a r e f i n e r y  i n  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  a re a  w ith  the  minimum r e q u i r e d  th ro u g h p u t.
2) T here  was a need f o r  a r a p id  expan sion  i n  r e f i n i n g  c a p a c i ty  a f t e r  th e  
war and many European c o u n tr ie s  had sm all  r e f i n e r i e s  t h a t  could  be
expanded to  cover th e  in c r e a s in g  demand f o r  p ro d u c ts  i n  t h a t  a r e a .
3) The d o l l a r  sh o r ta g e  i n  Europe a f t e r  th e  war made th e  r e s p e c t iv e  
Governments aware of th e  burden  of o i l  im po rts  on th o  ba lan ce  of 
payments and th e r e f o r e  made them e.aphasise a dom estic  r e f i n i n g  
i n d u s t r y .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  a f i r  ure of U160 m i l l i o n  has been q u o ted  as
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b e in g  the  amount of sav ings  of f o r e i g n  exchange in c u r r e d  by th e
0 .E aS oC8 c o u n t r ie s  of W estern Europe from 1949 to  1935 as a r e s u l t  of 
the  g rad u a l  change from p rod uc t to  crude o i l  i m p o r t s . ( 56 )
4 ) Many in d ep en d en ts  seek ing  to  secu re  m arkets  i n  th e  European a re a  found 
t h a t  th e  p r i c e  of e n t r y  was the  b u i ld in g  of a l o c a l  r e f i n e r y .
5) Independen t concerns i n  c o u n t r ie s  l i k e  Jap an  and I t a l y  found t h a t  i t  
was more econom ical to  im port c ru d e , t h a t  began to  c a r r y  heavy d i s -  
cou n ts ,  and r e f i n e  i t  a t  home, th an  to  im port p ro d u c ts .
6) The advances i n  r e f i n i n g  tech no lo gy  reduced w aste  t o  * g r e a t  e x te n t  
making i t  more economical to  t r a n s p o r t  crude tiw n to  sh ip  th e  v a r io u s  
p ro d u c ts  to  d i f f e r e n t  dost.: .na tions from a n*'jor producing a rea  
c o n s id e r in g  t h - t  th e  movement of e rv fe  o f f e r e d  l a r g e r  ecenemies i n  
comparison w ith  the  movement of p rod uc ts  due to  the lower c o s t s  th; t  
in v o lv e d  the  sh ip p in g  of d i r t y  c ' r n o s .(5 7 )
We could  a l s o  add a s t r a t e g i c  re a so n  f o r  th e  l o c a t i o n  of r e f i n e r i e s  
i n  th e  consuming c o u n t r i e s ,  and t h i s  I s  t h a t  th e re  seems to  be a p o in t  of 
view t h a t  o i l  companies p r e f e r  to  have the  r e f i n i n g  a re a  se p a ra te d  from 
the  p roducing  re g io n  so as to  en su re  th- t  i n  th e  e v e n t  of " i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
te n s io n "  th e  supply  of p ro duc ts  would no t be i n t e r r u p t e d  presuming t h a t  the  
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of crude  o i l  so u rces  i n  the  world p e rm its  a b e t t e r  chance of 
f in d in g  an a l t e r n a t i v e  supp ly , and n o t  so i n  th e  case  of p r o d u c t s . (5 8 )
The v a r io u s  changes accounted  f o r  were r a p id ly  r e f l e c t e d  w i th in ' th e  
pe tro leum  t r a d e .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  \?e f in d  t h a t  while i n  1938 697° of the  
n e t  e x p o r ts  o f pe tro leum  lnad o r ig in a te d  from the  Unted S t a t e s  and Venezuela.,
(56 ) O d e l l ,  P. ; page 118
(57) 112
(58) O de ll  O^.^Cit., page 114
35
i n  196.5 ' - p r a c t i c a l l y  t h i s  same p r o p o r t io n  (68a ) co rresponded  to  
so u rc es  of th e  E a s te r n  Hemisphere, ( s e e  Table  1 - 7 ) .  A lso , and as a 
consequence of the  g ra d u a l  change i n  th e  l o c a t i o n  of th e  r e f i n e r i e s ,  o i l  
movements which were p redo m inan tly  of r e f i n e d  p ro d u c ts  i n  1938 ( a p p ro x i ­
m ate ly  70%), a re  now made up of crude by ap p ro x im a te ly  th e  same p e r c e n t a g e . (59, 
A major change i n  the  demand p a t t e r n  of the  o i l  consuming c o u n t r i e s  has 
a l s o  been t h a t  co n ce rn in g  the  demand f o r  p ro d u c ts .  I n  the  e a r ly  s t a g e s  of 
th e  o i l  i n d u s t r y  th e  p ro d u c t t h a t  had the  g r e a t e s t  demand was k e ro sen e  
which was th en  used  m ainly as l i g h t i n g  o i l ;  l a t e r ,  wri t h  th e  a r r i v a l  o f the  
a u to m o b ile ,  g a s o l in e  look th e  l e a d ,  b u t  now i n  many o f  th e  la rg e  consuming 
a r e a s ,  such as Japan  and W estern  I.urope, f u e l  o i l  has been  the  main p rod uc t 
demanded due to  i n d u s t r i a l  re q u ire m e n ts .  For exam ple, w hile  f u e l  o i l  only 
p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  th e  demand p a t t o r n  of the  u n i te d  Kingdom ( th e  1?r g e r  consumer 
of o i l  p ro d u c ts  i n  W estern  Eurooo) i n  uprroxim t o l y  20/*> in  1950, i t s  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  had in c r e a s e d  to  by I960. I n  ‘o s t e r n  G-ermany th e  p ro p o r t io n  
was a l s o  doubled , from  12a> to  2if.. du rin g  the  same p e r io d .  (60)
A l l  th e s e  changes t h a t  we have a n a ly se d ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  those  r e f e r r i n g  to  
supp ly , have had a s t ro n g  in f lu e n c e  on tho  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o i l  i n d u s t r y ,  and 
e s p e c i a l l y  on the system  which had been  u sed  to  p r i c e  tho o i l .  I n  the  
fo l lo w in g  c h a p te r  we th u s  t u r n  to  ana ly se  some of i t s  i m p l i c a t io n s .
(59) G-ripaios, H . ; “I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O il  P r i c e s ” ; L ec tu re  d e l iv e r e d  to  th e  
“B r i t i s h  A s s o c ia t io n  f o r  the  Advancement of Science* '. P u b l ish e d  by 
" S h e l l  O i l  Company", September 10, 196 A; page 9: Major World O i l  
Movements.
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C IL-.PT ER _T WQ
B r ie f  accoun t of th e  e v o lu t io n  of the  p r i c i n g  system used  by the  i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  o i l  companies: A) The G-ulf of J 'ex ico  Basing’ P o in t ;  B) The
Venezuelan Basing P o in t ;  c) The P e r s ia n  Gulf Basing P o in t .  The R e la t iv e  
F a l l  of R idd le  E s.s te rn  F .O .B. P r i c e s .
I n t rodu o t io n
Before any a t te m p t  i s  made to  ana ly se  c e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  of the  p r i c i n g  
system  which c h a r a c t e r i z e d  the  o i l  i n d u s t r y ,  we must f i r s t  c l a r i f y  the  
s i t u a t i o n  or f rac ew o rk  i n  which i t  developed. As we saw in  our preceding; 
c h a p te r ,  the  o i l  i n d u s t r y  has been (and i s )  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by being  one of 
o l i g o p o l i s t i c  n a tu r e  and by the  predominance of v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n .  I t  I s  
Im p ortan t  t o  be aware of th e s e  two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  as we p roceed  In  our 
a n a ly s i s  i n  o rd e r  to  have a c l e a r e r  p i c tu r e  o f the  v a r io u s  s i t u a t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  
to  ’’p r i c e s " .
Crude o i l  i s  o n ly  a raw m a te r i a l  which must be r e f i n e d  b e fo re  i t  can be 
of any u s e ,  and t h e r e f o r e  needs to  re a c h  r e f i n e r i e s  to  undergo such a p ro c e ss  
b e fo re  a f i n a l  p ro d u c t  i s  o f f e r e d  to  a consumer. However, crude o i l  i s  seldom 
"bough t” s in ce  most of the  crude r e f in e d  i s  produced by th e  p a re n t  companies or 
a f f i l i a t e s  o f th e  r e f i n e r s .  As one source  words i t ,  "most o f th e  crude produc< 
i n  th e  w orld  i s  n ever  so ld  a t  a l l ” , ( l )  A pproxim ately  70 to  80/e of i n t e r a c t ­
io n a l  o i l  movements go th rough  I n te g r a te d  channels  ( 2 ) ,  and of th e  o i l  t h a t  i s  
sold, t o  indep enden t r e f i n e r s ,  only about ~/3 I s  a c t u a l l y  t r a d e d  a t  arm’ s - l e n g th  
d e a ls  s in c e  th e  r e s t  i s  s u p p l ie d  under lo n g -te rm  c o n t r a c t s  w ith  major in te g ra te d
companies o r envolves commitments to  r e f i n e  f o r  th e  m a jo r .  ( 3 )
(1) H a r tsh o rn ,  . ;  “O il  Companies and G0vernem nts’’ ( 1967 ) ,  page 133«
(2 )  JH id .
(3 ) A i d ,  page 135 .
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I t  i s  ^m oeiso iy  «Utc io  hhe £*jtb  t l * t  Mott ox f  e C::v.‘,c :.cvos through 
in te j -a tG d t  c lu i in o ls ,  t h a t  *|*ny of th o  t i n s  t h a t  v.o »e.-r o;C " p r i c e s "  re fex 'i i  3 
t o  Crude o i l ,  they  axe r o t  such; s in c e  to  \ e  . r, e c tu . 1 iMU&et pxi-.e  o f  to  
have any economic s ig n i f ic a n c e *  t h e r e  he s to  00 e, -mnrket w ith  a t r u e  buy . r  
ar JL a  t r  .0 s e l l e r .  And as  we saw5 t h i s  is  o x te r  n o t  th e  c c se .  In  our n ex t  
c h a p te r  we s h a l l  t r y  to  c l a r i f y  th e  moaning o f  t h e  " p r i c e s "  ox c ru d e .
A nother p o in t  t h a t  r u s t  ho xoutioneG i s  th ,  t  aXthough th e  p r ic in g  
system , of which we a r e  abou t to a n a ly se  some a s p e c t s s was £ police to  b o th  
crude o i l  ox- p ro d u c ts ,  we .ust r e c a l l  t h e t  t i le  la in  i n t e r n e t i o r u  1 movements 
ox o i l  were in  th o  f e r n  of pxoducts u n t i l  ap xroizi r  t e l y  th e  mid f i f t i . s ,  arc! 
i t  was f ro . .  t h i s  period onwar s t h a t  cru co  o i l  h a s  been tho  m ajor form of 
p e t r o le u n  being t r a n s p o r t e d  due to  th e  growth o f  re f i l in g -  c a p a c i ty  i n  
consuming c o u n t r i e s  ( se e  c h a p te r  one oage 31)• V.e th u s  f ine  t h a t  it  was 
m ostly  chic to  th e  e n q u i r i e s  made by some cur.to lere  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  p r ic e s  
tnoy  lu x  to  pay f o r  so .e pro u c t s , t h a t  i n i  t i c  1 changes were i r t r o u c e o  to  the 
p r i c in g  system ; and t h a t  as  crude began to  i n c r e a s e  i t s  >ro p o r t io n  in  th e  
volume ox' o i l  movements 5 o th e r  p a r t i e s  became concerned  as  w e ll  about th e  
p r ic in g  system  u se e  by ...ajor s u p p l i e r s .
A. The Gulf o f  j^exico ^Basirig^ _?oint
U: t i l  1S43 o i l  co p a n ie s  fo llow ed  a  i r ic in g  system  which had th e  e f f e c t  
o f  e l im in a t in g  p r i c e  (* i f f  ere: cos among them se lves  a t  any d e s t i n a t i o n  w h ile  
avoid ing  p r i c e  co p e t i t i o n  as  f a r  a s  o c s x ib le .  (4 ) Under t h i s  system th e  
. e l iv ex e d  x i c e  f o r  any consumer1 was e x a c t ly  th e  same regv.x 1* s s  of v. e th e r
he mace mis p u rch a se s  s f r 0 n  a low c o s t '  o r  h igh  c o s t  - sourc‘e ,
o r  from a nearby  or d i s t a n t  supply  a r e a .  In  o th e r
( / )  F r a  k .  . Ic i . iu t ;  "Crud e Oil ? r i c e s  i n  th e  R id d le  JEaet A htud.y in  
Clig o o o l i s t i c  .Price Behavior" ? ra e £ e r  -  1 j j >s >age 5*
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words y th e  IhG .Ih  p r i c e  would va ry  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e  d o s t i r r  t i c n  of th e  o i l ; 
and th e  GhI.I'h o r d e l i  vex eel p r i c e  would always be e x a c t ly  th e  same in  any 
m arket 110 m a t t e r  where th e  o i l  o r ig in a teC  from*
To be a b le  to  a r r i v e  a l  any p a r t i c u l a r  m arket w ith  equr.l d e l iv e r e d  m ic e  
f o r  crude  o i l  o r p e tro leu m  p ro c u c ts  under t h i s  systems th e  c i f f e r e r . t  s u x o l i e r s  
observed th e  fo llow ing  p rocedures
Tig p r i c e  of o i l  F . 0„ B. th e  Gulf o f d ex ico  was tak e n  ?„s the  113e.se P r i c e " .  
The nex t s t e p  was t o  ad, to  th e  basr- p r ic e  a  s ta r  d a rd  f r e i g h t  c o s t  from th e  
base p o in t  to  each of t h e  v a r io u s  d e s t i n a t i o n s  * Thus we a r r i v e  a t  a  d e l iv e r e d  
p r i c e  which i s  th e  sc, -e : o m a t te r  where tho  s u p p l i e s  o r i g i : -c i te d  from.
As a b r i e f  p a r e n t h e s i s ;  i t  w i l l  be convex l e n t  a t  t h i s  p o in t  to  c o n s id e r  
what i s  known as "Phantom F r e ig h t"  and " F re ig h t  A b s o rp t io n ” to  enab le  us to  
co: t i r u o  w ith  th e  a n a ly s i s  of th e  3: sing P o in t  System,
Simply s t a t e d  we r..oy say t h a t  phantom f r e i g h t  i s  a f i c t i t i o u s  c o s t  
charged as  f r e i g h t , f o r  a c e r t a i n  muiber o f  m ile s  which have n o t  bee:., incurxeC 
in  the  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of pe tro leum  from th e  supp ly  a r e a  to  i t s  d e s t i n a t i o n ;  
F r e ig h t  a b s o r p t io n  s on th e  o th e r  hand s wrould  be th e  amount of f r e i g h t  c o s t  
which has  to  be r e g i s t e r e d  as  a c o s t  f o r  th e  supplying, company} because i t  
cou ld  n o t  be in c lu d e d  i n  th e  Chi did o r  de live r© '’ p r i c e .
I t  i s  t h i s  warn t h a t  s u p p l i e r s  who a re  lo c a te d  n e a r e r  to  the  m arket than 
th e  b a s in g  p o i n t ;  a r e  a b le  to  cnai\ge what wc have denom inated "phantom f r e i g h t "  
and tn.oso who a rc  f u r t h e r  away have to  abso rb  f r e i g h t ,  ( s e e  diagram  I I  -1 1 ) .
T r a d i t i o n a l l y  tho  Basing P o in t  lavs th e  Gulf o f Kexico and th e  base  m ic e  
was the  American IhC.?!. Gulf p r i c e ,  (p) This p r i c e  i s  o b ta ined  from a
( g ) Franlc, Helmut J .  > "Crude O il ? r i c e s  yr. th e  11C.d ie  E as t  -  a, ,Study y n  
Q l i g o p o l i s t i g  P r i c e  .Belicwior" P ra eg e r  -  IS s page 10.
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s p e c i a l i s e d  jo u r n a l  ( ? l a t t 1s Oilyram P r ic e  S e rv ic e )  t h a t  p u b l is h e s  o i l  p r i c e s  
d a i l y  f o r  i n t e r n a l  a s  w e l l  a s  e x te r n a l  bound m a rk e ts .  The j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of 
t h i s  Basing; P o in t  and Base P r i c e  ’was t h a t  th e  G ulf area, had to  supply  m arke ts  
a l l  around th e  w o r ld , and t h a t  th e  p r i c e  always had to  be s e t  a t  th e  l e v e l  of 
th e  m arg in a l  o r  h ig h e s t  c o s t  s u p p l ie s  r e q u i r e d  to  s a t i s f y  demand. (3) I t  seems 
c le a r  therm t h a t  a  s i n g l e  b a s in g  p o in t  system  was used  by th e  companies f o r  
s e v e ra l  decades presumably because " i t  g u a ran teed  th e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  g r e a t e r  
p r o f i t s  th a n  o th e r  p r i c i n g  methods could  have p rov ided"*  (? )
In o rd e r  t o  m a in ta in  th e  s i n g l e  basing; p o in t  sys tem , t h r e e  b a s ic  r u l e s  
had to  be r e s p e c te d  by a l l  s u p p l i e r s .  (8)
1., The r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  th e  Gulf of Mexico a s  th e  only Base P o i n t ,  and th e  
American F .O .B . q u o ta t io n ,  a p p e a r in g  i n  P l a t t ’ s Oilgram f o r  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
s p o t ,  a s  th e  .Base P r i c e .
2o T ie u se  o f  s ta :  ha rd  a d ju s tm en ts  f o r  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  q u a l i t y ,  
p . The common u se  o f  s ta n d a rd  ta n k e r  r a t e s .
Thus e v e r  s in c e  petro leum  became an item  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e ,  o i l  
p r i c e s  g e n e r a l ly  wore ca lcu la te d .  a s  i f  th e  o i l  had o r ig in a to r :  from the  Gulf 
o f Mexico, I n  o th e r  w o rd s , s u p p l i e r s  lo c a te d  a t  d i f f e r e n t  p o in ts  of th e  
g lobe  quoted  IhChJh p r ic e s  which tended  to  r e s u l t  i n  i d e n t i c a l  d e l iv e r e d  
p r i c e s  a t  any g iv en  p o i n t , r e g a r d l e s s  o f  th e  d i f f e r e n t  p ro d u c t io n  o r  t r a n s p o r t ­
a t i o n  c o s t s  a c t u a l l y  in c u r r e d .
C o n seq u en tly , sh ipm ents mole to  d e s t i n a t i o n s  to  which t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
c o s ts  from an e a s t e r n  supp ly  p o in t  were lower th a n  from th e  Gulf o f Mexico
(5) De CJiazeau, th  and Kahn , A ,; " I n t e (yra .tion  and Coniyyptitioir yrypfche 
PylrcleyiA J tn d u slig r’ , T a le  U n iv e rs i ty  P r e s s  1959* cage 213*
(7) Frank. Helmut J . ;  Op C i t ,  page 9*
(8) I b i d ,  page 10,
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had f r e i g h t  advan tage  or "phantom f r e i g h t " ,  and f o r  d e s t i n a t i o n s  to  which th e  
s u p p l i e r  p a id  more f r e i g h t  th an  th e  Gulf s u p p l i e r  he in c u r r e d  a  f r e i g h t  
d isa d v a n ta g e  or "absorbed"  f r e i g h t .
O il e x p o r ts  from V enezuela a d ju s te d  them se lves  i n i t i a l l y  q u i t e  w e ll  t o  
the  Basing P o in t  system , s in c e  th e  American e a s t  c o a s t  was (and i s )  V enezue la ’s 
p r i n c i p l e  m a rk e t ,  and tho d i s t a n c e  between th e s e  two p o in t s  i s  ap p ro x im ate ly  
th e  same as  t h a t  between th e  Gulf and th e  American e a s t e r n  seaboard  ( h ig h e s t  
consuming; a r e a  o f  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s ) .  However, w ith  th e  emergence of Venezuela 
a s  th e  p r i n c i p l e  sou rce  of e x p o r ts  cf th e  W estern  Hem isphere, c e r t a i n  m o d if ica ­
t i o n s  were made to  tho  system . ($ )
Of th e  few e x c e p tio n s  to  th e  Gulf P lu s  sys tem , ( i o )  one i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
shou ld  be mentiowed. I t  was th e  e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f  a  base p r i c e  F.O.B. 
C o n s ta n tsa  (Rumania.) art the  beginning cf. th e  1930’ s .  ( l l ) This 'was cue to  
th e  f a c t  t h a t  Rumania had ;.n e x p o r ta b le  s u rp lu s  o f  crude  which was no t 
c o n t r o l le d  by th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o i l  companies, bu t  by a  l a r g e  number cl l o c a l  
p ro d u c e rs .  In  s p i t e  of t h i s ,  i t  seems t h a t  R um ania 's  e x p o r ts  did no t a f f e c t  
th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m arket a rc  were n o t com ple te ly  in depend en t o f th e  Gulf p r ic e  
because of h e r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  v a r io u s  o i l  ag reem ents  w ith  th e  o i l  companies <> 
(12 )
J u s t  b e fo re  th e  Second World War, th e  Gulf P lu s  system  was th r e a te n d  
by th e  new d i s c o v e r i e s  c f  Middle E as te rn  o i l .  However, t h e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  
i n t e r e s t s  beh ind  th e  newly ( I s  covered f i e l d s  were .also tho  same ones t h a t  wore 
d e l i v e r i n g  W estern Hemisphere s u p p l ie s  to  E a s te rn  Hemisphere d e s t i n a t i o n s
(9 ) These w i l l  be ana lysed  i n  th e  fo l lo w in g  pages*
(104 The e x c e p tio n s  wore Rumania, G a l ic ia  and R u s s ia .
(11) Ucvy, V .J .  ; "The 'Pa s t^  P r e  s e n t  ju id  yikelAh^Putur^ J P r ic e  ^S truc t-u r  q _f o r  ^ tjic 
InternationcH^^Oil^Trade"", T h ird  Pe tro leum  C ongress , P ro c e e d in g s ,  d e c , A 
I 93I , page l i d .
T ip ) Ib id -  Daae l i d .
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a c te d  a s  a  b u f f e r  f o r  th e  p r i c e  s t r u c t u r e ,  m in im iz ing  th o  im pact i t  would o th e r ­
w ise  have receive-., from the  new d i s c o v e r i e s ,  ( 13 )
C o n se q u e n tly 5 p e tro leu m  co n tinu ed  to  he priced  u n t i l  th e  o u tb reak  of 
Worlr War I I  a s  i f  i t  came from th e  Gulf a r e a ,  w ith  a l l  p r i c e  c o m p e ti t io n  
e l im in a te d  i n  a lm ost every  market* (14 ) Thus buyers  i n  tho Middle E ast t h a t  
purcnas co_ c i t h e r  crude  a t  arm ’ s - l e n g th  o r  p r o d u c ts ,  p a id  f o r  th e  o i l  a s  i f  i t  
came from Venezuela o r the  U n ited  S t a t e s .  In  o th e r  w ords, i t  was t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
p o s s ib l e  to  buy H i£h lc  E as te rn  o i l  which quo ted  lo v e r  1 , 0 , T-, p r i c e s  Has Tanura 
i n  th e  U nited  S t a te s  o r i n  Europe, th an  i n  Kuva.it o r  Saudi A rab ia .
Following: th e  o u tb reck  of h o s t i l i t i e s  in  1939? m i l i t a r y  o p e ra t io n s  i n  tho 
M e d ite r ran e an  made th e  M ickle E as t  a very  s t r a t e g i c  r e g io n  because ox i t s  
l o c a t i o n  and p r o l i f i c  o i l  re sou rces , ,  The f a c t  however, t h a t  tho  p r i c e  cl 
M iddle E a s te rn  o i l  in c lu d ed  a  l a r g e  amount o f phantom f r e i g h t ,  le d  B r i t i s h  
a u t h o r i t i e s  to  q u e s t io n  th e  v a l i d i t y  of th e  "Gulf P lu s "  p ric in g , system  as
a p p l ie d  to  o i l  from t h i s  so u rc e .  In  t h e i r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  th e  B r i t i s h  become
most concerned w ith  th e  problem of phantom f r e i g h t  c h a r re d  f o r  bunker f u e l  f o r
p u rch a se s  mad-0 a t  p o r t s  i n  th e  In d ia n  Ocean arid th e  M iddle E a s t .  T ie  r e s u l t
o f t h i s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  was th e  quo ting  of a F ,C ,B , p r i c e  f o r  bunker f u e l  a t  th e  
P e r s i a n  Gulf which- was to  bring; about l a t e r  on, i n  1945, th e  e s t a b l i s h i e r t  of an 
a u th e n t i c  now basing  p o in t  f o r  crude o i l  and. p r o d u c ts ,  ( 15 )
5*,-, . - S k  H ,!;■ uihhh Pyphgt
V enezuela  emerged an a  " tw in  basing point"* to  th e  Gulf a  Mexico b e fo re
( ip )  Frank e l , P J h  ; "A ncrican ^Oil I n  a  CIviHLiyu.AoRlcV1 * ~ ie C il  Forum >lTovomber 
1550, page 445 «.
( 14 ) F ra n k , Helmut; Op^Cit, page 9*
( lp )  F r a n k e l , PHI, ? "American O il i n  a Chcpig.ing; World"^ T ie  O il Forum, Uovofbber. 
1950 , page 4 4 $ *
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V orld  Mar XI, a p p ro x im ate ly  around 1938* as she became th e  m ajor source  o f  
e x p o r t s .  ( l 6 )  P r i c e s  in  the  C aribbean  were l in k e d  t o  those  of th e  G ulf of 
Mexico, bu t  were low er th a n  th e s e  by the  amount of American im port ta x  which 
p e rm i t te d  V enezuelan  crudes t o  be d e l iv e r e d  to  th e  e a s t e r n  c o a s t  of th e  U n ited  
S t a te s  a t  p r i c e s  comparable to  th o se  of American s u p p l i e s .  However, s in ce  
Venezuelan p ro d u c e rs  g ra n te d  t h i s  same du ty  a llow ance  t o  a r m 's - l e n g th  buyers  i n  
o th e r  a r e a s ,  th e  p r i c e  o f  Venezuelan crude became low er th a n  th e  p r i c e  of 
American o i l  by t h i s  same amount. (17) F u rth e rm o re , th e  d e l iv e r e d  c o s t  of 
V enezuelan o i l  became even ".lore fa v o u ra b le  f o r  p ro d u ce rs  t h a t  d e l iv e r e d  s u p p l ie s  
to  W estern  Europe due to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  shipm ents from the  C aribbean  en joyed  a 
t r a n s p o r t  advan tage  over th o se  from th e  G ulf  o f  Mexico of ap p ro x im ate ly  f i f t e e n  
c en ts  a b a r r e l .  ( l8 )
As m entioned above, Venezuela s t a r t e d  to  f u l f i l  i t s  r o l e  of " tw in  basing  
p o in t"  w ith  th e  a r e a  of the  G ulf  o f  vrex ico  a p p ro x im a te ly  in  1938, when su p p l ie s  
from the  W estern  Hemisphere began to  be p red o m in an tly  from t h i s  source  (se e  
t a b l e  I  -  7 )* However, as wo s h a l l  see i n  fo l lo w in g  p a g es ,  th e  lower p r i c e s  
a t  which V enezuelan o i l  could  be p la c e d  in  th e  European m arket i n  r e l a t i o n  to  
s u p p l ie s  from th e  G ulf  o f  Mexico (due p a r t l y  to  th e  f r e i g h t  advantage  m en tioned), 
and th e  in c r e a s in g  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of Venezuelan crude i n  th e  e x p o r ts  of the  "’•■'est­
e rn  Hem isphere, l a t e r  l e d  to  some q u e s t io n in g  about th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  the  Gulf 
of Mexico as th e  p o in t  o f r e f e r e n c e  i n  the  fo rm ula  used  to  p r i c e  Middle E a s te rn  
c rud e . As a r e s u l t ,  Venezuela became i n  1948 the  e x c lu s iv e  b a s in g  p o in t  of th e  
W estern  Hemisphere as th e  U n ited  S t a te s  became a n e t  im p o r te r .
Frank, Helmutra t; Op C i t , page 31*
(17) r b id .
(18) I b i d .
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C. The P e r s i an G-ulf  Baai ng P o in t
As m entioned b e f o r e , "G-ulf P lus"  came to  an end as  th e  e x c lu s iv e  p r i c in g  
system f o r  th e  i n d u s t r y  i n  1945> when th e  P e r s ia n  G-ulf was a b le  to  e s t a b l i s h  
i t s  own P o0nBo q u o ta t io n s  f o r  a l l  r e f i n e d  p ro d u c ts  and crude o i l .  A lthough 
vie r e a l l y  can no t c o n s id e r  th e  P e r s ia n  G-ulf as a b a s in g  p o in t  u n t i l  t h i s  
p e r io d ,  i t  was du rin g  the  war t h a t  the  f i r s t  changes were b rough t about w ith  
th e  q u o ta t io n s  made f o r  bunker f u e l  o i l .  T his was a c o n s id e ra b le  change in  
the  p r i c i n g  p o l i c y  of th e  companies, b u t  i t  was the  r e s u l t  of a f o r c e  e x t e r n a l  
t o  th e  in d u s try *  I t  was due to  the  i n s i s t e n c e  of th e  B r i t i s h  G-overnment t h a t  
th e  Middle E a s te rn  Companies r e c e iv e  a low er n e t  back s a l e s  w ith  th e  e l im in a t io n  
of phantom f r e i g h t  when th e  new q u o ta t io n s  were made in  th e  P e r s ia n  G-ulf.
The U.So G-ulf P lu s  system  was q u i te  fa v o u ra b le  f o r  th e  i n d u s t r y  bu t " th e  
B r i t i s h  A u d i to r  s tep p ed  in  and from 1943 or 1944 onwards th e  accep ted  
p ro cedu re  vias to  c o n s id e r  th e  P.O.Bo P e r s i a n  G-ulf p r i c e  as  be ing  th e  P l a t t ' s  
q u o t a t i o n . . .  (19) The B r i t i s h  were ve ry  concerned w ith  th e  phantom f r e i g h t  
which th e y  had to  pay f o r  t h e i r  pu rch ases  of bunker f u e l  a t  th e  P e r s ia n  G-ulf, 
and r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  c o n s id e ra b le  s a le s  were made b e fo re  the  war from t h i s  
supply  a re a  to  th e  U n ited  Kingdom and N orth  W estern Europe in  which because  
of f r e i g h t  a b s o rp t io n  th e  n e t  back to  the  P e r s i a n  G-ulf was lo w er,  th e y  began to  
i n v e s t i g a t e  the  p r i c e s  which th e y  had to  pay f o r  t h e i r  o i l .  (20) Since t h i s  
amount o f f r e i g h t  a b s o rp t io n  "was a l l  b u t  e l im in a te d  d u r in g  the  l a t e  war i t  i s  
no t s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  i t  was th e n  t h a t  the  ( B r i t i s h )  a u t h o r i t i e s  began 
to  query  th e  p r o p r i e t y  o f  the  p r i c e  s t r u c t u r e " .  (2 l )  "We could  
no lo n g e r  a c c e p t  t h i s  o r i g in  d i f f e r e n t i a l  a u to m a t ic a l ly  as a p ro p e r
T l9) E ra n k e i ,  P.H. ; "Arneriacn O il  i n  a Changing W orld" , The O il Forum,
November 1950, page 447*
(2°) I b i d .
( 21) I b id \
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elem ent i n  bunker p r i c e s  i n  o v e rseas  p o r t s * . . 11 were th e  words of th e  Aud i t  o r  
G en era l,  (22)
The ad v en t of th e  now b.:sing  p o in t  b rought v e ry  b in  eco: omies f o r  
consumers i n  th e  E a s te rn  Hemisphere a s  i t  e l i ^ i m t c s  r. c o n s id e ra b le  o ro o o r t io :  
o f phantom f r e i g h t  p re v io u s ly  in c lu d ed  in  th e  C .I.J? . o r i c e  and can be r e g : rd sd  
as  a  s te p  tow ards a  more ad.equnte p r i c e  s tru c tx iro  takiiw th e  H icd lo  E as t  i n t o  
c o n s i d e i , t i o n  as an im p o r ta n t  supply  a re a .  However, th e  f a c t  t h a t  p r i c e s  f o r  
t h i s  a re a  wore e q u iv a le n t  to  th e  q u o ta t io n s  o f  th e  f e e  tear- Hem isphere; le d  once 
more to  a  s e r i e s  of c r i t i c i s m s ,  t h i s  t i n e  from th e  American Government. Th:; 
Ai-ericnn p o in t  o f  view was exp ressed  th rough  a  C one r e s  s i  ona l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
d u r in g  1947-1548 known as th e  B rew ster Hearing's and. R ep o rts  rand became an 
i n t e r e s t e d  p a r ty  i n  tho  m a t te r  because  of th e  p u rch ases  of pe tro leum  cade by 
th e  Hi i t e d  Strikes Fr.vy from t h i s  so u rc e .  The A io r i e u :  Govern c n t  did n o t  
h e s i t a t e  to  show i t s  r e lu c ta n c e  to  a c c e n t  a, o r i c e  which only  r e f l o  ted th e  
h ig h e r  c o s t  o i l  from th e  h a s t e r n  F c .: isp h e re  r:.C had no r e l a t i o n  to  c o s t s  in  
th e  H ic c le  E a s t ,  ( 23 )
Ho\,over, th e  o l i g o p o l i s t i c  c h a r a c te r  ox th e  im rket in  which " th e  o i l  
was u n o b ta in a b le  e lsew here"  end th e  f a c t  th; t  th e  B r i t i s h  Government had 
a c c en ted  th e  ‘P e rs ian  G-ulf p r i c e  e q u iv a le n t  to  th e  American q u o ta t io n s  a t  th e  
Gulf of M exico, seems to  have made t h i s  p r i c e  q u i t e  r i g i d ,  amid th e  Favy could  
n o t  o b ta in  amiy c o n c e ss io n .  A ccording to  th e  s p e c i a l i z e d  p r e s s ,  th e  B r i t i s h  
had a cc ep ted  th e  F e s to r n  Hemisphere p r i c e  because "o f  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  of
(22) The P e tro leum  Times} May 15? 1944? pope 293.
(2p) In fo rm a t io n  ob tainec  from} "Thq Jirtuiucfbiopial 5 U.S.
Sons/bo, S e le c t  C o w li t to e  on Small B u s in e s s , S t a f f  R eport to  tho  
Eo>.eral Trade Commission, August 22, 1952, page 357 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e fe r ; .e d  
to  as  "F.ToCc R e p o r t" ) .
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a r r i v i n g  a t  p ro d u c t io n  c o s t s  and. i n  th e  knowledge t h a t  Ih 0,. II p r i c e s  i n  th e  
Gulf o f Mexico were c o n t r o l le d  by th e  U nited  St.. t o s  Government a t  l e v e l s  
giving; a. f a i r  r e t u r n .  . *". ( 24)
I,To inch t e r  how c ont r  o v e rs  i  a l  t h i s  a sp e c t  may b e ,  one th in g  rem ains unde- 
b a t  a b le  .and t h i s  i s  tbu.t i t  was duo to  th e  i n q u i r i e s  and th e  i n s i s t e n c e  of th e  
B r i t i s h  Government t h a t  t h i s  major change i n  o i l  p r i c i n g  was brought to  pass* 
Tho now b a s in g  p o in t  was u g r e a t  advan tage  f o r  th e  consumers w i th in  t h e  sphere  
of th e  P e r s i a n  Gulf s i n c e ,  as  a l r e a d y  m entioned, i t  took i n to  c o n s id e r a t io n  th e  
Madelc E ast a s  an im p o r ta n t  s u m l y  u re a .
The e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f a. b a s in g  p o in t  i n  th e  Persian . Gulf w ith  a  s e t  of 
EcChBo p r i c e s  e q u iv a le n t  to  tho  American q u o ta t io n s  gave way to  a  now 
th q o re t ic p g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  by which s u p p l ie s  from th e  M iddle E as t would moot 
th o se  from th e  Y/ostorn Hemisphere i n  th e  M editerranean. o,s f a r  west as I tc h y  
w ith  an i d e n t i c a l  d e liv e re d  cost* I n  o th e r  words I t a l y  became th e  l i m i t  whore 
d e l iv e r e d  c o s t s  became equal f o r  bo th  ex p o rt i .  g a r e a s ,  and. which i f  su rp a ssed  
would g iv e  r i s e  to  f r e i g h t  ab so rp tio n *  The FoO.B* p r i c e  ah both  a r e a s  f o r  
crude o i l  t h a t  p e rm i t te d  such an enco un ter  was ci /  1*05 a b a r r e l  and w ith  t h i s  
q u o ta t io n  th e  now basing  p o in t  become e s tab l ish ed ;  a t  th e  end o f  1945* ( 25 )
I t  i s  im p o rtan t  t o  r e a l i z e ,  however, tbu.t a p a r t  from -./hat th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
im p l i c a t io n s  might have been, most o f th e  crude o i l  t h . t  was moved from source  
to  'market wow; done th ro u g h  i n t e g r a t e '  c h a n n e ls ,  end sin* e th e  suoo ly  from th e  
Midi l c  E as t  was of low er c o s t ,  i t  'produced a h ig h e r  i n t e g r a t e d  r e tu r n  f o r  tho 
companies th a n  i f  th e  s h i  iments were made from o th e r  h i ;  h e r  c o s t  sources*
"T ie  companies sup i l i o d  each market th roughou t th e  world from th e  so u rce  t h a t
( 24) The q tro le i^q  ^ Times , May l y ,  1944 ? page 29G*
( 25) F ran k , Helmuts O q j l i t ,  page 27•
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gave them tho  b e s t  n e t  r e t u r n " * (25) Thus tho  westward movement cf pe tro leum  
was a m a t te r  o f  gooc economies f o r  th e  o i l  companies cvon in  th e  case  of 
" f r e i g h t  a b s o r p t io n " .
( 2 3  j  H a r ts h o rn ,  J , ?  Op Abb 5 (1967) > page 144*
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I I  The R e la t iv e ^ jg a l l  of Middle E a s te rn  E , 0 ,B . Pr i c es
The decade which fo l lo w ed  th e  war was c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by the  economic
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  of c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  were a f f e c t e d ,  and was a p e r io d  i n  which many
a re a s  th ro u g h o u t  th e  w orld  went th rough  c o n s id e ra b le  economic developm ent.
These were y e a r s  o f g r e a t  in d . - s t r a a l  expansion  in  which th e  pe tro leum  in d u s t r y
u n avo id ab ly  p lay e d  a m ajor r o l e .  Tilth o i l  p r i c e s  go ing  up i n  the  U n ited
S t a t e s ,  the  f i d d l e  E a s te rn  q u o ta t io n s  were a l s o  in f lu e n c e d  in  the  same d i r e c t i o n ,
By 1948, and a f t e r  v a r io u s  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  b o th  the  G-ulf of L'exico and
P e r s i a n  Gulf a r e a s ,  th e  d e l iv e r e d  p r i c e  was e q u a l iz e d  i n  the  United Kingdom
and th u s  a westward wove went of the  f r o n t i e r  or "market range" from Ital}?" to
U rea t B r i t a i n  became e v id e n t .  The e q u a l i z a t io n  of th e  d e l iv e r e d  p r i c e  of
crude o i l  In  th e  U n ited  Kingdom r e s u l t e d  i n  a $  2 .22  F.O .B . Abadan p r i c e  by
March 1948. ( 27) T h is  q u o ta t io n  was reached  w ith  what has been known as the
"n e t  back  formula"; adding  to  the American p r i c e  F .0 ,B o G-ulf of " e x ic o  th e
f r e i g h t  c o s t  from t h i s  ,?oint to  the  U n ited  Kingdom; and th e n  s u b t r a c t in g  the
f r e i g h t  from t h i s  l a t t e r  p o in t  to  Abadan, (28)
G-iving t h i s  phononenon some c lo s e r  a t t e n t i o n  we w i l l  n o t ic e  t h a t  th e
s h i f t i n g  of th e  market range towards the  w est would have :mea,nt a r e l a t i v e
re d u c t io n  in  the  Middle E a s te rn  p r i c e .  There be ing  no a b s o lu te  r e d u c t io n
can be e x p la in e d  by th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  movement of the  m arket range  was th e
e f f e c t  of a l e s s e r  p r i c e  in c r e a s e  f o r  : id d le  E a s te rn  o i l  th a n  f o r  the  s u p p l ie s  
the
o f / b e s t e r n  hem isphere . I n s te a d  of r a i s i n g  i t s  p r i c e  a f u l l  j$/ l*40  p e r  b a r r e l  
a s  in  th e  G-ulf o f  : e x ic o ,  th e  P .O .B, Abadan p r i c e  ro se  $  1 .1 7  by March 1948, 
when i t  rea ch e d  i t s  h ig h e s t  mark and t h e r e a f t e r  began a s e r i e s  of r e d u c t io n s .
(27) F ran k , Helmut; Op^  Cji.t, page 38.
(28) F ran k , Helmut; Op C i t ,  page 32.
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N o\t th e  core  of th e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  tw ofo ld . I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  why d id
th e  Middle E a s te rn  q u o ta t io n  b e g in  t o  r i s e  w ith  th e  American p r i c e ?  And second,
why d id  i t  b e g in  to  f a l l  a f t e r  March 1948?
Having a t  t h a t  time a l a r g e  c o n t ro l  over o i l  r e s o u r c e s ,  th e  m ajor o i l
companies sim ply d id  n o t  have any re a so n  v/I" :- tsoever t o  make any d i r e c t  r e d u c t io n
the
or ad ju s tm en t on th e  p r i c e  of i t s  o i l  from th e  r i d d l e  E a s t ,  s i n c e / l i n k  to  the  
American p r i c e  made th e  whole system q u i te  p r o f i t a b l e .  A low er p r i c e  f o r  
Middle E a s te r n  crude would have on ly  meant to  o f f e r  th e  raw m a te r ia l  to  indepen­
den t r e f i n e r s  which v/ould e v e n tu a l ly  compete w ith  them i n  the  m arke t. Even f o r  
the  few indepen den ts  " th e r e  w a s . . .  no p a r t i c u l a r  i n c e n t iv e  to  underquote  such 
laiddown American p r i c e s  i f  th e  q u a n t i t i e s . . .  could be marketed a t  th e  American 
p a r i t y '1. (29) F u r th e rm o re , th e  f a c t  t h a t  most of th e  o i l  moved through  
i n t e g r a t e d  channels  and t h a t  th e re  was ve ry  l i t t l e  o i l  i n  the  hands o f  independ­
e n ts  e l im in a te d  any c o m p e ti t iv e  p re s s u r e  on th e  o i l  p r i c e .  "The emergence of 
non-American o i l  as a m arket f a c t o r  was a g ra d u a l  one", so f o r  th e  independen ts  
i t  must have a ls o  been p r o f i t a b l e  to  quote the  M a jo r 's  p r i c e .  (3'?)
However co n v en ien t  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  must have been f o r  th e  o i l  companies, 
we n o t ic e  t h a t  th e  E a s te rn  p r i c e  fo llow ed  the  American q u o ta t io n  on ly  u n t i l  
March 1948, and soon a f t e r  i t  began to  f a l l  c r e a t in g  a growing margin between 
the  two. There a re  some o p in io n s  on t  i s  m a t te r  which we t u r n  to  an a ly se  below.
I n  the  f i r s t  p la c e  th e ro  : s  a p o in t  of view from th e  a u th o rs  of th e  "P.T.C. 
R eport ■ which does no t g ive  much im portance to  t  e e s ta b l is h m e n t  of a lower 
p r i c e  (w ith  r e s o e c t  to  th e  American q u o ta t io n )  i n  th e  P e r s i a n  G-ulf a l l e g in g  
t h a t  " the  P e r s i a n  G-ulf P.O.B. p r i c e  d id  not a c t u a l l y  r e s u l t  i n  a p r i c e  r e d u c t io n
(29) Pranked , P.M. ; "imierican O il  i n  a Changing 'fo rld"  , The O il Forum,
November 1950, page 4^:6.
(30) I b i d .
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. . .b ecause  i t s  e f f e c t  was more th a n  o f f s e t  by th e  r i s i n g  l e v e l  of U n ited  S ta te s
t h a t
G-ulf p r i c e s ,  t o  which th e  P e r s ia n  G-ulf p r i c e  was l i n k e d ” . (31) They s t a t e / t h e  
e q u a l i z a t i o n  of th e  d e l iv e r e d  p r i c e  a t  G reat B r i t a i n  in  1948 r e p r e s e n te d  only 
a " t h e o r e t i c a l  downward a d ju s tm e n t” (32) and t h a t  i t  a c t u a l l y  r a i s e d  th e  Middle 
E a s te rn  p r i c e  to  a h ig h e r  l e v e l  th a n  b e fo r e .  I n  r e a l i t y  th ey  a re  r i g h t ,  b u t  
i t  seems t h a t  t h e i r  e x p o s i t io n  la c k s  ( v o l u n t a r i l y  o r  i n v o lu n t a r i l y )  the  rec o g ­
n i t i o n  of th e  s ig n i f i c a n c e  which such a breakdown of p r i c e  u n i ty  had . The 
e q u a l i z a t i o n  p o in t  i n  th e  U n ited  Kingdom in  t h e i r  o p in io n  was due to  " th e  need 
f o r  f in d in g  W estern  European and U n ited  S ta te s  m arke ts  f o r  Middle E a s t  c r u d e . . . . "  
and in  o rd er  n o t  to  be " faced  w ith  the  p ro sp e c t  o f hav ing  to  absorb  f r e i g h t  and 
ta k e  a low er n e t  p r i c e  . . . ” .(3 3 )  To say only t h i s ,  i s  n o t  to  have been f u l l y
aware of th e  a l r e a d y  s t a t e d  f a c t  t h a t  most o f  th e  crude t r a v e l l e d  th rough  
i n t e g r a t e d  chan ne ls  and t h a t  i f  companies were d e l i v e r i n g  o i l  to  W estern  Europe 
and to  American m arke ts  i t  was because  th ey  were a c t u a l l y  supp ly ing  t h e i r  
a f f i l i a t e s  o r p a r e n t  companies w ith  a lower c o s t  c rude  i n  s p i t e  o f t h e i r  
" f r e i g h t  a b s o r p t io n ” .
P r o f e s s o r  ‘Wayne Leeman, on the  o th e r  hand, does re c o g n iz e  th e  s ig n i f ic a n c e  
of t h i s  "degree  of independence" from th e  WesterK Hemisphere p r i c e  bu t w h ile  
doing so he a t t r i b u t e s  th e  low er q u o ta t io n  to  a c o m p e ti t iv e  s i t u a t i o n  in  which 
th e re  I s  "a s t r u g g le  f o r  custom ers in  the  v i c i n i t y  o f th e  w a t e r s h e d . . . ” . (34)
He s t a t e s  t h a t  ihhe d e c l in e  of r i d d l e  E a s te rn  p r i c e s  r e l a t i v e  to  those  i n  th e  
U nited  S t a te s  i s  an " e s s e n t i a l l y  c o m p e ti t iv e  developm ent” . (35)
(31) E .T.C . R e p o r t , page 382
(32) jbdcU
(33) E . T. C. Re p o r t , page 381.
(34) Leeman, W .; "The P r ic e  of M iddle_Ea s t  O i l ” , I t h a c a ,  N.Y. 1982, page 98.
(35)  I b i d . '  '
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According to  P r o fe s s o r  Adelman, a f t e r  K iddle  E a s te rn  p rodu ce rs  ex tended  
t h e i r  ( t h e o r e t i c a l )  :na.rket range  as f a r  ‘.vest as th e  U n ited  Kingdom, th ey  would 
have p r e f e r r e d  to  m a in ta in  t h i s  F.O.B, p r i c e  in s t e a d  of reduc ing  i t  and re a ch in g  
out f a r t h e r  west s in c e  t h i s  would have in c re a s e d  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  in  th e  European 
m arke t.  ( 38) T his may he so i n  the  case  of p r o d u c ts ,  b u t  i n  th e  case of crude 
t h i s  could  n o t  have made much d i f f e r e n c e  s in c e  as m entioned b e fo r e ,  crude o i l  
v/as g e n e r a l l y  su p p l ie d  to  i n t e g r a t e d  r e f i n e r s , and th e r e f o r e  a lower o r h ig h e r  
" t r a n s f e r  p r i c e "  f o r  crude would h a rd ly  a f f e c t  th e  t o t a l  i n t e g r a t e d  p r o f i t  of 
the  company, 7e th u s  see t h a t  w hile  the  p r i c e  f o r  K idd le  E a s te rn  crude began 
to  f a l l  i n  1946 the  l i s t  p r i c e s  f o r  p ro d u c ts  i n  Europe d id  rem ain ap p ro x im ate ly  
i n  l i n e  w i th  Caribbean p a r i t y  u n t i l  about th e  m i d - f i f t i e s ,  and even d is c o u n ts  
o f f  l i s t  p r i c e s  were h a rd ly  g ra n te d .  (37) P r o f e s s o r  Adelman however, does 
c o n s id e r  t h a t  "companies (were) r e s o lv e d  no t to  cu t  the  p r i c e  (presum ably  of 
crude) u n t i l  somebody fo rc e d  them t o " .  (38)
T his i s  the  e x p la n a t io n  t h a t  does seem most l i k e l y .  I t  seems q u i te  
f e a s i b l e  t h a t  th e  westward movement of the  "w atershed" o r  "market range" 
could  have been  due to  an e x t e r n a l  f o r c e ,  the  U n ited  S ta te s  Government.
Quoting Dr. P au l  Frank©1 " i t  was th e  adven t of an e x t r a - i n d u s t r y  a u t h o r i t y  
which once more b rou gh t about a change; t h i s  tim e th e  im pulse came from 
W ashington from the  agency formed to  a d m in is te r  the  M a rsh a ll  P la n " .  (39)
I t  seems to o  much of a co in c idence  t h a t  when no t  long  a f t e r  the  "European 
C o -o p e ra t io n  A d m in is tra t io n "  (E .G .A .) began to  o p e ra te  in  A p r i l  1948, th e  
major o i l  companies began to  lower t h e i r  p r i c e s  f o r  Middle E a s te rn  c ru d e .
(36) Adelman, EKA. ; " ih e  JTorld Oi l  Outlook" i n  "N a tu ra l  R esources and I n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  Development" .Edited by Marion Clawson, page 81,
(37) K art sh o rn ,  J . ; Oja J 3 i t  (19 87) , png e 151.
(38) Adelman, Op C i t , page 8 5 .
(39) F ra n k e l ,  P.H. ; "Ayier i can Oi l  i n  a jChang ing  Morld " , The O il  Forum,
November 1950, page *447*
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I t  was j u s t  a month befo re  the  EoC.A* programme was I n i t i a t e d  t h a t  the  Majors 
had reached  the  $ / 2 .22  I.O..B. Abadan p r i c e  ( March) > and only  two months l a t e r  
(June) when th e y  a l l  began to  d e c l in e .  I t  i s  a l s o  q u i te  p o s s ib l e  t h a t  the  
Middle E a s te r n  p r i c e  d id  n o t fo l lo w  the American q u o ta t io n  a l l  the  way because 
" the  companies inv o lv ed  a c te d  in  i n t e l l i g e n t  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of p o s s ib le  Government 
p re s s u re  and behaved ,fas  i f  th e r e  was orthodox c o m p e t i t io n " .  (AO) Since by 
t h i s  time most o f  the  crude from 'Je s t e r n  Hemisphere so u rces  o r ig in a te d  from 
V enezuela , e„nd Venezuelan crude had a t r a n s p o r t  advantage  over th e  o i l  from the  
G ulf of Mexico w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e  European m arket of a p p ro x im a te ly  15 cen ts  
a b a r r e l ,  and fu r th e rm o re  had a low er p r i c e  by 10 .5  c e n ts  c o n s id e r in g  \h e  
ad ju s tm en t f o r  th e  nm erican  im port t a x ,  the  d e l iv e r e d  p r i c e  o f Venezuelan 
crude in  n o r th -w e s te r n  Europe was ap p ro x im ate ly  25 c e n ts  a b a r r e l  below t h a t  
of s u p p l ie s  from th e  G ulf of Mexico, and co n seq u en tly  i t  was a l s o  below 
the  d e l iv e r e d  p r i c e  o f Middle E a s te rn  crude a t  W estern  European m arkets by t h a t  
same amount* "Such a s i t u a t i o n "  as Helmut f r a n k  s a y s ,  “could  no t be 
expec ted  to  c o n tin u e  f o r  very  .long under the  w a tc h fu l  eye of Government 
o f f i c i a l s " .  (Al)
Thus th e  downward movement of the  k id d le  E a s te rn  p r i c e  began. By mid- 
June 19A8 a 19 c e n ts  r e d u c t io n  took p la c e  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a $ . - 2 ,0 3 p r i c e  f o r  
f i d d l e  E a s te r n  crude ta k in g  i n t o  c o n s id e r a t io n  the  low er Venezuelan p r i c e  and 
th e  lower f r e i g h t  c o s t  from t h i s  c o u n try  to  th e  U n ited  Kingdom, and a l s o  th e  
change of lo a d in g  p o r t s  from Abadan to  Rus Tanura and a q u a l i t y  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
between V enezuelan and A rab ian  crudes* (A2) I t  i s  a t  t h i s  moment when 
Venezuela becomes th e  e x c lu s iv e  b as ing  p o in t  of the  W estern  Hemisphere.
(AO) F ranked , P .H . ; Op G i t , page AA8.
( i l l)  F ra n k , H . ; Op C i t , page 33.
(A2) I b i d , page 32.
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Due to  th e  expanding p ro d u c t io n  of the  Middle E ast*  which was e s s e n t i a l  
i n  o rd e r  to  tak e  f u l l  advantage of i t s  lower co s ts*  ’'c u r t a i lm e n t” was a p p l ie d  
to  th e  h ig h e r  c o s t  p ro d u c t io n  o f  o th e r  c o u n t r i e s .  (43) ” The n e t  c o s t  of t h i s
(Middle E as te rn )  o i l . . .  was p o t e n t i a l l y  very low p ro v id in g  o u tpu t cou ld  be 
s tepped  up” . (44) ”ri t h  about one m i l l io n  b a r r e l s  o f  p ro d u c t io n  sh u t  i n ,  the 
U n ited  S ta te s  im ported  during  th e  l a s t  few months o f  194S and the  beg inn in g  
o f 1949 a p p ro x im a te ly  4 m i l l io n  b a r r e l s  o f  crude o i l  p e r  on th . (45) However, 
the  f a c t  t h a t  can be co n s id e red  most re v e a l in g  of th e  c o s t - p r i c e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
of th e  o i l  i n d u s t r y  i n  th e  middle E as t  i s  t h a t  th e s e  shipm ents were made a t  
low er r e a l i z e d  p r i c e s  th an  the  ones made to  Europe, ’’The majors d e l iv e r e d  the  
Middle E as t  o i l  as  f a r  as  i t  p a id  then  w e ll  beyond th e  w a te r s h e d . . . absorb ing  
f r e i g h t  on a s i g n i f i c a n t  s c a l e ,  ( d e l iv e r in g )  f a r t h e r  west th an  t h e i r  F id d le  
E as t  q u o ta t io n s  p lu s  f r e i g h t s  would in  th eo ry  have p e r m i t t e d ” . (46)
The lower p r i c e  of th e s e  shipm ents to  the  American m arket le d  to  a s e r i e s  
of p u b l ic  d e b a te s  among a l l  p a r t i e s  concerned and b r o u g h t , th e  whole p e tro leu m  
s i t u a t i o n  out in to  th e  open. The American G-overnment became d i r e c t l y  
in v o lv ed  in  the  m a t t e r  due to  the f i n a n c i a l  a id  g iv e n  to  Europe under the  
M arsh a ll  Plan* The g e o g ra p h ic a l  p r i c e  d i s c r im in a t io n  shown by the  o i l  
companies was f o r t h i s  re a so n  a s e r io u s  m a t te r  to  which the  ’’European C o -o p e ra t io n  
A d m in in i s t r a t io n ” was showing i t s  d is a p p ro v a l  and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n .  However, 
i t  must have been v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  th e  E.C.A, to  h an d le  th e  s i t u a t i o n  due 
to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  "on ly  few of t h e s a l e s  were arm’ s - l e n g th  t r a n s a c t i o n s  and most 
of them were t r a n s a c t i o n s  between a s s o c ia t e d  companies"* (47) Over 94f-' of
(43) °.0°, R e p o r t” , page 364»
(44) H a r tsh o rn ,  J .  ; 0p_ Ci t  (196?), page 147.
(45) Repo r t ” page 364 .
( 46) H a r tsh o rn ,  J , ; Op C i t , page 148.
(47) E ra n k e l ,  P .K * ; "American O il  in  a Changing TJorld” , The O il  Forum* November 
1950, page 448*
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the  o i l  sh ipm ents f in a n c e d  by "iI»C0 . i n  194H -  1949 'Te re  made by the Majors 
and most of them were shipm ents to  t h e i r  own a f f i l i a t e s . (48)
Since E u ro p e 's  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  r. h ig h  p ro p o r t io n  of f u e l  
e x p e n d i tu re ,  t h i s  agency was deep ly  concerned th  t  the  p r i c e s  charged  were 
to  be a s  low as th e  m arket would p e rm it  and t h a t  th e  " a id  d o l l a r s "  sp e n t  on 
t h i s  l i n e  were no more th an  r e q u i r e d .  Under the  E 0C0A, a p p ro p r ia t io n s  ac t"  
no p u rch ases  of commodities i n  b u lk  may be made w i th  the  funds a p p ro p r ia te d ,  
a t  p r i c e s  h ig h e r  th an  the  market p r i c e  p r e v a i l i n g  i n  th e  U nited  S t a t e s  a t  th e  
tim e of th e  p u rc h a se ,  a d ju s te d  f o r  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  c o s t  of t r a n s p o r t ,  t i o n  to  
d e s t i n a t i o n ,  q u a l i t y ,  and term s of payment". (49) S ince  p r ic e  e q u a l i s a t i o n  
i n  the  U n ited  Kingdom had been based  upon the  th e o ry  t h a t  the  supply  of 
Middle E a s te rn  o i l  was i n s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  European needs and th e r e f o r e  im ports  
of W estern  Hemisphere crude were n e e d e d ,(50) i t  must h; ve c r e a te d  a v e ry  
em barrass ing  s i t u a t i o n  f o r  th e  o i l  companies 'when o i l  bef.m  to  move i n  
s u b s t a n t i a l  volume to  th e  e a s t e r n  co. s t  of tne U n ited  S t a t e s .  The M ajors, 
t r y in g  to  give re a so n  f o r  t h i s  ->wk*ard s i t u a t i o n ,  a l l e g e d  th, t  th e se  
sh ipm ents were only  " t r a n s i t o r y "  and of " sp o ra d ic  c h a r  c t o r " . ( h i)
However, i t  seems e v id e n t  t h a t  "supu ly  p r e s s u r e s " , ( ^ 2) and the  concern  
of th e  American G-overnment f o r  a "market p r i c e " ,  induced  th e  o i l  companies
to  make f u r t h e r  r e d u c t io n s  on th e  p r i c e  of Middle E a s te r n  o i l .
(48) "P.T .C . Report^  page 365
(49) O i l  and Gas J o u rn a l ,  a u g u s t  12, 1948, page 57
(50) F rank , H . ; O p .C i t . page 42
(51) Quoted by "F ,T oC0 R e p o r t" ,  page 366
(52) F rank  H . ; O p .C i t . page 45
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I t  a l s o  seems p ro b ab le  t h a t  i n  o rd e r  to  improve the  -.ncais try 1 s '‘p u b l ic  
r e l a t i o n s ” ( 53 ) th e  companies had no o th e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  b u t  to  e l im in a te  
th e  d i s c r im in  t o r y  s i t u a t i o n  of t„ o  d i f f e r e n t  r e a l i s e d  p r ic e s  t h . t  a c t u a l l y  
p e r s i s t e d  f o r  Middle E a s te r n  o i l  - dt'> the s b iu u rn t s  to  the  U nited  S t a t e s .
I n  c o n c lu s io n ,  by J u ly  1949 the  P.O.B, P e r s ia n  G-ulf p r i c e  had been  reduced  
to  0 1 , 7 5  which e q u a l iz e d  the  d e l iv e r e d  p r i c e  o f K iddle  E a s te rn  o i l  w ith  
s u p p l ie s  from the  G-ulf of Mexico and V enezuela  a t  the  e a s t e r n  c o a s t  of the  
U n ited  S t a t e s . (54)
Y;e have th u s  a r r i v e d  to  a s i t u a t i o n  where Middle E a s te r n  p r i c e s  gained  
some independence from the American q u o t a t i o n s , a lth o u g h  b a s i c a l l y  they  were 
s t i l l  l in k e d  to  th e s e .  Because of t h i s ,  th e  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s  of the  w estern  
Hemisphere d u r in g  1953 and 1957 were s t i l l  r e f l e c t e d  i n  th e  Middle E a s t ,  
a lth o u g h  the  second was a l r e a d y  n o t  re f lec ted  i n  i t s  f u l l  f o r c e .  (55) I t  i s  
only a f t e r  th e  reop en ing  of th e  Suez Canal t h a t  ”the  f u l l  u n le a sh in g  of the 
c o m p e ti t iv e  f o r c e s ” i n  the  o i l  in d u s t r y  became e v i d e n t , ( 56 ) and f i n a l l y ,  
v/ith the  im p o s i t io n  of im port r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  i n  1959, 
t h a t  t h i s  l i n k  became c o m p le te ly  s e v e r e d . ( 5?)
(53) F .T .C . R ep o r t,  page 367
(54) F ra n k , H . ; Op.Cit .  page 53
(55) F rank , H . ; Op^Cit. page 86, be omit .an *n r l y s i s  of thesfc p r ic e  
in c r e a s e s  s in ce  i t  -would be beyond the  scope of t h i s  d i s c u s s io n .
( 56 ) I b id -  P’-ge 92
(57) I b i d .  page 120 , \:e  s h a l l  give t h i s  new s i t u a t i o n  f u r t h e r  c o n s id e ra t io n
when we an a ly se  th e  e v e n ts  to u t  l e d  to  the c r e a t i o n  of 0 „Fj .B.C „ i n  
C hap ter 6 .
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c k a p t :r
S ig n i f ic a n c e  of P o s te d  P r i c e s ,  R e a l is e d  P r i c e s  and Tex 'deference  
P r i c e s .  T a x a tio n  on th e  O il  In d u s t ry  i n  O .P ," \C , C o u n t r ie s .
I .  S i g n i f i c a nce of P o s te d  P r i c e s ^ J t l e a l i s e d  P r i c e s  and Tax R eference  P r i c e s .
I n  r e l a t i o n  to  the  o i l  i n d u s t r y  th e re  a re  th r e e  main i n t e r e s t s  in v o lv e d  
i n  o i l  p r i c e s :  th o se  of p roducing  c o u n t r i e s ,  those  of o i l  companies, ana thos 
of consuming c o u n t r i e s .  P roducing  c o u n t r ie s  have an i n t e r e s t  i n  h ig h  p r i c e s ,  
p a r t ic u la r ly  f o r  c rud e , h u t  a l s o  f o r  p ro d u c ts  i n  th e  case  of hav ing  an 
im p o r tan t  r e f i n i n g  in d u s t r y  as V enezuela , s in c e  t h e i r  o i l  revenue i s  d e t e r ­
mined by q u o ta t io n s  th  . t  u l t i m a t e l y  depend on th e  m arket p r i c e  i n  th e  sense  
t h a t  any q u o ta t io n  used w i l l  be under i t s  p r e s s u r e .  O i l  companies a re  a ls o  
n a t u r a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  h igh  p r i c e s  fo r  prod c t s  i n  o rd e r  to  in c r e a s e  t h e i r  
ovm p r o f i t s  and to  be ab le  to  f in a n c e  p r r t  of the c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e d  by the  
i n d u s t r y  f o r  f u r t h e r  developm ent; ( l )  j nd i n  some c a se s  i t  seems th a t  the  
major o i l  companies would a ls o  be i n t e r e s t e d  i n  quoting h igh  " p r i c e s ” f o r  
c ru d e , due to  c e r t a i n  t~x  adv n t  ,, cs g r  r.t~a to  t.ac ■. bp t h e i r  h o m e-co u n tr ie s ;
( 2 ) and because  t h i s  would perm it tiicu. "hi.Aw r  p r o f i t s  on o i l  so ld  to  o u ts id e  
u s e r s ,  (keep) the  raw m a te r i a l  c o s t s  of c e r r e t i n g  r- f i n c r s  h i f h ,  and swe­
e te n .  . . .  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s  , / i th  th e  r ro d u c in g  c o u n t r i e s  " (5 )  Consuming 
c o u n t r i e s ,  on the  o th e r  hand, which a re  Im po rte rs  o f  p e tro leu m  and t h a t
(1) a9 eVj I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O il  _Pr_icing_Problems" , page 4 , august 19^3;
SheTr*‘D'Il^'ompany:. '
\ 2 )  T hrs  I s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  so of American companies which re c e iv e  "vary
fa v o u ra b le  t a x  t re a tm e n t"  from the  U n ited  S t a t e s  Government w ith
r e s p e c t  t o  d e p le t i o n  a llow ances and r e l i e f s  f o r  f o r e i g n  ta x .
(H a r tsh o rn ,  J . ; "O il  Companies and Governments" (1967) PaSe 195
(3) P e n ro se ,  E, ; 11 j j i d  d ie  JE ast J ) i l r  The I n t e r n a t io n a l  D is t r i b u t i o n  of 
P r o f i t s  and I nc ome_ T a x e s11 "Economica", August i 960 , page 209
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lack-a dom estic  f u e l  i n d u s t r y ,  u s u a l ly  fa v o u r  lo7F p r i c e s  f o r  p ro d u c ts  (and  
a l s o  f o r  crude i n  th e  case  of h- v in g  a dom estic  r e f in in g  in d u s t r y )  i n  o rd e r  
to  save f o r e i g n  exchange and to  enab le  t h e i r  i n d u s t r i e s  to  o b ta in  cheap 
energ ey , I n  o th e r  c a se s  ho./ever, consumin; cc n t r i . e s  n i: ,±t , i s o  be i n c l i n e d  
to  f a v o u r  h igh  p r i c e s  f o r  p e tro leum  (b o th  crude o i l  and p ro d u c ts )  i n  o rd e r  
to  p r o t e c t  a dom estic  o i l  in d n t r v  and ( o r )  c th,. r  d our, s t i c  f u e l  i n d u s t r i e s  
t h a t  may e x i s t  ( e . g .  U n ited  S t a t e s ,  Tn * V n d , and .e s t e r n  Germany); o r  
because  th e  Government has an e q u i ty  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  the  o i l  b u s in e s s  and 
p r o f i t s  may o u tw e ig h ith e  c o s t  of im p o rts  (e  g. U n ited  Kingdom and Franco 
Tilth " B r i t i s h  Petro leum " and "Compagnie F ra n c a is e  des P e t r o le s "  r e s p e c t i v e l y ) ,  
or because  th e y  are th e  home c o u n tr ie s  of o i l  companies t h  t  c o n t r ib u te  
tow ards a f a v o u ra b le  b a lan ce  of payments w ith  t h e i r  r e m i t ta n c e  of p r o f i t s .
I n  tho  o i l  i n d u s t r y  we f r e q u e n t ly  h e a r  of d i f f e r e n t  ty p es  of " p r ic e s "  
b e in g  m entioned i n  r e l a t i o n  to  s a l e s ,  ta x e s  and r o y a l t i e s ,  and because  of t h i s  
th e re  can be some m isu n d ers tan d in g  w ith r e s p e c t  to  t h e i r  r e a l  s ign ificance  
u n le s s  we a re  a b le  to  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  what th e se  " p r ic e s "  r e a l l y  a re  and what 
t h o i r  f u n c t io n  i s .  The th r e e  types  of " p r i c e s "  t h t  we u s u a l ly  come ac ro ss  
a re  p o s te d  p r i c e s ,  r e a l i s e d  p r i c e s ,  and t a x  r e f e r e n c e  p r i c e s ,  b u t  as we 
s h a l l  see below , only  one of th e s e  can be c co p ted  as hav ing  economic 
meaning.
P o s te d Pr i c e s
P o s te d  p r i c e s  a re  those  quot t io n s  11 . ted  by th e  o i l  companies and 
p u b l is h e d  i n  v a r io u s  o i l  p u b l ic a t io n s  -which i n i t i a l l y  r / o r e s n t e d  a f a i r l y  
" r e a l i s t i c  p r i c e  s t r u c tu r e "  f o r  b o th  crude o i l  • nd products^
ana now serve  m ain ly  the  purpose ''of t a x  r e f e r e n c e  * ‘ *
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p r i c e s .  (3A) Thus 7/e h e a r  of a p o s ted  o r io e  f o r  crude f t  the  w e l l-h e a d ,  or 
P , 0 oB, a t  the  p o r t  of e x p o r t ;  o r a p o s te d  e x - r e f in e r y  p r i c e  f o r  the 
v a r io u s  p ro d u c ts .
Crude o i l  p r i c e s  began t o  be p o s ted  i n  the  U n ited  S t a te s  from the  ve ry  
b eg in n in g s  o f  the  i n d u s t r y  by the  demand s i d e . (4 ) T his was due to  th e  
p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n  of t h a t  c o u n try  i n  which la n d -o w n e rs , hav ing  th e  
r i g h t  to  any m in e ra l  w ea lth  u n d e rn e a th ,  o f f e r e d  th e  o i l  to  r e f i n i n g  
companies t h a t  "posted"  the  p r i c e s  a t  v/hich th e y  were w i l l i n g  to  buy. ( 5 )
I n  a h i s t o r y  of th e  S tandard  O il  Company, (6 )  v/e f i n d  t h a t  t h i s  company 
as w e l l  as many o th e r s  "p ro cu red  i t s  crude o i l  by sp o t  pu rchase  and by long­
term  c o n t r a c t s  . . . .  which were a rran g ed  a t  p o s te d  p r i c e s  by the  major 
p u rch a s in g  companies i n  th e  v a r io u s  f i e l d s . "
P r i c e s  were f i r s t  po s ted  i n  the  Middle h a s t  f o r  crude o i l  tow ards the  
end of 1950 (7 ) by Socony-Vacuum O il  Comp.my, and Im to r ,  i n  1952, i n  
V enezuela  by C re o le ,  a su b s id ia ry  of S tand ard  O i l  of Uee J e r s e y  ( 8 ) .  I t
seems however, t h a t  i n  the  Middle ■ st- posted  t r i c e s  - c r'G in tro d u c e d  by th e
companies as a way of v a lu in g  th e  crude in  o rd e r  to  s a t i s f y  the as p i  r a t i o n s  
of th e  Middle E a s te r n  c o u n t r i e s  f o r  c p r o f i t  sh; r i n g  system  more o r  l e s s  
a long th e  l i n e s  of tho V e n e z u e l .n . ( 9 ) The system  f i n a l l y  adopted  v a r i e d  
from  the  V enezuelan  presum ably due to  company s t r a t e g y ,  as v/e s h a l l  see  
i n  fo l lo w in g  pages , b u t  b a s i c a l l y ,  i t  was s im i l a r  to  i t ,  d i t h  th e s e  now
(3A) H a r ts h o rn ,  J .  Qp.C l t  ( 1967) page 137
(A) G-ibb and Knowlton. "His to r y  of S tanda rd  O il  Company (New J e r s e y )^
The Re su r  ge n t  Years 1911-1927" page 48
(5 )  Xhi-d. pages 48-50
( 6 ) T 5 i a .
\ 7 )  "P l a t t ^ s O i l  P r i c e Handbook" -  1950. page 307
(8) I b i d ,  1952'; p a g e ”335
( 9 ) P ran k , H , ; Op. C i t . page 170
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p r o f i t  s h a r in g  ag reem en ts , i n s t e a d  of r e c e iv in g  a payment based  on a f l a t  
r o y a l t y  pe-r u n i t  p roduced , the  Governments shared  w i th  th e  companies th e  
p r o f i t s  from  producing  o p e ra t io n s  th rough  t a x  payments and n r o y a l t y ,  and 
th u s  th ey  came t o  a c q u ire  an i n t e r e s t  i n  crude o i l  j j r i c e s ,
a
I n  V enezuela , on th e  o th e r  hand, the  e s ta b l is h m e n t  of/ p o s t e d  p r i c e  
had n o th in g  to  do w ith  th e  t a x  payments t h a t  had to  be p a id  to  the  
Government as i n  the  case  of the  Middle E a s t  (a s  v/e s h a l l  s e e ,  the  income ta x  
t h a t  was p a id  i n  V enezuela , was based  on the  r e a l i s e d  p r i c e  and no t  on a 
po s ted  q u o t a t i o n ) .  And s in c e  i t  seems th a t  V enezuelan  p o s te d  p r i c e s  
i n i t i a l l y  "were p r i c e s  ■ t  which a s iz e a b le  volume of a r m 's - le n g th  t r a d in g  
was p ro b a b ly  d o n e " ,( lO ) ,  t h i s  t  ices us to  c o n s id e r  th . i t  th e  p o s t in g  of 
p r i c e s  i n  V enezuela  f o r  the  f i r s t  time i n  1952 could  h-.vc been due more to  
oil-com pany p o l ic y  seek ing  to  e s t a b l i s h  a un ifo rm  p r ic in g  system  f o r  the  
major e x p o r t in g  a r e a s ,  f u r th e rm o re ,  s in ce  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  was (and i s )  
th e  p r i n c i p l e  market f o r  V enezuelan  o i l  and in c r e a s in g  volumes of crude  were 
a ls o  b e in g  im ported  from the  Middle E a s t ,  where p r i c e s  were b e in g  p o s te d  
f o r  th e  re a so n  s t ' t e d  above, l i s t e d  q u o ta t io n s  would have now seemed 
im p e ra t iv e  f o r  a l l  th e  m ajor sou rces  of e x p o r ts  to  a llow  any i n t e r e s t e d  
p a r ty  i n  th e  U n ited  S t a te s  to  make some a p p r a i s a l  o f the  p r i c e  s t r u c tu r e  of 
th e  o i l  t h a t  was b e in g  im p o rted .  I t  might have seemed n e c e s s a ry  to  make 
a l l  p r i c e s  a t  ‘which o i l  was moving p u b l ic ly  a v a i l a b l e  i n  view of the 
i n c r e a s in g  d is tu rb a n c e  of dom estic  p ro d u ce rs  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  th e  l a r g e  quan­
t i t i e s  o f  im p o r ts ,  and u n le s s  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een p r i c e s  
from a l l  a r e a s  could be s u b s t a n t i a t e d  f o r  th e s e  dom estic  p ro d u ce rs  and 
t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  Congress, th e re  cou ld  have been a danger of an
(10) H a r ts h o rn ,  J .  ; Op.G i t . ( 1967) ,  P<nge 140
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enactm ent of im port  r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  th e  U n ited  S t a te s  of which by t h i s  
time ( 1952) th e r e  was a " r e a l  t h r e a t " ,  ( l l )  A p o s te d  p r i c e  'was on the 
o th e r  hand, p u b l i c ly  know and th e r e f o r e  i t  d id  no t "need to  be documented 
each tim e i t  was i n  q u e s t i o n , "(12)
Recalljsed P r i c e s
R e a l i s e d  p r i c e s  r e  the  a c t u a l  s a le  p r i c e s  of pe tro leum  which r e s u l t  
from th e  ^o s ted  p r i c e  minus any d is c o u n t  th- t  m ight be g iven  to  make an 
a r m 's - le n g th  t  ansae t i  on. I t  seems t h a t  the  d iv e rg e  no... 01 r e a l i s e d  p r i c e s  
from  a c tu a l  p o s t in g s  hoc-'.me q u i te  f r e s uent ..ad e v id e n t  by 1957,(3-3) end 
s in c e  th e n ,  th e se  have been the  q u o ta t io n s  th. t  h ve been c lo s e r  to  a market 
p r i c e  o f o i l ,  (14-) Although th e  amount of crude be in s  t ra d e d  in  th e  market 
a t  th e s e  arm’ s - l e n g th  d e a ls  r e p r e s e n ts  only abou t J.o of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o i l  
movements j A ccording to  an a u t h o r i t a t i v e  source  (3-5) th e se  s a l e s  a re  the  
on ly  ones t h a t  can  a c t u a l l y  be c o n s id e re d  -as r e p r e s e n t ,  t i v e  of the  m arket. 
R e a l i s e d  p r i c e s  d iv e rg e d  from a c t u a l  p o s t in g s  as a r e s u l t  of in c r e a s in g  
c o m p e ti t iv e  p r e s s u r e s  which were on ly  r e f l e c t i n g  a s i t u a t i o n  of o ve rsupp ly  
f o r  th e  e x i s t i n g  l e v e l  of p o s te d  p r i c e s ,  and c o u n t r i e s  which had t h e i r  o i l  
revenues  based  on r e a l i s a t i o n s ,  such as Irdonesia , L ibya , and V enezuela , were 
th u s  a f f e c t e d .
(11) F ran k , H . ; Q p .C i t , page l 6 l
(12) I b i d ,  page 174-
(3-3) I b i d t pages 102 and fo l lo w in g s
(3-4-) T r a n s f e r  p r i c e s  of o i l  moving th rough  i n t e g r a t e d  ch an ne ls  (which i n c i ­
d e n ta l l y  have a ls o  been  moving down; H a r ts h o rn ,  J , ; Q p .C i t . ( 1967) 
page 14-1) are  a ls o  re g a rd e d  as " r e a l i s e d  p r i c e s " ,  a lth o u g h  i t  i s  c l e a r  tha  
i n  t h i s  case  th e y  b e a r  no co n n ec tio n  w ith  a m. r k e t  p r ic e  e i t h e r ,
( l 5 )  H a r tsh o rn ,  J , ; O p .C i t , ( 1967) page 135
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Tax R efercnce  P r i c e
As i t s  name i n d i c a t e s ,  t h i s  i s  a f i g u r e  o r q u o ta t io n  chosen to  
c a l c u l a t e  « i l  income which e i t h e r  w i l l  p a ss  d i r e c t l y  to  the  Government 
concerned , o r  t h a t  w i l l  e v e n tu a l ly  he tax e d .  V enezuela  i s  a good example 
of a c o u n try  t h - t  u se s  r e f e re n c e  p r i c e s  i n  th e  c a l c u l a t i o n  of b o th  r o y a l t i e s  
and income ta x e s .  As i n  the  case of p o s te d  p r i c e s ,  th e s e  q u o ta t io n s  a ls o  
do nofch-'ve any economic meaning as p r i c e s ,  h u t  se rve  on ly  the  purpose of 
a " r e f e r e n c e "  f o r  th e  c a l c u l a t i o n  of ta x e s .  R efe rence  p r i c e s  or r e f e r e n c e  
f i g u r e s  can ho e i t h c -  p o s te d  p r i c e ,  as i n  th e  case  of th e  Texan p r i c e  
used  to  c a l c u l a t e  V enezuelan  r o y a l t i e s ,  o r -n  o r i g i n a l  f i g u r e  c a l c u l a t e d  
to  meet c e r t a i n  re q u ire m e n ts ,  as i n  the  c se of the  r e c e n t  f i g u r e s  
announced by the  V enezuelan  Government to  c le u i -  t e  income A x e s ,  le  
s h a l l  see  more i n  r e l a t i o n  to  t h i s  u o in t  bclo*..*.
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I I  Taxat i o n on the O il Industry in  O.P,EyC._ C ountries
Under most o.f the  e a r l i e r  co n cess io n  agreem ents , payments to  the
h o s t  governments were g e n e r a l ly  a"lump sum a t  th e  tim e th e  con cess ion  was
g ra n te d ,  a dead r e n t  d u r in g  e x p lo r a t io n ,  and a f l a t  r o y a l t y  p e r  to n  of o i l
p ro d u ced " ,(1 1  ) However, Venezuela, s e t  the  "p rec ed e n t"  i n  1943 w ith  th e
e s ta b l is h m e n t  of a p ro g re s s iv e  income t a x  schedu le  to  which the  o i l  companies
became s u b je c t  to ,  and w ith  the  gro- t  expan s ion  of p ro d u c t io n  a f t e r  Uorld
W r  I I ,  h o s t  Governments gonea.;llp  b cLun to  e x e r t  p r e s s u re  f o r  r e v i s io n s  of
t h e i r  c o n c e ss io n  a g re e m e n ts , (12 )
C o n tra ry  however, to  h r .  f r a n k 1 a b o l i  ' f  th*;!: " the  s x - 1 1" of the
50-50 sh a r in g  p r i n c i p l e  i n  V enezuela  w cw hed ; made the  k id d le  la' s t e r n
1c o u n t r ie s  p e r s uade " t h e i r  major c o n c e s s io n a ire s  to  submit to  i t "(13 )
I  am of th e  o p in io n  t h  t  i t  cou ld  have been the  companies t h : t  "persuaded"
th e  P id d le  E a s t e r n  c o u n tr ie s  to  "submit" to  the  50-50 . The fo l lo w in g  reasons
seem to  i n c l i n e  me to  t h i s  b e l i e f .
l )  f i r s t  o f a l l  t h e r e  has never  been  a 50-50 p r o f i t  sh a r in g  p r i n c i p l e
i n  V enezuela . bhnt vras in c o r p o r a te d  i n  1948, as  we s h a l l  see  i n  g r e a t e r  
d e t a i l  i n  our n ex t c h a p te r ,  was an " a d d i t i o n a l  ta x "  c la u s e  i n  the  income 
ta x  law which was a p p l ie d  to  a l l  e x t r a c t i v e  o p e ra t io n s ,  i . e .  mining 
and hyd roca rbo ns , and n o t  only  th e  pe tro leum  i n d u s t r y .  k i t h  t h i s  c la u se  
the  V enezuelan  Government en su red , as Hr. f r a n k  c o r r e c t l y  s t a t e s ,  t h a t  the
(11^) f  r a n k , II. ;  Ojd . c i t . ,  page 170. I r a n  was th e  p r i n c i p l e  e x c e p tio n ,  "where 
th e  o r i g i n a l  agreem ent p ro v id ed  f o r  a payment to  tin.: Government of 
l6k> of n e t  p r o f i t s .  T h is  w s chanced i n  1933 f o r  . f i x e d  r o y a l t y  and 
a p e rcen tag e  of d iv idends  ,.bcvo s t . t e d  f l o o r " . ( i b i d )
12^)I b i d ,  page 170 
13 ) I b i d ,  page 170
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Government's sh.- re  of p r o f i t s  would no t be i n  any case  l e s s  th a n  50>4 But
i t  d id  n o t  s t a t e  t h a t  i t  would be 5 0 4  The a d d i t i o n a l  ta x  c la u se
s p e c i f i c a l l y  s t a t e d  th. t ;
" . .  „ i n  th e  case s  o f n e t  income c f  t ; x  payors  oh I.lin ing  e a rn in g s
d e r iv e d  from  the  mining o r  hydroc rbon i n d u s t r y ,  in c lu d in g  r o y a l t i e s
and o th e r  p a r t i c i p  t io n s  of th e  sr.me o r i g i n ,  i f  -aft r  the  c e d u la r
and complementary tax  h va heon deducted  the  rem ain ing  exceeds the
agg reg a te  of the  tax e s  c ru se d  by rea so n  of the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the
in d u s t r y  d u r in g  the  ta x a b le  ye r ,  such e x ce ss  s h a l l  be s u b j e c t  to
an a d d i t i o n a l  tax: of f i f t y  p e rc e n t .  "(14^)
I n  o th e r  words, on ly  i n  th e  case  when the  com panies’ share  of p r o f i t s
was g r e a t e r  th a n  theG  overrun©n£s would t h i s  c la u s e  come i n to  e f f e c t  to  
the
d iv id e /e x c e s s  e q u a l ly .  But as th e  income ta x  law w ith  i t s  normal ta x  
schedu le  and the  r o y a l t y  u s u a l ly  p rov id ed  f o r  a s l i g h t l y  h ig h e r  sh a re  of 
p r o f i t s ,  t h i s  c la u s e  seldom was a p p l i e d . (15^) T h is  c la u se  was a sim ple 
g u a ra n te e  b u t  n o t  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f p r o f i t  sh a r in g  i n  V enezuela . T h is ,
I  b e l i e v e ,  has been  a g e n e ra l iz e d  m iscon cep tion  of th e  V enezuelan 50-50 
c la u s e .
2) I n  1943 w ith  th e  nevr pe tro leum  law, V enezuela  ix xsed h e r  r o y a l t i e s  
2s u b s t a n t i a l l y  to  16 /3% of p ro d u c t io n .  ...Iso ta e  income t. x low began to  
have e f f e c t  i n  t h a t  y e a r  which y nvc th e  country  n o th c r  au j o r  source of
( l4 ^ )  R ep u b lic  of V enezue la ,  "_0f fp c i  r I_ Gaze t i e ;t 216, November 12, 1948.
1(15 ) from  1943 to  1948 th e  p ro p o r t io n s  o f  p r o f i t s  shared were ap p ro x im ate ly  
54/o -  46% to  th e  Government* s fa v o u r  ( P e t r o le u m_Press S e rv ic e .
J u ly ,  1949, page T58); In  1947, y e a r  b e fo re  th e  a d d i t i o n a l  t a x  
cls.use was in c o r p o ra te d  to  the  law, th e  govern m en t 's  sh re was of 
52%. (M in is t ry  of Mines and Hydrocarbons "Memoria 1965" page I  ~ 199)
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p e tro leu m  income. R o y a l t i e s ,  however, cou ld  n o t  he c r e d i t e d  a g a in s t  
th e  com panies' t a x  o b l ig a t io n s  i n  the  U n ited  S t a te s  as could  be done w ith  
the  payments of income ta x e s  to  the  h o s t  governm ents. A f te r  th e  e x p e r ie n c e  
of th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  p roced u re  i n  V enezuela , i t  would n o t  be s u r p r i s in g  i f  
tho  m ajor o i l  conrnarri.es found i t  a d v is a b le  to  make fo rm al agreem ents w ith  
tho  governments of th e  Middle E '-s t ,  which were anx ious f o r  b e t t e r  te rm s , to  
e s t a b l i s h  a p r o f i t  s h a r in g  b a s i s  which v .u l d  be a c c e p t  H e  to  b o th  p a r t i e s  
b e fo ro  th e y  too  began to  L e g is la te  as m  the. case  of V enezuela , In. any 
case v/e see  t h H  i n  th e  50 -  50 ’r e f i t  sh a r in o  - reomerits of the Middle E a s t ,  
a low er r o y a l t y ,  which could  not he c r e d i t e d  to  the  t a x  o b l i r t i o n  of th e  
home c o u n try ,  was e s t a b l i s h e d  (12 .5  ;) ; nd l i m i t  to  f a r t h e r  poyrxie t s ,  ,/hich 
would be t r e a t e d  as income t a x e s ,  vms imposed, i . e .  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  to  make 
up f o r  th e  5Qi> sh o re .  V enezuela  on th e  o th e r  hand was f r e e  to  r a i s e  h e r  
income t .  x , as i n  f a c t  she has done i n  n o t  a few o c c a s io n s ,  and u s u a l ly  
su rp a sse d  th e  50$ l e v e l . ( l 6 )
3) Another r e a s o n  f o r  b e l i e v in g  t h a t  th e  50-50 agreem ents b a sed  on 
p o s te d  p r i c e s  were in t ro d u c e d  i n t o  tho Middle E a s t  by the  companies i s  t h a t  
the  V enezuelan  system of t a x a t i o n  was a l r e a d y  g iv in g  th e  companies hard  
t im e s .  S ince 19A5 companies i n  V enezuela  were a l r e a d y  b e in g  th re a te n e d  w ith  
an "ex cess  p r o f i t  ta x "  because  "some companies had made e x c e p t io n a l ly  h ig h  
p r o f i t s " , (1 7 )  During t h a t  y e a r  th e  Government headed by Mr. Romulo B a tan -  
c o u r t  and i n  which Dr. P erez  Alfonzo a c te d  as M in is te r  o f  Development (18)
(16) \ re w i l l  sec th e  V enezuelan  procedure  of uncrousing  h e r  o i l  revenue i n  
g r e a t e r  d e tc . i l  i n  our n ex t  c h a p te r .
( 17 ) B a l e s t r i n i ,  C. ; "La_JTndusi.ria P e t r o lc r u  n V enezuela"
M in is t ry  of Mines and H ydrocarbons, 195 5; 35
(18) The M in is t ry  of Development t  th-A time I s o  f u l f i l l e d  the  r o l e  o f  the  
M in is t ry  of Mines nnd ’Hydrocarbons.
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began to  t a l k  about making m o d if ic a t io n s  to  th o  income t a x  lav/ becau se  the  
t a x  refo rm  of l%-3 ”had n o t  com ple te ly  s a t i s f i e d  th e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t ” . ( 19 ) 
S ince o i l  companies i n  V enezuela  were b e g in n in g  to  f e e l  th e  in c r e a s in g  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  of the  G-overnment i n  r e l a t i o n  to  7/hat were f a i r  p r o f i t s ,  they  
could  have t r i e d  to  avoid as f a r  as p o s s ib le  th e  development o f such a 
s i t u a t i o n  i n  the  Middle E a s t ,  and thus o f f e r e d  a p r o f i t  sh a r in g  system  to  
th e s e  c o u n t r i e s  e x p lo i t in g  an !iequal sh;.rc -- f u r  b u s in e s s ’1 s lo g a n  i n  which 
fu r th e rm o re ,  because  i t  was b ased  on po s ted  p r i c e s ,  thy -- c id  n o t  have 
nto  open t h e i r  books continuously" to  i n s p e c t io n  by the host governm ents” 
and thus  r i s k  f u r t h e r  p ry in g  i n t o  t h e i r  b u s in e s s .  (20) Th*. companies "no 
doubt f e l t  t h a t  . . „ .  th e  50-50  r u t h  i t s  i n h e r e n t  r i n g  of f a i r n e s s  . „ „ cou ld  
give thorn an e n t i r e l y  new image which would reduce  t h e i r  c o n c e ss io n a ry  
problem s, en su re  s t a b i l i t y ,  and sa feg u a rd  th e  v a l i d i t y  of t h e i r  c o n t r a c t s "  (21 
f o r  th o se  th re e  rea so n s  I  am i n c l i n e d  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  the  50-50 p r o f i t  
sh a r in g  p r i n c i p l e  was a c t u a l l y  in t ro d u c e d  to  the  Middle E a s t  by the  companies 
i n  th e  same way as we now see th e  Majors o f f e r  b e t t e r  terms to  Governments 
in  o r d e r  to  c o n s o l id a te  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  and to  weaken t h a t  of t h e i r  i n ­
dependent c o m p e t i to r s .(2 2 )
P re s e n t  System  of T a x a t io n
At p r e s e n t  th e r e  i s  a common system o f t a x a t i o n  i n  crude o i l  p ro d u c t io n  
i n  a l l  o f  0 .P ,.’ 0C0 c o u n t r i e s .  This system  however, has c e r t a i n  v a r i a t i o n s  
i n  some c o u n t r i e s  which a re  q u i te  im p o r ta n t  i n  p r a c t i c e  b u t  which n e v e r th e le s s
( 19 ) B a l e s t r i n i ,  C .; 0 £ . o i t .  p. ge 3b-
(20) F ran k , H. O p .C i t . p*age 17h 
£21) I b i d . page 173
,2 2 /. P e r  t h i s  k in d  of o i l  company s t r - t o g g  i n  l i b y a  sec "P e tro leum  I n t e l l i ­
gence Weekly" , 'A pril  19,1965, p. 6; and i n  V enezuela  sec same p u b l i ­
c a t i o n  f o r  F e b ru a ry  28, 1966, page 4 .
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do n o t  a l t o r  i t s  fundam en ta l p r i n c i p l e s .  Such d iffe rences  may c o n s i s t  of 
d e f in in g  g ro ss  income on th e  b a s i s  o f a p o s te d  p r i c e ,  a r e a l i z e d  p r i c e  or 
a r e f e r e n c e  f i g u r e ,  or the  g ra n t in g  of c e r t a i n  a llow ances  such as p e rcen tag e  
d e p le t i o n ,  o r exem ption from a v a r i e t y  of i n d i r e c t  t a x e s .  However, as f a r   ^
the  m ajor o i l  e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r ie s  a re  concerned , th e  p r e s e n t  t a x a t i o n  system 
c o n s i s t s  m ainly of a r o y a l t y  and and income t a x . (23) be must however, make 
th e  o b s e rv a t io n  here  and now t h a t  i n  i t s  t r u e  e ssen ce  r o y a l t y  i s  n o t  a- t a x ,  
and th  t  income ta x  i s  norm ally  no t  a t a x  on r e a l  income, b u t  s in ce  th ey
a re  g e n e r a l ly  reg a rd ed  as such, we sh; 11 ana lyse  th e s e  under th o se  head in g s .
R o y a lty
C o n c e p tu a l ly ,  r o y a l ty  i s  a form of -u.yment th  t  wc have i n h e r i t e d
from th e  days b e fo re  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  ol income t.ixes nd i t s  o r i g in  i s  to
be found i n  th e  tim es when tho  Croon c l  rLn-xl A l l  m in e ra l  vc 1 th .  I n  r e t u r n  
f o r  the  co n ce ss io n  to  e x t r a c t  the  mira.ra3 , a concession-, i r e  vould  p-'y the 
Crown a c e r t a i n  p e rcen tag e  of th : p ro d u c t ,  k n e  ~n s r- r o y a l t y .  This system 
was I n t e r  adop ted  i n  the  U n ited  S t a te s  w ith  th e  l-~nd owner, who i n  th. t  count 
owns s u b - s u r f  r!ce m in e ra l  w e a l th ,  tak in g  th e  p i  ce o f  the- Crown. R oyalty  
th e n ,  i s  g e n e r a l l y  c o n s id e re d  as com pensation to  the  owner of th e  m in e ra l  
re so u rce  f o r  th e  m in e ra l  i t s e l f ,  and as such i t  i s  d i s t i n c t  from any tax e s  
which may be charged . I n  a l l  of th e  m ajor e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s ,  su b su rface  
m ine ra l  r i g h t s  axe owned by the  n a t io n  and th e  r o y a l t y  i s  t h e r e f o r e  payable
to  th e  G overnm ent.(24)
( 23 ) O .P .E .C .;  " T a x a t ion Economics in^Crude P ro d u c t io n 11; page 8. P aper  
p re s e n te d  to  the  F i f t h  Arab Pe tro leum  C ongress; C a iro ,  March 1965
(2h) I b i d . page 9
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In co me Tr.xos
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  the  r o y i l t y  p \id  to  tho Cnvernmorh, income ta x  i s  
charged  "by th e  m ajor e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s , u s u a l ly  ‘t  tho r - ' to  o f  507° of* 
t h e o r e t i c a l  n e t  e a rn in g s .  T h is  t a x  i s  usu. l ? y  &. f l a . t  t a x  on th e s e  e a rn in g s ,  
r e g a r d l e s s  of s i z e ,  b u t  i n  some c o u n t r i e s ,  l i k e  V en ezuela , i t  i s  p ro g re s s iv e  
up to  a c e r t a i n  p o i n t ,  depending on the  t o t a l  s i z e  of th e  income, and a 
f l a t  r a t e  above t h a t  p o i n t . ( 25) I n  most of the  m ajor co n cess io n s  i n  the  
Middle E a s t  and L ibya , th e  tax; i s  l e v ie d  on the  t h e o r e t i c a l  n e t  income 
c a l c u l a t e d  on th e  b a s i s  of p o s te d  p r i c e s .  I n  V enezuela , i t  i s  l e v i e d  on 
an income c a l c u l a t e d  on the  b a s i s  of r e fe re n c e  p r i c e s ,  and i n  I n d o n e s i a , i t  
i s  ch a rg eab le  on a c t u a l  s a l e s  p r i c e s .
I n  many of the  major e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s ,  though n o t  i n  a l l ,  aga in  
as i n  V enezuela , c o n c e s s io n a ire  companies r r e  exempt from t a x e s ,  o th e r  th a n /  
r o y a l ty  and income t a x e s .  T h is  exemption a p p l i e s  n o ta b ly  to  im port d u t ie s  
on equipment t o  be used i n  th e  development of o i l  r e s o u r c e s ,  b u t  i s  a ls o  
a p p l ic a b le  to  s e v e r a l  o th e r  i n d i r e c t  t.-xos, the  n a tu re  o f -k ich  v a r i e s  f r c  
cou n try  t o  c o u n try ,  (26) I n  . .d c i t io n  to  the  i- .unr 1 ru.ymouts o u t l in e d  above, 
which by f  r  a rc  the  most im port i n t ,  th e r e  ace . -.Iso bonuses • h ic h  are  
u s u a l ly  payab le  a t  the  tim e tho concess ion  i s  g ran te d  • nd e th e r  minor tax e s  
such as s u r fa c e  and e x p lo r  t i o n  ta x .
Midd l e E a s t
I n  th e  Middle E a s t ,  r e a l t y  i n  the  m ajor co n ce ss io n  agreem ents i s  
equal t o  1 2 .5 ^  of p ro d u c t io n  va lu ed  a t  the  p o s te d  p r i c e , ( 27 ) and from V ) 0
(25) I b i d .
( 26) O .P .E .C „, Q p . C i t .  page 9
( 27) I b i d ,  page 8
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onwards i t  has been  expensed and charged  as a c o s t  a g a in s t  income t a x  i n  
some of the  c o u n t r i e s ,(2 8 )  P r e v io u s ly ,  r o y a l t y  was g e n e r a l ly  in c lu d e d  i n  
th e  5Qb of tho  p r o f i t s  sh a red  by th e  Government b u t ,  .s v/e s h a l l  see i n  a 
fo l lo w in g  c h a n te r ,  t h i s  l e d  to  s e r io u s  c r i t i c i s m s  f r o  o C .P .h .C . , s in c e  the 
Middle E a s te rn  c o u n t r i e s  under t u t  system re  or t in  r  no t obi* i n in g  a f u l l  
sh a re  of income t  xes on a 50 - b a s i s ,  . h ich  a \ s  claim ed to  ne normal 
t a x  f o r  the  l e v e l  of p r o f i t s  o b ta in ed  by the  i n d u s t r y ,  or the  o i l  companies 
aero  evad ing  payment of r o y a l t i e s ,(2 ^ )  th e  com p-nies agreed  to  pay r o y a l t i e s  
i n  a d d i t io n  to  the  ta x e s  on income, i n  r e t u r n  f o r  vrh''t was i n  e f f e c t  a 
r e d u c t io n  i n  p o s te d  p r i c e s  f o r  t a x  purposes f o r  a p e r io d .  I n  th e  assessm ent 
of ta x a b le  income th e  companies would be g iv en  an a llow ance o f f  th e  pos ted  
p r i c e  for" t h r e e  c o n se c u t iv e  y e a r s ,  and f o r  the  f o u r t h ,  19&7 , ' th is  allow ance 
would be s u b je c t  t o  c o n s id e r a t io n .  (30) I t  seems however, t h a t  O.P.E'.C. 
now f in d s  t h a t  i t  should  be e l im in a te d  f o r  1 9 6 7 .(3 1 )  The agreem ent has been 
e f f e c t i v e  i n  I r a n ,  Saudi h r u b ia ,  and Q a tar  s in c e  1964, b u t  i t  d id  n o t apply  
i n  I r a q  nor Kuwait because th o se  c o u n tr ie s  c o n s id e re d  t h a t  i t  went a g a in s t  
" p r i n c i p le s  o f s t - t c  s o v e r e ig n ! ty " , ( 32 )
(28) P e t r oleum I n t e l l i g e n c e  ."-leekl^, J"nu r y  18, 1965, page 6.
(29) OqP qE.C. ."E x p lan a to r y  Me mo rand  on tho 0 . P h.yud . R eso lu t io n s  IV 3 2 .
IV 33 ,. and IT 3 4 . "p -g o 1 .4 7  - - —
(30) P e tro leum  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  f e b r u  wy, 1966 , page 42 .
(31) P e tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  eo k ly .  O ctober 3 , 1966, p y c  3
(32) P e t r oleum I n t e l l i gence /eok ly , '.'arch 28, 1966, p-gu 6
More i n  r e l a t i o n  to  t h i s  wi 11 be seen  i n  the- ch r t o r  r c l  t e d  to  
O.P.I-.C.
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W ith r e s p e c t  to  income t ' x e s ,  th e  f i r s t  coun t -y to  f  o il  o u V e n e z u e la  
and o b ta in  a s i m i l a r  payment was Saudi ..rrb ia  i n  December 1950, and th en  
Kuwait i n  the fo l lo w in g  y e a r ,  th rough  tho e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of th e  50-50 
p r i n c i p l e .  Im m edia te ly  a f te rw a rd s  t h i s  type  of agreem ent becam eggnern lized  
th ro u g h o u t  th e  Middle E a s t  (3 3 ) .  The main d i f f e r e n c e  however was t h a t ,  as 
we saw b e fo re  th e  Middle E a s t  ca lcu la ted  p r o f i t s  on th e  b a s i s  of p o s te d  
p r i c e s ,  w hile  V enezuela  d id  i t  on the  b a s i s  o f r e a l i s e d  p r i c e s .  T h is  type  
of agreem ent was f i r s t  b roken  i n  1957 w ith  a new p a r t n e r s h i p  arrangem ent 
betw een th e  N a t io n a l  I r a n i a n  O il  Company ( N . I a0 .C o) ,  and th e  Azienda G enerate  
I t n l i a n n  P e t r o l i  (A*GoI . P 0) ,  a s u b s id ia  y of F .N . I .  (E nte  N azionale  
I d r o c a r b u r i )  tho  I t a l i a n  S ta te  company, by which th e  h o s t  government would 
r e c e iv e  more th an  50b> of th e  p r o f i t s .  The agreement p ro v id ed  t r r t  from n e t  
p r o f i t s  h a l f  s h a l l  be p/ i d  to  the  I r a n i a n  Government : s  t-.x , •''■no. th e  o th e r  
h a l f  s h a l l  be d iv id e d  e q u a l ly  betw een IT.1 .0 ,0 .  .ud .*00-. I , r ,  (34)
A lthough  le g  - l l y  the  50-50  t./pe «.*#.-re  o .\ont u t i l 1 prov i l s  i n  the Middle 
E a s t ,  new a s s o c i a t io n s  of the  k in d  s . in  do ova,, the. expensing of roy  l t i e s  i n  
some c a s e s ,  and the  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of sa le  ■’■ 'rices, h -vr r e s u l t e d  i n  an 
in c r e a s in g  partic ip --  t i o n  of th e  r i d d l e  h r  s t e r n  c o u n t r ie s  i n  th e  p r o f i t s  
of tho i n d u s t r y .  I n  t h i s  way we f in d  t h  .t the  share  o f a c t u a l  p r o f i t s  of 
c o u n t r ie s  i n  th e  E a s te rn  Hemisphere has a c t u a l l y  r i s e n  from 507° ^o 65)5 du ring  
the  p a s t  n in e  y e a r s . (35)
(33) F ran k , H. 0 £ . c i t . ,  page 171
(34) P e t  r q 1 eum JPres^s J5ervi c e , O ctober 1957, page 359
(53) Pe t r o l e um I n t e l l i g e n c e  vfeekly. November 7, 19^6, page 1
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Libya
Tit , 'T J
W ith th e  p e tro leu m  law of 1965 L ibya ad op ted  a t a x in g  system  p a r a l l e l  
t o  t h a t  p r e v a i l i n g  i n  the  Middle E a s t .  There i s  a 12.5/J r o y a l t y  which can 
be p a id  i n  c ash  o r  i n  k in d  to  the  Government ana tn  t  j.l t r e a t e d  as a c o s t  f o r  
ta x  p u rp o se s ,  and an income t a x  which i s  a ls o  c a lc u la t e d  a t  >■ H a t  r a t e  of 
5Q?o of p r o f i t s  de te rm ined  by pos ted  . r i c e s .  ( 36 )
I t  seems however, t i n t  i t  was the m j o r 0^-! comp'Tiies who ? c t u a l l v  
proposed  to  make th e s e  payments to  the  Libyan Government o f f e r in g  th e  same 
term s they  had ag reed  to  g ive  the  Middle E a s te r n  governments on c o n d i t io n  
t h a t  th e s e  would a l s o  be a p p l ie d  to  a l l  the  companies o p e ra t in g  i n  Libya.
(37) I t  i s  obvious t h a t  the  M ajors were t r y in g  t o  make th e  s i t u a t i o n  more 
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the  in d ep en d en ts  t h e t  had managed t o  b rea k  i n t o  m arke ts  by 
g r a n t in g  heavy d is c o u n ts  on t h e i r  o i l ,  s in c e  th e s e  a llow ances  v/e re p o s s ib le  
nl a  -gely because  th e  p r o f i t  s h a r in g  agreement w i th  th e  Government was based  
on r e a l i s e d  p r i c e s . . . M(38)
Indones i a
In d o n e s ia  has th e  most unique system  of t a x a t i o n  among the  m ajor 
e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s .  I n  h e r  case  n e i t h e r  r o y a l t i e s  n o r  p o s te d  p r i c e s  a re
TVr e l e v a n t ,  -Lo re ig n  companies may o p e ra te  only  as c o n t r a c t o r s  to  one of the 
s t a t e  a g en c ie s  which have now been  reduced  to  t ,o :P e r tu m in  ■ nd I-ermina. 
C o n t r a c to r s  work on a p ro d u c t io n  s lu .r in f  b a s i s ,  advancing th t  c - p i t a l  f o r  
e x p lo r a t io n  and development o p e ra t io n s  ‘ :ic pr.yinr t - c  's e lv e s  v i t h  a sha re  
of th e  c ru d e , ususlk  y  A0?o. However, In  most c a se s  the  fo re i.cn  c o n t r a c t o r  
h a n d le s  a l l  e x p o r ts  and hands over to  the  In d o n e s ia n  a u t h o r i t i e s  60/0 t f  th e
(36) See o f f i c i a l  t e x t  of L iby a’ s O i l  Law i n  P e t r o l e um I n t e l l i g e n c e  "Weekly;- 
December 6,1965 ( S p e c ia l  Supplement) page 9
(37) P e t r o leum I n t e l l i g e n ce w eek ly . A p r i l  19 , 1965 page 6
(38) P e tro leu m  P re s s  _Seryice_T August 1966 , page 28A
72
proceeds  which a re  c a l c u l a t e d  a t  r e a l i s e d  p r i c e s . (39)
The p rev io u s  In d o n e s ia n  Law, which d a te d  hack to  1954, had p ro v id e d  
f o r  a 50/£ share  of p r o f i t s  as th e  g e n e ra l  r u l e ,  b u t  i t  became i n o p e r a t iv e  
w ith  th e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  Decree 476 of August 28, 1961 t h a t  s p e c i f i e d  the  
p r e s e n t  p r o f i t  sh a r in g  b a s i s , (40)
V enezuela
V e n ez u e la ’ s p rev io u s  o i l  m in i s t e r ,  Dr. l e r c z  Guerrero, d e sc r ib e d  1966 
as "a y e a r  o f  t r a n s i t i o n '1 f o r  tho  Venezuelan o i l  i n d n s t r \  . ( t  Oh) He was 
a c t u a l l y  em phasis ing  w ith  h i s  s ta te m e n t  tne  c~r :,y es t h a t  imrc b e in g  i n t r o ­
duced to  the  ta x in g  system end t tn h  rould be • - ' r o l l e d  to  t ; 0 o i l  in d u s t r y  
i n  1967- S ince  t h i s  new method of t a x a t io n  i s  th e  one which a f f e c t s  the 
V enezuelan  o i l  i n d u s t r y  a t  the  time of w r i t i n g ,  I  f i n d  i t  c o n v en ien t  to  
in t ro d u c e  i t s  m ajor c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a t  t h i s  p o in t  a lth o u g h  i t  a c t u a l l y  
co rresponds to  a p e r io d  beyond th e  one chosen f o r  t h i s  s tu d y ,  be s h a l l  
an a ly se  i n  any c a se ,  the  e v o lu t io n  of the  t a x in g  system  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  the 
o i l  i n d u s t r y  of t h i s  co u n try  i n  our next c h a p te r .
B a s i c a l l y  th e  new t a x  system  i s  the  same as b e fo re :  th e r e  i s  a
r o y a l t y  of 16 / 3 $  t h a t  can be p a id  i n  cash or i n  k in d ,  and i f  i t  i s  accepted, 
i n  cash , i t s  v a lu e  i s  de te rm ined  by u s in g  the  p o s te d  p r i c e  (F.0.B-. G ulf of 
Mexico) of s i m i l a r  Texan c rudes  w ith  c e r t a i n  ad ju s tm en ts  f o r  g r a v i ty  and 
d e d u c tin g  th e  American im port t a x .  The aver.; ge o f such " r o y a l t y  r e fe re n c e  
p r i c e s " ,  as th e y  a re  c a l l e d ,  w i l l  obv iously  v e ry  from one y e a r  to  a n o th e r
(39) P e tro leu m  P re s s  S e rv ic e .  September 1961 yvw-e 354. f o r  a model of the  
new t :pe of agreem ent b e t  /con o i l  cui.nyo.nios as  c o n t r a c to r s  and th e  
In d o n e s ia n  Government, see tho c o n t r a c t  be to e  -m Pan -.Inert con and 
P e rtam in : "P e t r o l eum I n t e l l i g e n c e  o e ek ly 11, August 20, 1962, 'a g e  9
(40) P e tro leu m  P re s s  Ser v i c e , Oct o': or~19£6 ~ pay o 379
(49 A )P^tro leum _Pres s^ S e rv ic  e , Hove mber 196 *, paye 4°  3
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ac c o rd in g  to  the  p a r t i c u l a r  ou tpu t p a t t e r n  of c ru d es  f o r  th e  y e a r . (41)
The m ajor change occured  i n  income ta x .  F i r s t  th e r e  was a r i s e  a t  the  top  
of the  schedu le  to  52yo a g a in s t  47-57° which had p r e v a i l e d  p r e v io u s ly ,  (42) 
and second and most im p o r ta n t ,  th e  wh^le b a s i s  f o r  c a l c u l a t i n g  the  i n d u s t r y ’ s 
p r o f i t s  was changed. B e fo re ,  p r o f i t ' s  had been  c a l c u l a t e d  on th e  b a s i s  of 
r e a l i s e d  p r i c e s ,  b u t  now a whole new schedule  #f " r e f e r e n c e  p r i c e s "  has been 
de te rm ined  by the  V enezuelan  M in is t ry  o f Mine's and Hydrocarbons t h a t  w i l l  
s u b s t i t u t e  the  r e a l i s e d  p r ic e  f o r  each type  of p ro d u c t  and crude i n  the  
c a l c u l a t i o n .  These p r i c e s  a re  s t i l l  no t  a m i a b l e  f o r  a l l  th e  p ro d u c ts  and 
crude e x p o r te d ,  b u t  th e  fo l lo w in g  t a b le  g iv e s  us the  r e f e r e n c e  p r i c e s  f o r  
some of the  more im p o r ta n t  ty p es  of crude tn - . t  e n t e r  world m ark e ts . ( s e e t a b le
The most i n t e r e s t i n g  f a c t  about those  new p r i c e s  i s  tin. t  th ey  could  
a c t u a l l y  be c o n s id e re d  as new " p o s t in g s " ,  t h i s  time ho e v e r ,  made by a 
Government. B u t even more im p o r ta n t ,  the  th e s e  ne ■ o u o te t io n s  hove 
in tro d u c e d  a s e t  of l i s t e d  p r i c e s  which re  1 one r  t h m  the  c o rre sp o n d in g  
p o s te d  p r i c e s  t h a t  have n o t  been  allowed to  cha nge s in c e  I960. T h is  of 
course  was done to  r a i s e  th e  ta x  b a s i s  from a low er r e a l i s e d  p r i c e  b u t  i t  a l s  
im p l ie s  a fo rm al and o f f i c i a l  r e c o g n i t io n  by a p ro d u c in g  government of the  
inadequacy  and i n s i g n i f i c a n c e  of th e  p r e s e n t  s t r u c tu r e  of p # s te d  p r i c e s .
As m entioned above, r e f e re n c e  p r i c e s  f o r  r e f i n e d  p ro d u c ts  w i l l  be 
s e t  s e p a r a te ly  by c o n s id e r a t io n s  which a re  s t i l l  n o t  a v a i l a b l e .  F o r crude 
o i l ,  th e  fo rm ula  to  determ ine  the  re fe re n c e  p r i c e  w i l l  be t i e d  to  the  
g r a v i ty  d i f f e r e n t i a l  of th e  v a r io u s  c rud es . T r a d i t i o n a l l y  companies
(41) B a l e s t r i n i ,  C; G p ^ J J i t .  page 174
( 4 2 ) R epub lic  o f V enezuela , " O f f i c i a l  Ga z e t t e " .  December 23, 1966, page 9
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Re f e re n c e  P r ic e s ,  of ..Venezuelan, O il
(V„ S * e r  b a r r e l )
API P osted R eference j  Below
Crude G ra v ity P r ic e P r ic e P o s ted  Price
Boscan 10 ^ 1 . 5 7 /1 .4 0 4 - 0 10 .6
I -ag u n il la s 13.5 2 .07 1.6042 22.5
Bachatquero 16 1.85 1 .6224 12.3
T ia  Juana  (heavy) 18 1 .90 1.6952 10.8
T ia  Juana (medium) 26.5 2.30 2 .0046 12 .8
Guanipa 30 .5 2.53 2.1502 15 .0
T ia  Juana ( l i g h t ) 31.5 2.55 2.1866 14.3
O fic in a 35.5 2.80 2 .3 322 16.7
Lagocinco 36 .5 2.76 2.3686 14.2
Cumarebo 47 .5 3-34 2.7690 17 .1
Source: Pe tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  ' e e k ly ,  Jan uary  23> 1967> page 3.
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e s t a b l i s h i n g  a p o s te d  p r i c e  f o r  a crude alio.-' t h a t  p r i c e  to  move up or down
by 2 c e n ts  f o r  each one degree  of r rp .v it”  above or below t h ^ t  a t  which the
p r ic e  i s  p o s t e d . (43) Under the Venezuelan fo rm u la ,  a t h e o r e t i c a l  crude 
o i l  of zero  g r a v i t y  i s  p r i c e d  a t  $ i , 0 4  p e r  b a r r e l .  Then f o r  each  degree  
of g r a v i ty  t h i s  p r i c e  i s  r a i s e d  by 3 .6 4  c e n t s . (44) V enezuela  has g e n e r a l ly  
fo llow ed  t h i s  p rocedure  i n  p r i c i n g  he r  o i l ,  a l th o u g h  i n  c e r t a i n  cases  q u a l i t y  
f a c t o r s  have a l s o  been tak e n  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n . (45) I t  a l s o  seems t h a t  
th e s e  base  p r i c e s  s e t  f o r  1967 w i l l  be " s l ig h t ly " r a i s e d  from 1968 to  1971 
a cco rd in g  to  th e  agreement w ith  th e  major c o m p an ie s .(46 ) Thus the  Government 
has no t m ere ly  a r r e s t e d  the  downward t r e n d  of th e  q u o ta t io n  to  be u sed  i n  th e
c a l c u l a t i o n  of p r o f i t s  ( s e c  t a b l e  I I I -  2 ) ,  b u t  has a c t u a l l y  r e v e r s e d  i t .
F u rth e rm o re , i f  a company s e l l s  o i l  a t  a h ig h e r  p r i c e ,  th en  t h i s  s a le  p r i c e  
w i l l  be used  i n  th e  d e te rm in a t io n  of p r o f i t s .  With a f u r t h e r  5 c e n ts  pe r  
b a r r e l  which seems w i l l  be added to  V e n e z u e la 1s revenue, th e  p r o f i t  
sh a r in g  r e l a t i o n  w i l l  now ch. nge to  ~]2/o -  28,o to  the  g r e a t e r  fav o u r  of the 
Governme n t , (4 7 )
We have th u s  seen  t h a t  V en ez u e la 1s income t a x  i s  no lo n g e r  a pe rcen tage  
of p r o f i t s ,  b u t  a number of f i x e d  c e n ts  per b a r r e l  as i n  t i e  Middle E a s t  
and A f r ic a .  I t  a l s o  seems th  t ,  w ith  t h i s  new- t a x in g  system Venezuela* s 
p e r  b a r r e l  revenue w i l l  exceed th e  r e s t  of the  e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s  "even 
•vershadowing" L ibya where as a r e s u l t  of h e r  -1°65 o i l  law, she managed
(43) P e tro leu m  I n t e l l i g e n c e  J e e k ly ,  Jan u ary  23, 1967, page 3.
(4 4 ) P e tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  ;eek ly , J^ n u sry  23, 1967, page 3
(45) I b i d .
(46 ) P e tro leu m  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  November 1966 , page 403.
(47) P e tro leu m  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, O ctober 17, 1966, page 1.
Average Royalty* P o s ted  £
( u 7 s . '
:■ ndJReal1  sed P r ic e  of_ VerT_e.sue 1an_ Cru de 
f p e r  b a r r e l^
Average 
R oya lty  
r e f e r e n c e  
_ r  i,cp..
Jr. verage 
P o s ted
.’■■verage 
R e a l is e d  
P r ic e  (3J),
i  Below 
P o s ted  
P r i c e _
1961 2,71 2 .31 2,12 8 .2
1962 2 .67 2,31 2,06 10.8
1963 2 ,66 2.31 2,03 12 .1
1964 2,60 2 .29  (4) 1.91 16.6
1965 2 .58 2 .27  (4) 1 .86 18 .1
( l )  The average  r o y a l t y re f e r e n c e  p r i c e was o b ta in ed  by d iv id i :
payments by the  volume of r o y a l t y  o i l ,
(2) The average  p o s te d  p r i c e  has been weighted c o n s id e r in g  the  p ro p o r t io n s  of 
tho d i f f e r e n t  ty pes  of crude produced in  t h a t  v e a r ,
(3) The average  r e a l i s e d  p r i c e  was o b ta in ed  by d iv id in g  t o t a l  e a rn in g s  derived  
from th e  s a l e s  o f crude by th e  volume of crude e x p o r te d ,
( 4 ) The lovrer average  of th e  p o s te d  p r i c e  f o r  1964 and 196;; i s  th e  r e s u l t  of 
a h ig h e r  p ro p o r t io n  of heavy crude in  th e  p ro d u c t io n  p a t t e r n  of crude oil*.
Source: Banco C e n tra l  de V enezuela; wInfcproe _j*!oonoiaioo 19651: > pages 278 and
279. " ' in is  t r y  of '"ines and H ydrocarbons; i!P e t r o i e o y  Otros j ja to s  
Es;tad1  st_i. cp s .1 9 6 9 54  page 3.69.
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to  r a i s e  h e r  revenues s u b s t a n t i a l l y .  (1-8) ( s e e  T ahle  I I I  -  3)
As oan be seen  from T able  I I I  -  3, payments to  the  G-overnments of the  
p r i n c i p l e  o i l  e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s  have been  in c r e a s in g  y e a r  by y e a r .  H igher 
r a t e s  of p ro d u c t io n ,  r e d u c t io n  i n  o p e ra t in g  c o s t s ,  and i n  some c a s e s ,  new 
agreem ents such as r o y a l ty  expensing  a re  r e s p o n s i b l e . (4-9)
I n  the Middle H a s t ,  th e  i 960 c u t  i n  p o s te d  p r i c e s  was p a r t i a l l y  
o f f s e t  by th e  p ro d u c t io n  of l a r g e r  volumes o f  o i l  nd  by r e d u c t io n s  i n  
o p e ra t in g  c o s t s .  I n  Libya h i r h e r  e x p o r ts ,  and the 19^3 pe tro leu m  law 
r a i s e d  o i l  revenue s u b s t a n t i a l l y  I n  t  ■. t  ;o.? to  $ 1 + 2 2  m il l io n  which i s  
more th an  double t h ~ t  of the  p re v io u s  y e a r .  ( s e e  T ab le  I I I  ~ 3) The two 
major changes in t ro d u c e d  by t i e  p e tro leum  1-v  were: the  a p p l i c a t i o n  of
th e  r o y a l t y  agreem ent, and second th e  changeover to  a p o s ted  p r i c e  b a r i s  
f o r  ta x  payments. I t  seems th= t  on ly  the a p p l i c a t i o n  of the  r o y a l t y  ag ree ­
ment in c r e a s e d  L ib y a 1 s revenues  i n  1965 by a p p ro x im a te ly  013b- m i l l io n ,
I n  V enezuela  we a ls o  see an in c r e a s e  i n  t o t a l  roveue b u t  we a l s o  n o t ic e
low er p e r  b a r r e l  payments. The r e t u r n  p e r  b a r r e l  i n  V enezuela  depended 
p a r t l y  on the  g r a v i t y  of th e  o i l  ex p o rted , and p a r t l y  on the  p r i c e  i t  
o b ta in e d  i n  th e  m arket i . e .  th e  r e a l i s e d  p r i c e .  Both th e se  re a so n s  accoun­
te d  f o r  th e  low er p e r  b a r r e l  revenue of V enezuela . I n  t h i s  r e p e c t  we saw 
i n  Table I I I  -  2 how the  average  p o s te d  p r i c e  of crude  o i l  d e c l in e d  due to  
th e  g r e a t e r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of heavy crudes i n  th e  e x p o r t  p a t t e r n  of th e  o i l ,  
end a l s o  how the  r e a l i z e d  p r j e e ,  which w  s th e  b a s i s  of income t a x ,  h "d 
been  f a l l i n g .  P e r  b a r r e l  payments i n  V enezuela  ‘.re s t r l l  h ig h e r
(4-8) P e tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  weekly, O ctober 17, 19&-'-, ^  ° 1 
(4-9) P e tro leu m  P r e s s  S e rv ic e ,  September 19 £, r - y e  326.
(30) P e tro leum  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  Seotembe^ 1^66, par.? 3 86.
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T<?,ble^ I I I zJ>
_Gil _ venwe_ _crf th e Ea;In 0 r  t  i  ng_ C puntr ie  s
A) _________ T o ta l  Goverruient O il BejujiucS
“ T S T m i l l io n )
-
Tote.l
Saudi K idd le
huw ait (1 ) ■rlrr.hia^l) I r a n I r a q  0JdiersJ^2) E as t  _ L ib ja VenezueL
1956 310 300 153 193 47 1,003 738
1957 338 323 213 137 57 1 ,068 9 68
1358 423 310 247 224 72 1 ,278 993
1959 405 315 263 243 69 1 ,2 9 4 926
I960 4 63 355 285 266 70 1 ,442 877
1961 464 396 301 266 70 1,497 3 938
1962 526 41-6 334 267 75 1,648 39 1 ,071
1963 555 489 398 368 83 1,833 109 1,106
1964 62/f 552 474 353 95 2,099 197 1,122
1965 636 639 53 2 368 120 2,295 422 1,128
B  ^ _ go_verm ent Rece lpts_ J P e B a r  r e 1 
(lJ0Sa c e n ts  P/B of e x p o r ts )
1956 76 .5 82 .9 84 .3 89.5 tl 32.3 87.2
1957 79 .6 88 .2 86 .8 93.1 — 8 5 .7 103 .0
1958 81 .7 81 .7 89 .0 88.9 - 8 4 .8 111.6
1959 77 .8 75 .8 8 3 .6 8 2 .4 - 79 .8 9 8 .4
I960 76.4. 75 .0 80 .1 78 .6 - 1 7 .1 89 .2
1961 7 4 .4 74 .6 75 .8 76 .5 - 75 .6 62.7 92 .9
1962 74 .6 75 .8 74 .5 76 .7 - 1 5 .1 64.7 97.2
19 63 74 .0 76 .7 79 .7 76 .5 ~ 76 .5 65 .0 98.6
1964 74 .8 8 0 .7 8 1 .7 8 0 .1 - 77 .6 62.9 9 5 .4
1965 74 .8 80 .5 82 .7 00,2 ~ 7 7 .7 95.2 95.0
(1) In c lu d in g  h a l f  F e u t r a l  Zone*
(2) r a t a r ,  4bu Dhabi and B a h ra in .
Source: p e tro leu m  P re s s  S e r v i c e , September, 1966, page 326.
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th a n  i n  the  Middle E a s t ,  b u t  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  has been  narrow ing  i n  r e c e n t  
y e a r s ,  d ropp ing  from  22 .1  c e n ts  i n  1963 1 7 .8  c e n t s  i n  1964 and 17.3
c e n ts  i n  1965 . b i t h  r e s p e c t  to  L ibya , V enezuela  f o i l  s h o r t  i n  h e r  p e r  
b a r r e l  reveue  by 0 .2  c e n ts  f o r  the  reiisons s t a t e d  above, b u t  as we a ls o  
m entioned, i t  seems t h a t  w ith  th e  new V enezuelan ta x in g  system  she w i l l  s u r ­
pass  Libya a g a i n . (51)
( 5 l )  I  s h a l l  le a v e  f o r  l a t e r  th e  d i s c u s s io n  of the  p o s s ib le  e f f e c t s  e f  
V en ezu e la ’ s new ta x  measures 011 t o t a l  rev en u e .
V enezuela i n  th e  Framework 
of th e
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m m
The B eg inn ings  of th e  O i l  I n d u s t r y  i n  V enezuela . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of 
th e  V enezuelan  O i l  I n d u s t r y  and i t s  P o s i t i o n  i n  the  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
I n d u s t r y :  E x p lo ra t io n ,  R ese rv es ,  P ro d u c t io n ,  R e f in in g ,  and In v e s tm e n ts .
S ig n i f ic a n c e  of the  O i l  In d u s t r y  to  th e  V enezuelan  Economy. V enezutla .1 s 
P e tro leu m  P o l ic y ,  The s'C orporacion  V enezolana  d e l  P e t r o le o "  (C ,V ,P . ) .
The P e tro c h e m ic a l  I n d u s t r y  i n  V enezuela .
I . The Begi n n i ngs_o f^ tt ie  _ O i l  JIndusj;ry In_V enesuela
Prom a comm ercial p o in t  o f view we c-:n go b .ck . ,s f a r  as Septem ber 3, 
1878 to  s e t  th e  b eg in n in g s  of the  o i l  i n d u s t r y  i n  V enezuela . On t h i s  
d a te  the  "Compania P e t r o l i a  d e l  Tachir-^" w a f o u n d e d  by 
Mr. Manuel P u l id o  to  e x p o lo i t  f ' e  b la c k  o i l s  which were f i l t r a t i n g  from 
th e  ground and r e f i n e  them i n  an o rd in a ry  s t i l l  i n  o rd e r  to  supp ly  the  
neighbourhood w i th  ke ro sene  ( l ) .  T h is  f i r s t  comm ercial v e n tu re  took 
p la c e  i n  what i s  now the  S ta te  of T ach ira  i n  w e s te rn  V enezuela  co v e r in g  
an a re a  of 100 h e c t a r e s  over which Mr. P u l id o  o b ta in e d  e x c lu s iv e  
e x p l o i t a t i o n  r i g h t s .  I n  1880 an o i l  d e r r ic k  was im ported  from th e  
U n ited  S t a t e s  i n  o rd e r  to  d r i l l  f o r  the o i l  as  i t  was done i n  th e  
American in d u s t r y  ( 2 ) ,  and by 1912 t h i s  company was r e g i s t e r i n g  a d a i l y  
p ro d u c t io n  of 60 b a r r e l s  of crude  o i l .  ( 3 ) At t h i s  e a r l y  p e r io d ,  however,
(1 )  B a p t i s t  a , F e d e r ic o ;  8 ’His t  o r i a _ d  e l a  Indus t r i a  P e t r o l e r a  e n Venez u e la 11, 
Greole P e tro leu m  C o rp o ra t io n ,  C aracas; page 2 .
(2 )  B a p t i s t a ,  F e d e r ic o ,  Pp.. p i t . , page 2
( 3 ) B e ta n c o u r t ,  Romulo; ’'V enezuela^  PoD.itIcy y  P e t r o l e o n , Fondo de
C u l tu re  Economics, -  Mexico 1956; page 14.
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no o f f i c i a l  i n t e r e s t  was g iven  to  the  i n c i p i e n t  i n d u s t r y , and a l l  
government a t t e n t i o n  was d i r e c t e d  towards a g r i c u l t u r e  a n d c a t t l e  
b re e d in g  which a t  t h a t  time were th e  main economic a c t i v i t i e s  of the 
c o u n try  ( if) .
I t  seems to  be t h a t  th e  f i r s t  c o n ce ss io n  g ra n te d  to  a f o r e ig n  
i n t e r e s t  d a te s  back to  1883 when an American named H oracio  Ham ilton 
o b ta in e d  a c o n ce ss io n  to  e x p lo i t  a s p h a l t  from the  la k e  of G-uanoco i n  
th e  S t a t e  of Sucre i n  the  e a s t e r n  p a r t  o f V enezuela , and which l a t e r  
pa sse d  to  the  "New York and Bermudez Company'1 a s u b s id i a r y  of "G enera l 
A sp h a l t  Company of P h i l a d e lp h ia " .  ( 5 ) In  1909 th e r e  was an o th e r  
im p o r ta n t  co n ce ss io n  to  a f o r e ig n  i n t e r e s t ,  t h i s  tim e to  the  B r i to n  
John A l le n  T r e g e l l e s  who r e p re s e n te d  "The V enezuelan  Development 
Company L td ."  (6 )  T h is  co n cess io n  covered  an a re a  of 26 m i l l io n
h e c t a r e s  i n  12 s t a t e s  and a F e d e ra l  T e r r i t o r y , b u t  o f t e n  fo u r  y e a rs
w i th o u t  having  d r i l l e d  any w e l l s ,  the  Government c o n s id e re d  t h a t  th e  
Company had no t f u l f i l l e d  i t s  commitments end c a n c e l le d  the  c o n c e s s io n .^ ')  
O ther con cess io n s  were a ls o  g r  n ted  to  the  v a r io u s  n a t i o n a l s  t h a t  were 
fa v o u re d  by th e  p r e v a i l i n g  Governments, b u t  th e se  c o n c e ss io n s  were h e ld  
by th e s e  people  o n ly  w hile  they  were ab le  to  p a ss  them to  fo r e ig n  
companies i n  a rrangem en ts  betw een th e s e  p r iv a t e  i n t e r e s t s  and th e  
newcomer. (8 )
(if) B e ta n c o u r t ,  R- u lo ;  Op. o i t .  page 13.
( 5 ) B a l e s t r i n i ,  C esa r;  "La I n d u s t r i a  P e t r o l e r a _en Venezu e l a "
M in is t ry  of Mines and H ydrocarbons, -  V enezuela ; page 7 .
(6) B e ta n c o u r t ,  Romulo; O p .C i t , page 23
(7) I b i d
(8) I b i d
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I t  i s  on September l k ,  1922, however, the. t  the ev en t which i s  
c o n s id e re d  to  he th e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  In  the  h i s t o r y  of the  Venezuelan 
o i l  i n d u s t r y  took p la c e .  (9 )  On t h i s  d a te ,  th e  "B arrosos  2" w e ll  
of th e  "Venezuela O il  C oncessions ( s u b s id i a r y  of the  R oyal D u tc h -S h e ll  
group) (lO ) s t ru c k  o i l  and gave f o r t h  100,00^ b a r r e l s  o f o i l  p e r  day 
f o r  n ine  c o n se c u t iv e  days. T his even t i n  the  h i s t o r y  of the  V enezuelan 
o i l  i n d u s t r y  which in  my o p in io n  i s  comp*rable to  D ra k e 's  success  i n  the  
U nited  S taL es i n  1859, a c te d  as  a s t im u lu s  f o r  o i l  men and a tt rac ted  
many more companies to  the co u n try  which now proved to  have g r e a t  p o te n t ia l  
o i l  w e a l th .  I n te n s iv e  e x p lo ra to ry  programmes took p la c e ,  and by 1929 
seven ty  t h r e e  companies were se a rc h in g  f o r  o i l  on V enezuelan  t e r r i t o r y ,  
o b ta in in g  m ajor su ccess  th o se  which today  a re  s u b s i d i a r i e s  of th e  
Royal D u tc h -S h e l l  group, J e r s e y  s ta n d a rd ,  and G ulf O i l  Company, which 
u n t i l  t h i s  day a e th e  m ajor p ro d u ce rs .  ( l l )
Of th e  th r e e  m ajor p roduc in g  companies, th e  Royal D u tc h -S h e l l  was 
th e  f i r s t  t o  a r r i v e  on V enezuelan  s o i l  i n  1912 th ro u g h  i t s  a f f i l i a t e s  
" S h e l l  C aribbean  Pe tro leum  Company", "S h e l l  V enezuelan  O i l  C o n cess io n s" ,  
and the  "Colon O i l  Company" . (1 2 )  In  1917 i t  b u i l t  i n  o;-,n Lorenzo the  
f i r s t  r e f i n e r y  of th e  co u n try  and a lso  th e  f i r s t  p ip e l in e  ■••hich was 
between San Lorenzo end th e  lene  Grande o i l  f i e l d .  (13) Next to  
e n te r  th e  c o u n try  was J e r s e y  S tandard  i n  1921 w ith  i t s  a f f i l i a t e
(9 )  B a p t i s t a ,  F e d e r ic o ;  Op. C i t . .page 6
(10) B a ta n c o u r t ,  Romulo; Op.CI t . ,page 29
( 1 1 )B a p t i s ta ,  F e d e r ic o ;  O p .C i t , . page 6
(12) B a l e s t r i n i ,  C esa r;  Op. C it , . page 73 
(13 .Ib id
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"S tandard  O i l  Company o f  V e n ez u e la " , which i n  1943 merged w ith  the  
"Lago P e tro leum  Company" and formed the  "C reo le  P e tro leum  C o rp o ra t io n " ,
In  1923 th e  "Venezuelan G-ulf O i l  Company" e n te r e d  as  a s u b s id ia r y  of 
G-ulf O il  which to d ay  o p e ra te s  i n  Venezuela as th e  "Mene G-rande O i l  
Company". (14)
I t  m ight be of in te re s t  to  p o in t  out no*; i t  w-_»s tue  Loyal D u tc h -S h e l l  
group who e n te re d  V enezuela  n e a r ly  10 ye- r s  b e fo re  S tan d ard  C-il, due 
p ro b ab ly  to  th e  d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g y  t h ^ ’ governed th e s e  coinp.-.ries, s in c e  
w hile  S tan dard  O i l  was busy c o n s o l id a t in g  i t s  p o s i t i o n  i n  the U n ited  
S t a t e s ,  the  Anglo-Dutch vTe re  out t r y in g  to  secure  i t s  o i l  from f o r e i g n  
so u rc es  due to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  d id  not count w ith  dom estic  s u p p l i e s .,(15)
(14) B a p t i s t a ,  P e d e r ic o ;  Op. Ci_t. t pa - e 7
(15) E ra n k e l ,  P . H . ; " E s s e n t ia l s  of Petro leum : A Key to  O il  Economics". 
London, 1946, page 89.
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s t i e s  J / e n e z u e l a n ^ O i l _ _ J n d u s a ,n d  i ts ^  P o s i t i o n  i n
the. I j a t e r n a i ^ j ^ o n d u s j t  r y .
The o i l  i n d u s t r y  i n  V enezuela  i s  formed hy  ap p ro x im a te ly  f i f t y  
companies of which about 10 a re  f u l l y  i n t e g r a t e d .  ( l 6 )  Three of t h e s e ,  
Compahia S h e l l  de V enezuela  ( s u b s id ia r y  o f  Royal D u tc h -S h e l l ) ,  C reole 
P e tro leu m  C o rp o ra t io n  ( s u b s id i a r y  of J e r s e y  S ta n d a rd ) ,  and Mene G-rande O il 
Company ( s u b s id i a r y  of G ulf O i l )  accoun t f o r  77h’ of dom estic  p r o d u c t io n , (37) 
80,o of r e f i n i n g , (18) and h e ld  ap p ro x im a te ly  65>o of th e  a re a  i n  co n cess io n s  
a t  th e  end of 1% 5. (19) B esides  the  p r i v a t e  companies th e r e  i s  a 
N a t io n a l  O i l  Company, th e  "C orporac ion  V enezolana de l  P e t ro le o "  (C .V .P .)  
vfaich a l s o  o p e ra te s  i n  a l l  s ta g es  of the  i n d u s t r y  mil ^n ich  i s  su p p o rted  
by f a v o u ra b le  l e g i s l a t i o n . (20) However, a l th o u g h  t h i s  company does no t 
p a r t i c i p a t e  a t  t h i s  moment i n  any c f  th e  o p e ra t io n s  i n  a c o n s id e ra b le  
p r o p o r t io n ,  i t  may e v e n tu a l ly  g a in  c o n t r o l  over i t s  c o m p e ti to rs  s in c e  i t  
a lone  i s  a u th o r iz e d  to  s ig n  s e rv ic e  c o n t r a c t s  w ith  the  p r i v a t e  o i l  
companies. The more im p o r ta n t  f i rm s  i n  Venezuel- th e n ,  g e n e r a l ly  b e lo n g  
to  p a re n t  companies w ith  h e a d q u a r te r s  i n  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s ,  U nited  
Kingdom, H olland  and, i n  minor c a se s ,  S p a in ,  Canada, S w itz e r la n d  and 
P ra n c e .  (21) D e c is io n s  of im portance and e s p e c i a l l y  th e  c a p i t a l  budget
(1 6 ) In fo rm a t io n  o b ta in ed  from the  C e n tr a l  Bank of V en ezu e la .
(17) T able  IV~8
(18) M in is t ry  of Mines and Hydrocarbons -  V enezuela ; "Memo r i a  -  1965". 
page IV -38 .
C1^) I b i d  paee IV - 9. ( a l s o  t a b le  IV -  k )
(20) Yie s h a l l  see t h i s  p o in t  i n  fo l lo w in g  pages .
(21) P a r r a  & F o c a te r r a ;  "The Pe tro leum  In d u s t r y  i n  V enezuela"  page 3. 
(P a p e r  p re s e n te d  by th e  V enezuelan D e le g a t io n  a t  trie T h ird  Arab 
P e tro leu m  C ongress , A le x a n d r ia ,  O ctober 196l)
of each o p e ra t  ng; company must be approved by th e  p a re n t  o r g a n i s a t io n  
a lth o u g h  th e  s e v e r a l  e x e c u tiv e  boards of companies i n  the  co u n try  have 
v a ry ih g  . d eg rees  o f  autonomy. (22) Local c.-.pii.J, programmes i n  any 
case  a re  approved by th e  V enezuelan  M in is t ry  of H ines and. H ydrocarbons,
A) E x p lo r a t io n .
As can be seen  i n  t a b l e  VI -  1, l a r g e  sums of money a re  d i r e c te d  
towards e x p lo r a t io n  i n  v a r io u s  p a r t s  o f  the  w orld . I n  19&5 $1^180 m i l l io n  
were sp e n t  by the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o i l  i n d u s t r y  i n  e x p lo r a t i o n  and le a s e  
r e n t a l s  and a n o th e r  X5,785 i n  th e  development of new a re a s  i n  p ro d u c t io n  
c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i tu re s .  V enezuela  had u s u a l ly  occup ied  a n  im p o r tan t  p o s i t i o n  
i n  th e s e  e x p e n d i tu re s  b u t ,  as we can see i n  our t a b l e ,  i n  19&5 l e s s  th a n  
y/o of th e  t o t a l  was a l l o c a t e d  to  t h i s  c o u n try .  During t h a t  y e a r  th e  
a re a s  t h a t  were m ostly  fav o u red  by e x p lo r a t io n  and developm ent, a p a r t  from 
th e  U n ited  S t a l e s ,  were Canada, the  Middle E a s t ,  and A f r ic a  ( t a b l e  IV -  l ) , 
The v a r io u s  r e a so n s  f o r  e x p lo r a t io n  have been  a n a ly se d  i n  a p re v io u s  
c h a p te r .  Reasons f o r  the  f a l l  i n  e x p lo ra to ry  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  V enezuela  
however, a re  d e b a ta b le .
As m entioned above, e x p lo r a t i o n  i n  V enezuela  had u s u a l ly  been  
m a in ta in ed  a t  a c o n s id e ra b le  l e v e l  up to  1;60 .men th e se  a c t i v i t i e s  s t a r t e d  
to  d e c l in e  s h a rp ly  ( t a b l e  IV - 2 ) .  The pe :k: y e a r s  o f  1958, 1987, and 
1958 can  be a t t r i b u t e d  to  the  now co ncess ions  g ra n te d  a t  t h a t  time 
( t a b l e  IV -  3 ) ,  b u t  soon a f t e r  th e  d ec l in e  ‘was to  reduce  e x p lo r a t io n  to  
l e v e l s  f a r  below th o se  b e fo re  the  1958-58 p e r io d .  There a re  some q u i te  
opposing views i n  e x p la in in g  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .  Mr, A n ib a l  M artinez , a
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Table IV -  1
"Exolorat i  on nd Pr^oductio.n Capiti 1 Expei:Lditures ”
(M illion  doli:n r s )
Ceologic. 1 and Production T ota l Explore tion
Geophisical C ap ita l , nd
Exp®! pd i  tu.r^e s Deve1onmcnt _ ..................
un ited  S ta te s 700 4,575 5,275 72.3
Canada 90 400 490 6.7
Vilil -liiZO i.'jiiii 45 680 725 9.9
Other ,ii he ' i s  ji., 35 190 225 3.1
¥  Europe 30 110 140 1.9
A frica 35 80 115 1 . 6
Middle East 30 175 205 2.8
Ear i^ast 39 __ __ 90. — 125.
World T ota l ( l ) 1,000 6,300 7,300 100.0
United S ta te s 700 4,525 5,225 67.2
Canada 95 380 475 6.1
VENEZUELA 65 900 965 12.4
Other ¥ , He;v:isoh. 50 260 310 4.0
¥, Europe 35 160 195 2.5
A frica 55 150 205 2.6
Biddle  East 35 190 225 2.9
Ear East .-142. _180 ^ 2 , 3
World T o ta l ( l ) 1,075 6 f705 7,780 100.0
United S ta te s 610 3,760 4,370 62.7
Canada 125 550 675 9.7
V E l -j S 2 jU  EEA 10 175 185 2.7
Other W.Herais ph 60 255 315 4.5
Wo Europe 150 175 325 4.7
A fr ica 100 340 440 6.3
riiddle East 35 405 440 6.3
Ear East 90 125 215 3.1
World T o ta l ( l ) 1,180 5,785 6,965 100.0
( l )  Excluding S ino-Soviet Bloc
Source; Chs-.se Manhatten Bank, ” Capi  t- .■ 1 I nvestments ox the  World Petroleum 
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T ab leJV  -  J5
''Area i n _Conessions in  Venez u e la !f 
(h ec ta re s )
Area m  Concession 
a t  the  beginning he1* Concessions
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a t  the  end 






















Source; M in is try  ox Mines and Hydrocarobs 
page  I  -  151.
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Table IV -  4
"Area of  Concessions in  Venezuela Held by the  Main  Oil Compa n ie s
a t  tbig ..end of 1965" 
( h e c ta r e s )
Men© Grande O il Company
Creole Petroleum Corp.
Cia. S h e ll  de Venezuela
Mobil O il Co. of Venezuela
S in c la i r  Venezuelan Oil Co,















Source: l i i n i a t r y  of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Ve. Lezuela. "Memoria." -  1965,
page I  -  152
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V enezuelan  g e o lo g i s t ,  (235 i s  °D the  o p in io n  to  t  t h i s  r e d u c t io n  i s  a 
ve ry  n a t u r a l  phenomenon s in c e  " t i e  e x te n s io n  of the  V enezuelan  sed im en ta ry  
b a s in s  b e in g  f i n i t e ,  th e r e  had to  come -■ tim e -.‘hen the  v a r io u s  methods 
f o r  o i l  e x p lo r a t io n  would t o t a l l y  cover the  who3.e c o u n try " ,  (24)
A ccording to  Mr. M artinez n e a r ly  94h of a l l  the  area, of th e  V enezuelan  
sed im en ta ry  b a s in s  bas been  "adequa te ly "  e x p lo re d ,  and the r e d u c t io n  
i n  e x p lo r a t io n  s in ce  1938 i s  a s c r ib e d  "o n ly  to  a t r u e  p h y s ic a l  s i t u a t i o n  
and to  norm al development s ta g e s " .  ( 23 ) He th u s  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  i t  i s  
" a b s o lu te ly  normal" t h a t  from  i 960 onwards th e  number of g e o lo g ic a l  
f i e l d  crews i n  V enezuela  would have " d r a s t i c a l l y  d im in ish e d " .  (26)
O ther p o i n t s  of viev; p la y  w i th  the  id e a  t h a t  the  r e d u c t io n  of e x p lo ra to ry  
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  V enezuela  i s  on ly  b u t  p a r t  of a g lo b a l  r e a c t i o n  of the 
o i l  companies a g a in s t  th e  "ag g re s iv e"  p e tro leu m  p o l ic y  p r e v a i l i n g  s in ce  
1939 , s in c e  i t  te n d s  t o  a f f e c t  th e  n a t io n a l  revenue  which d e r iv e s  from 
such a c t i v i t i e s ,  the  lab o u r  f o r c e ,  and a lso  th e  e x p e n d i tu re s  a t  t h i s  
s t a g e .(2 7 )
One th in g ,  however, does seem obv ious, -ad t h i s  i s  th.- t  s in c e  th e  
p o l ic y  of "No more C oncessions"  v;.s p roc la im ed , the  companies have 
redu ced  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t h e i r  e x p lo ra to ry  a c t i v i t i e s , (  2P>) P x p lo r e t io n
(23) Mr. M artinez  i s  C h ie f  of the  Enforcem ent Departm ent of th e  
O rg a n is a t io n  of th e  Pe tro leum  e x p o r t in g  C o u n t r ie s ,  and D e leg a te  of 
V enezuela  i n  th e  Permanent C ounc il  of the f o r I d  Pe tro leum  C ongress .
(24) M artin e z , A n ib a l ; M0ur Ohf t ^ .  Our t O il"  , p \ge 44 .
(25) £ b id ,  page 44
(26) I b i d .
(27) Casado, B z e q u ie l  M.; 1 ;E c o n o m i a J T p l i t i c a  y  L e g is la  cion_ jde 
Hi d r  oc a rbur  o_s" C aracas -  19 §2, page 62.
(28) We s h a l l  see th e  P e tro leum  P o l i c v  a t  the* -t-n-? ~ —-1- - -
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had g r a d u a l ly  reach ed  20^668 thousand  h e c ta r e s  "by 1958, and soon a f t e r
"began to  "be reduced  l e - v in g  on ly  814 thousand "by th e  end of 19&5
( s e e  Table  IV -  2 ) .  As a r e s u l t  of t h i s ,  th e re  was on ly  a t r i v i a l
in c r e a s e  (l?o) of p roven  r e s e rv e s  i n  19^5 , most of *,.hich due to
r e v i s i o n s , (29) and th e  I n d u s t r y 's  expec ted  o p e ra t in g  p e r io d  /r; s been
reduced  from a t h e o r e t i c a l  d u ra t io n  of 1J y ea rs  i n  1958 to  14 y e a r s .
V e n e z u e la 's  pe tro leu m  p o l ic y  does not. go a g a in s t  e x p lo r a t io n ,  as
one cou ld  th in k ,  b u t  only  a g a in s t  handing out more c o n ce ss io n s  to  th e  o i l
companies which would d e la y  the  time i n  which the In d u s t ry  would pass to
th e  e n t i r e  domain of the  s t a t e  o i l  company, "C orporac ion  V enezolana d e l
P e t ro le o "  (C .V .P .) .  The form er o i l  M in is te r ,  Dr J , P e Perez-Al-fonzo has
s t r e s s e d  th e  need f o r  more e x p lo r a t io n  on d i f f e r e n t  o c c a s i o n s , (30)
and th e  same can be s a id  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  Dr. M„ Perez-G -uerrero  who h e ld
th e  same p o s i t i o n  u n t i l  r e c e n t l y .  (31) However, th ey  i n s i s t  t h a t
e x p lo r a t io n  shou ld  be done on the e x i s t i n g  co n cess io n s  a l l e g i n g  t h a t
th ey  have n o t  been  a d e q u a te ly  e x p lo r e d , (32) The a t t i t u d e  of the
V enezuelan  G-overnment i s  t h a t  4s long as i d l e  a re a s ,  g ra n te d  f o r
developm ent, s t i l l  e x i s t ,  th e re  i s  no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  more c o n c e s s i o n ! ^  
Mr, M artinez  c o n s id e rs  "adequate  e x p lo ra t io n "  to  be th e  " v e r i f i c a t i o n "
of the  p re s e n c e ,  or absence of pe tro leum  i n  the  fa v o u ra b le  t r a p s  found
(29) See Table  IV -  6
(30) P e rez -A lfo n zo , J 0P 0; "Petroleum  P o l i c y " , f i n i s t r y  of f i n e s  and
Hydrocarbons -  V enezuela ; page 24.
(31) Perez-G -uerrero , M; " H e e n s i  d e r a c io n e s '' * I n i s  t r y  of Mines
and Hydrocarbons -  V enezuela ; pages 20-21.
(32) P e tro leum  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  November 19&5, P‘^ e 431.
(33) P e rez -A lfo n zo , J . P e ; Op.Cijs, page 24.
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and d e l in e a t e d  by the  v a r io u s  e x p lo r a t i o n  m e th o d s ,(34) accord ing  
to  t h i s  g e o lo g i s t ,  w i ld c a t  d r i l l i n g  i s  th e  on ly  t o o l  known in  t h i s  
r e s p e c t ,  and as th e  end of 1964 on ly  42/o of the  V enezuelan  b a s in s  
(e x p lo re d  i n  94/0 undergone o i l  t e s t i n g  th ro u g h  what i s  known as 
e x p lo r a to r y  d r i l l i n g . (35) However, i t  seems l o g i c a l  t h a t  the o i l  
companies would have v e r i f i e d  the  b e t t e r  p ro s p e c ts  of th e s e  f i e l d s  
l e a v in g  the  more d o u b tfu l  beh'.nd and, having  a tim e l i m i t  imposed w ith  
th e  e x p ir in g  of the  co n cess io n  c o n t r a c t s  i n  the  r e l a t i v e l y  neer  f u t u r e  
(most co n cess io n s  w i l l  b eg in  to  e x p ire  In  1983), (38) t^ e se  concessionaires 
cou ld  f e e l  t h a t  th e r e  was no t time enough to  recoup  the in v es tm en ts  v/hich 
would be n e c e ssa ry  to  develop  th e s e  h ig h e r  c o s t  f i e l d s .  "Costs a re  
c o n s id e re d  over th e  rem ain ing  l i f e  of the f i e l d  ( f o r  the  c o n c e s s io n a ire  
th e  l i f e  of th e  f i e l d  i s  a ls o  l im i te d  to  th e  time th e  co n cess io n  e x p i r e s ) ,  
*•* and d e c i s io n s  on in v es tm en ts  and p ro d u c t io n  ° re  made on t h a t  
b a s i s " ,(3 7 )
B)_ R eser v es
World crude o i l  r e s e r v e s  f o r  1965 were e s t im a te d  to  be of th e  o rd e r  
of 364^981 m i l l io n  of b a r r e l s  of which a breakdown i s  p re s e n te d  i n  
Table IV -  5 . The g r e a t e r  p ro p o r t io n  of th e s e  (62^>) a re  l o c a te d  i n  
th e  Middle E a s t  and a t  p r e s e n t ,  V enezuela  occu p ies  the  sev en th  p lace  
among th e  major c o u n t r i e s  w ith  re sev es  a f t e r  Kuw ait, Saudi A rab ic , I r a n ,  
U nited  S t a t e s ,  R u ss ia  and I r a q ,  -with a p p ro x im a te ly  5h> of the  t o t a l  f i g u r e .  
P r e s e n t  r e s e rv e s  seem to  be more than  adequa te  to  cover ex p ec ted  demand
(34) M a r t in e z , Aniba1; Op^CIt, page 45
(35) I b i d .
( 36 ) Casado, E ze q u ie l  M. ; Op. CjLt( page 38.
(37) Adelrmn M.A,; "The 'CorId O il  Outlook" i n  "N a tu ra l  R esources and 
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up to  th e  end of the  century, and th e re  a re  a t  p r e s e n t  "no i n d i c a t i o n s  
of an emerging t r e n d  tow ards lon g -te rm  s h o r t a g e " .(3 8 )  fu r th e rm o re ,  
acco rd ing  to  0 oP .I ;oCo, th e  re s e rv e  p o s i t i o n  ' 'w i l l  be f u r t h e r  s t re n g th e n e d  
by improvement of metnods i n  secondary r e c o v e r y " .(3 9 )
P r o f e s s o r  M.A. Adelman a l s o  seems to  f i n d  c u r r e n t  w orld  r e s e r v e s  a t  a 
"co m fo rtab le"  l e v e l  even a c c e p t in g  a world demand (e x c lu d in g  the  S o v ie t  
sphere)  of 15 b i l l i o n  b a r r e l s  pe r  annum by 1975 .(40 ) P r o f e s s o r  Adelman 
does n o t  v e n tu re  i n to  g iv in g  an op in ion  of th e  s i t u a t i o n  a f t e r  1975 
f o r  c o n s id e r in g  i t  on ly  a "g u ess" ,  b u t  i n  any esse  he does seem to  agree  
t h a t  th e r e  w i l l  be p l e n ty  f o r  as  f  r  as one can  f o r e s e e .
"O il  R esources"  i s  a term  used  by the  i n d u s t r y  n i ic n  in c lu d e s  th ree  
d i f f e r e n t  v a r i a n t s  of the o i l  w e a lth  of t. c o u n try :  ,■.) tne  cum ula tive
p ro d u c t io n  up to  a g iven  moment, b) the volume of proved r e s e r v e s  a t  the 
same i n s t a n t ,  and c) th e  e s t im a te  of -probable r e s e r v e s :  i . e .  o f  f u t u r e  
d i s c o v e r i e s  which w i l l  be economical 1y e x p l o i t a b l e ,  ( 4 l )  Such n 
e s t im a te  of V enezuelan  o i l  r e s o u rc e s  wrs made by  ...niibal M artinez  i n  
196 l,(A 2) b u t  h i s  work was r e c e n t l y  b ro u g h t  up to  d a te  by
(38) O .P .E .C . "The Development of Pe tro leum  Resources  under th e
C o u n tr ie s " ,  page 15 .
(39) I b i d
(4 0 ) Adelman, M,A0: Q p^C it. page 98
(41) M artin ez , A n iba l,  "N u e s t r o P e t r o le o .  Def e nse, de un Recurso 
Ag o ta b le " t Geneva - 1963, page 71.
(4 2 ) I b i d ,  page 62
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Dr, P e re z -A lfo n z o .(43) ^hey conclude t h - t  o i l  r e s o u rc e s  i n  Y e rez u e la  
c re  of the  o rd e r  of 80^,500 m i l l io n  b a r r e l s  of o i l  which might 
" e v e n tu a l ly 1' even re a c h  the  g lo b a l  f ig u r e  of 100,000 m i l l io n ,  (44)
To a r r iv e  a t  such a f ig u r e  of 80^500 m i l l io n  b a r r e l s ,  the cu m ula tive  
p ro d u c t io n  f o r  19&5 s e t  a t  20/ 500 m i l l io n  b a r r e l s ;  th e  volume of 
proved  r e s e rv e s  were e s t im a te d  a t  30^000 m i l l io n  b a r r e l s , (4-5) and a 
f u r t h e r  30^000 m i l l io n  b a r r e l s  were c o n s id e red  as th e  " c o n s e rv a t iv e "  
measure f o r  p ro b ab le  r e s e r v e s .
Due to  the  r e d u c t io n  of e x p lo r a t io n  i n  V enezuela  (10,116 IV -  2) 
proved r e s e rv e s  have shown ve ry  l i t t l e  expansion  s in c e  1959-1960, and 
even r e g i s t e r e d  a n e t  r e d u c t io n  du ring  19&1 and 1962 as can be seen  i n  
Table IV -  6, As we saw In  a p rev io u s  c h a p te r ,  th e  in c r e a s e  i n  proved 
r e s e r v e s  can be o b ta in e d  by r e v i s io n s  of p rev io u s  e s t im a te s ,  by an 
e x te n s io n  of known r e s e r v e s  v/hicu i s  accom plished by i n t e n s i f y i n g  e x p lo ra ­
t i o n  i n  known d e p o s i t s ,  and t h i r d l y ,  by the  d i s c o v e r i e s  of new f i e l d s .  
D uring 1965 , 74--3?o of the  i n c r e - s e  i n  r e s e r v e s  was due to  r e v i s io n s ,
(43) nV e r t i c e u , Ju ly -A u g u s t ,  1966, page 14.
(4 4 ) M artinez , A n ib a l;  ”|J u e s t r u _ P e t ro le o 4 D efensa de  ^ un Recurso 
Ago-t a b l e " ,  page 62.
(4 5 ) A ccording to  D r, P e re z -A lfo n z 0 , r e s e r v e s  i n - s i t u  i n  Venezuela a re  
e s t im a te d  to  be appro x im ate ly  90/000 m i l l io n  b a r r e l s .  To t h i s  
f i g u r e  the  o i l  companies app ly  a rec o v e ry  f a c t o r  o f  2Q/o and th u s  
th e y  a r r iv e  to  a f i g u r e  o f p u b l is h e d  or p roved r e s e r v e s  of 
l8 / 000 m i l l io n  b a r r e l s  (17/367 m i l l io n ,  see Table IV -  6 ) .
However, th e  M in is t ry  c o n s id e rs  t h a t  a rec o v e ry  f a c t o r  of 2C$>
i s  ex trem ely  lonf c o n s id e r in g  ex p e r ien c es  o f  o th e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  
and thus a p p l i e s  a f a c t o r  of 337^  'which b r in g s  proven  r e s e rv e s  
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20.3% to  in te n s iv e  e x p lo r a t io n  i n  known d e p o s i t s ,  arid on ly  5*4% to  new 
d i s c o v e r i e s  (Table IV -  6 ) .  Taking 3 lo n g e r  p e r io d  we f i n d  t h a t  from 
1963 to  1965 75% of the  ircrease  was a r e s u l t  of r e v i s i o n s .  C o n s id e r in g  
th e  n, what th e  o i l  companies' e s t im a te  of V enezuelan  r e s e r v e s  i s ,  the  
c o u n try  has o i l  to  l a s t  an o th e r  f o u r t e e n  y e a rs  a t  the  p r e s e n t  r a t e  of 
p ro d u c t io n .
C) P ro d u c t io n
P ro d u c t io n  i n  I 965 averaged  a l i t t l e  over 30 m i l l io n  b a r r e l s  d a i l y  
(Table  IV -  7 ) ,  which r e p r e s e n t s  an in c r e a s e  of app rox im ate ly  7% w ith  
r e s p e c t  to  the  p rev io u s  y e a r .  In  f ^ c t ,  such hns been  th e  average 
annual increa .se  over the  l o s t  decade and i t  seems t.i  t  i t  i s  a l s o  the 
g e n e ra l  p r e d i c t i o n  up to  1970 ( 4 6 ) .  The u n i te d  ot,-.tes was th e  main 
p roducer w ith  26% of th e  t o t a l ,  f o l i o  ed by R uss ia  arf Venezuela w ith  
16 /0  and 12% r e s p e c t iv e ly .  The Middle ’ . .-t as a -/hols however, su r ­
passed  the  U nited  S t a te s  by p roducing  2'v .' of th e  -’o r ld  t o t  1.
I n  V enezu e la ,  most of th e  crude (80%) i s  p roduced i n  the  v<e s t e r n  
re g io n  of the  c o u n try  i n  the  M aracaibo, U lcon, and Apure b a s in s ,  
and the  r e s t  from the e s t e r n  p a r t ,  known as th e  O rien t .\1  b a s in ,  (47)
The crude e x p lo i t e d  i n  1965 «as of an -average g r a v i t y  of 2%.8C A . P . I . , ( 4 8 ) ,  
which f a l l s  i n  th e  medium range  of c ru d e s ,  formed by 30% heavy crudes
(46) 0 0P cP oCo, " E l a s t i  c i t y  o f Demand f o r  j l ru d e ^ O il j  I t s  I m p l ic a t io n s  
fo r_ U x ^ q r tin g  C o u n tr ie s ' '  y page 31; and *'The _Pe v elopment  ^of
P e t  r o l e  urn Re s ource s _ Und e r  th e  C once s s i on J3 y s t  e nyJL n _ N on- 
I n d u s t r i a l i z e d  C o u n tr ie s  " , page 12.
(47) M in is t ry  of Mines and Hydrocarbons -  V en ezu e la ,  "Memojri;n ~_1965", 
page IV -  31.
(48) C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of crude acco rd in g  to  th e  "American P e tro leum  
I n s t i t u t e "  which d iv id e s  crude o i l  c o n s id e r in g  i t s  g r a v i ty .
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( l e s s  than 19.9° A .P . I . ) ,  35/9 medium crudes ("between 20.0° ,md 29-9° A .P . I . ) ,  
and 35^- 11 .h t  crudes (more tlr .n  30.0° A .P . I . ) .  (49) In  the  l a s t  few yea rs ,  
however, the  o i l  companies h- re  r a i s e d  the p ro p o rt io n  of the heav ie r  crudes 
(medium and heavy) in  Venezuela’ s production p a t t e r n  because of the  favourab le  
accept - nee of these  in  b -th the European and American markets due to  
i n d u s t r i a l  requirem ents . (50) Venezuela has r e a l i s e d  th  t  although th i s  
deprives h e r  of h ig h er  r o y a l t i e s  s ince  they  a re  regarded as o f lo v e r  q u a l i ty  
and as such a re  acco rd ing ly  p r ic e d ,  i t  perm its  her to  m ain ta in  markets 
which cannot be s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th e  l i g h t e r  crudes from o th e r  soui’ces. ( 5l )
As mentioned e a r l i e r ,  production  i s  mainly in  the hands of th ree  
companies. However, i n  Table IV -  8 we see how th ese  Companies have been 
lo s in g  c o n tro l  of the  p roductive  s tage  due m ostly to  the  en try  of independent 
f irm s . In  Table IV ~ 9 we can a lso  follo*r the  co u n try ’ s y e a r ly  output s ince  
1520, which ~ reaches a m il l io n  b a r r e l s  per d a l  in  1946, two m il l io n  b a r r e l s  
d a i ly  in., 1955 y and a l  io.-1 a r r iv e s  a t  3-5 m il l io n s  of b a r r e l s  per day in  1965.
In  the  s e r i e s  we n o t ic e  fo u r  years  in  which th e re  was a reduc tion  in  
production; 1942, 1949, 1953 and 1958. The red u c t io n  in  1942 was due to  
the presence of German submarines in  the Caribbean during  the war which 
made t r a n s p o r ta t io n  of c ru le  o i l  more d i f f i c u l t .(52) In  1949 and 1953 
p roduction  was a f f e c te d  by the  rec ess io n s  in  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y  in  the 
United S ta te s ,  and in  ,1958 i t  i s  a l leg e d  th a t  i t  was the  r e s u l t  01 world
(49) Banco C entra l de Venezuela, ’’Informe Economico -  1965’h page 247
(50) Ib id
(51) This w i l l  be analysed f u r t h e r  in  a fo llow ing  ch ap te r .
(52) Banco C entral de Venezuela; ’’R ev is ta  T r im e s t r a l 11 A pril-June  1965, page 46
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Table IV -  8
P e rc e n t  Produ c t i on of Crude in  Venezuela by R ajo r Companies*1
194-5 1950 1955 I960 1965
Creole  P e t r o l eum Corp., 54-5 45-8 45-5 38.4  37.4
( je r s e y  Standard)
Cia„ S he ll  de Venezue la  25-2 30.8 28.2 26.5 27.7
( d o y r1 Dut c h -S h e l l )
15.4 13-5 14.7 14.1 . 11.8
(Oulf Oil Company)
Others 4.9  9-9 11.6 J23-0  „.23z l
T o h l  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source; M in is try  o i  Mines and Hydrocarbons -  Venezuela, 




H i ......... % chc:,ne;(










194-8 1 .338 ,75S 12.4
1949 1,321,372 -  1.3
1950 1;497,988 13.4
1951 1,704,648 13 . S
1952 1,803,915 5 .8
1953 1*764,994 -  2.2












Source; nMernoris1 -  1965, M in is try  of Mines and Hydrocarbons.;, page 1 - 1 6 9
c m  « < w n w «
106
wide adjustm ents in  the supply p a t te rn  a f t e r  th -  Suez c r i s i s .  (53)
World r e f  ini,!.:' c apac ity  stood a t  34; 883 thous nd b a r r e l s  d a i ly  by the 
end oi 1965 o± which 3V' was loca ted  in  the American in d u s try ,  25)-- in  Western 
tlurope and approxim ately 6% in  Japan. Venezuela’ s r e f in in g  cap ac ity  ( th e  
h ig h es t  of the  major exporting  co u n tr ies )  a t  the end of 1965 was 1 ,2  m il l io n  
b a r r e l s  d a i ly  which rep re se n ts  approximately 3-6% ox the  w orld’s capac ity  
However i t  i s  sometimes u se fu l  to  include  the capacity  of the  Dutch is la n d s  
of Aruna and Curacao which a re  r ig h t  o f f  the coast ox" Venezuela and r e f in e
i
Venezuelan o i l ,  i n  o rder  to  g ive a more re p re s e n ta t iv e  f ig u re  of the 
r e f in in g  cap ac ity  of the a re a .  Including  then th e  r e f in in g  cap ac ity  of 
the  Dutch i s la n d s ,  which i s  of 740/000 b/D, we a r r iv e  a t  a g lobal f ig u re  
of approxim ately 1.9 m il l io n  b/D fo r  the  a rea , or 6^ of world capacity  
(Table IV -  10).
The r e f in in g  s tage  in  Venezuela beg n to  ga in  importance a f t e r  the 
in t ro d u c t io n  of the "Refining Clause" in  the  Petroleum Law of 1943.(54)
Since then , a growing p ropo rt io n  of crude has been r e f in e d  in  the  country 
reach ing  by 1965 34% ox -production. (Table IV -  l l )  At the  eud of 1965 
th e re  were 15 r e f i n e r i e s  in  Venezuela oi vuich the  major ones a re  Amuay 
R efinery  (435/000 b/D capacity ) owned by the  Creole Petroleum Corporation
(53) P a rra  and Poc t e r r  ,' O p .C it ,  p :‘ge 15.
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( j e r s e y  Stand d ) , -..nd the  C a rd on fief 1 eery  (515,000 b/D capacity ) owned 
ay the S he ll  group. (55) Thes ; tiro comp..nies alone hold 72y of the 
coun try1 s capac ity ,  ,-nd i i  we include  the r e f in e ry  of Puerto La Cruz owned 
by Lena Grade (Gulf Oil Company), ■ 3)’o of c ap ac ity  i s  he ld  by j u s t  th ree  
comp n ie s  (Table IV -  12). I t  m.„y a lso  be i n t e r e s t i n g  to  poin t ou t, th a t  
in  1J65 93,. o f  the  c o u n try 's  capac ity  was used, which i s  undoubtedly a  h igh 
pro ,00 3? t  i  on j g iv ing  f o r th  a r e f in e ry  y ie ld  made up mainly of f u e l  o i l  (6Cy-)> 
Diesel-Gas Oil ( 17;h), and Gasoline and L'aphth* ( 12;V.). (See Table IV -  11)
E)Investmen ts
V/e h ve already seen the  investment p a t te r n  of the petroleum in d u s try  
in  a p revious ch ap te r .  however, i t  seems necessary  a t  t h i s  po in t  to  take  
0 look a t  the  p .- t te rn  of c a p i ta l  expenditures of the  i n t e r n a i  onal o i l  
in d u s try  f o r  1965. Analysing Tatne IV -  Ip we tiucl t lv  t  almost h a l f  of 
t h i s  expenditure  ( 4By) vent to  the American in d u s try ,  a n  another heavy 
p rop o rtion  (lGJo) to  Western Europe. These two main -rea.sv favoured by new 
expend itu re , were followed by the  Fer East 6>f Canada S;b, Middle East 5au 
A fr ica  5,-v Je s te r , .  Hemisphere (excluding the J 'n ited  S ta te s ,  Canada and 
Venezuela) 5,-> ■■■■nd Venezuela 2y.-.
C ap ita l  expenditure  in  tne  Venezuelan petroleum in d u s t ry  during 1965 
t o t a l l e d  200 m il l io n  d o l la r s ,  a  reduced f ig u re  i f  we were to  compare i t  w ith  
prev ious years  e s p e c ia l ly  p r io r  to  I960. In th i s  re sp ec t  we c.-ui see the  
r e s u l t s  of such lower new expenditure  in  T.-dole IV -  14. A t f i r s t  glance we 
f in d  th a t  the  g ross  value of f ix ed  a s s e ts  h s been in c re a s in g  to the  cu rren t
(55) M in is try  of Mines and Hydrocarbons -  Venezuela, nPe tipple 0 y Gtros Pat os 


















H*H  P 3H piVDOvffiov'S;v* pj
3hd o 
P o0*} P 
CD hi




























o TJ H3 w o <S GO o6 P 4 CD H- t r o ' p 3* 3<3 H* M 3 p CT4 3 p P0 h-1 p o < H- p H Ohd H 03 M 3 H tSJ H HH- P O p P*3 hd H- 3 o H Pi03 p hi H- P P hich o H 3 p
11 4 o H* <  ct-P O H- I—1 O O P 3C+- H H O P 3 Oh! CD i-d O J! H p
j_i
O p o hd CS) P
1—’ 0 P • P p PCD i-b 3 p &P O • *<! H
& O* P oo
5
vn I—1 Vn Vn —j o
O Vn O vo Vn vo
* 1 I -* V* 1 '• M jvno o fO o ov o
-J o o -J o o oo o o O O o o
Vn 3 IO toro W Vn Vn o oO ro O  Vn vo vo vn
\» j i '• ^ 1I v# Nft00 H o o f_J o o\ OVN o o o Vn o O oo  j O o o O o O o
H  Vm f -  H Vn Vn Vn IO DO f—1 ro vn o  vn On vn h1 vo vn
v n v n o o o t o r o o v v n
o o o o o o o o oo o o o o o o o o
H1 Vn Vn 
H Vn .p- ©o Vm Vn O 
iOVNO CO Vn OVO HVD
V N C o o o v n v n o o v r o























hd 3 CD 
CD 33 
3 jp 
























M |o  |—1 Do -t~
o  | o o  o v n Vn o w n v o  ro




































































































































cl£  p  p  
P 4 PI—1 pjI—1 td l—1 
o P 0 o co 




& °  b  ® c+
4  0  S '



































H f* 0  H W H *v|
M O - J  Vn -d  Cn QV
O Vl Vo O Vo Vo VO o  o
P  IV)co o  -v ro vm ro




V n V r i O O V o O O O O
IO *V P  OV
Vo Vo 00 P  ro P  Vm O 
O O O vn O Vo O VO O
I—1 P  VO
p h  -v o  ro ro
OVoVn OVo O O Vo Vn
I—1
\4
Vm CO I—j O
o  ro -o VrO h  o  o  
O O O V n O V o O O  o
ro
Vm V o  OV r o  H  r o
o o o  0  0  0  0 ) 0  VO
P ro ov
H-1 CO ov CT\ O  <T\ ro -V Vm 
--J O  [O OVjl O  O V o m I 
Vo O  Vn O O O O O V o
CD OV - f -  - S  VO -fr* p  V o  0 3  








• P  Pis Si




























19 ?ffl b  p
5£ P  O 
j p  ct* ct* 
s j H *  P P 






















p  4  O jj£ 
P i P 
I—11 eh 
P P  H’ kO 0
So















Table Iv -  14
1 A , ots_pr_ the  .J^ene^ue 1 an Oil In d u s tr y ”
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le v e l  ( f o r  1965) of 20,057 m il l io n  b o l iv a r s .  However, tak in g  a c lo s e r  look 
a t  the s e r i e s j  we n o t ic e  th a t  the  s e t  value of these  a s s e t s , i . e .  ne t 
investment in  X’ixed a s s e t s ,  reached i t s  h ig h es t  l e v e l  i n  1959 and from then 
beg-n to  f a l l  constantly ., Since t ie  t  year tn e re  has been a reduc tion  in  the  
amount of -new c a p i ta l  expenditure  aimed io  expand the i n d u s t r y  and consider!, 
th a t  d e p re c ia t io n  and am o rtisa t io n  fo llow  t, ,e i r  normal coume, we thus f in d  
th a t  a period  of d isinvestm ent has been c h a ra c te r iz in g  t.-o o i l  in d u s try  s ince  
I960. (Table IV -  14).
The s i t u a t io n  seems to imply tn  t  t .  o o i l  companies do not i in d  a t  
prese: t  any stim ulus f o r  f u r th e r  expension in  Venezuela, anc. thus li.vve 
conce-jtr.;.ted t h e i r  opera tions  in  o th e r  a reas  of the  world. There . re  two 
main reasons f o r  t h i s  which w i l l  be analysed L - te r ,  bu t a t  t h i s  po in t  we may 
ju s t  mention then, co s ts  and t i e  petroleum p o l ic y  of the  host government.
I l k
I I I  S ig nificano_e__of t h e__QiI  I ndustry^ j o  t he Venezue la n  Economy; ,
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  e x a g g e ra te  the  im portance  of pe tro leu m  in  
V e n ez u e la 's  economy. Pe tro leum  w ea lth  has f in a n c e d  the  c o u n t r y 's  
economic growth and has made Venezuela one of th e  r i c h e s t  c o u n t r ie s  
i n  i . a t in  Am erica. I t  was the  p e tro leum  in d u s t r y  t h a t  gave the  economy 
the  b a s ic  s t im u lu s  as a source  of f i s c a l  re v e n u e ,  s a v in g s ,  and of f o r e ig n  
exchange and enab led  o th e r  s e c to r s  of the  economy to  d ev e lo p . Using 
revenues  d e r iv e d  l a r g e l y  from r o y a l t i e s  and income ta x e s  p a id  by th e  
o i l  com panies, G-overnments have been a b le  t o  encourage I n d u s t r i a l  
expansion  and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  and a t  the  same t im e ,  devote  in c r e a s in g  
a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  e d u c a t io n ,  housing  and h e a l th  o f  i t s  p e o p le .  Below 
th e n ,  we a n a ly se  some o f  the  more im portan t  c o n t r ib u t io n s  of th e  pe tro leum  
s e c to r  to  th e  V enezuelan  economy in  o rd e r  t o  have a more a c c u ra te  b a s i s  
to  judge th e  s ig n i f i c a n c e  o f  th i s  in d u s t ry  to  th e  c o u n try .
As we can see from t a b l e  IV -  17, o i l  has had a, predom inant share  
o f  th e  G-ross Domestic P roduct a l l  th roughou t our s e r i e s .  I n  1963 i t  
p a r t i c i p a t e d  w ith  ap p ro x im a te ly  Z]% of th e  &.D.P. which i s  th e  l a r g e s t  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  made by any p a r t i c u l a r  s e c to r  o f th e  economy (se e  t a b l r  IV -  
1 6 ) .  However, we might have n o t ic e d  t h a t  th e  pe tro leum  i n d u s t r y ’ s 
c o n t r i b u t io n  t o  G-.D.P. has been lo s in g  some w e ig h t .  T h is  i s  due p a r t l y  
to  the  development o f  th e  r e s t  o f  the  economy which i s  f o r t u n a t e l y  making 
th e  c o u n try  l e s s  dependent on one m ajor source  o f  income, b u t  a l s o  due to  
th e  weakning of V e n ez u e la 's  p o s i t i o n  i x  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o i l  i n d u s t r y  
coupled  w ith  the  f a l l  i n  o i l  p r i c e s .  In  any c a s e ,  o i l  i s  s t i l l  th e  
m ajor c o n t r i b u to r  t o  V e n e z u e la 's  G-.D.P. w hich, a s  a p o in t  of f u r t h e r  
i n t e r e s t ,  we may m ention  t h a t  i t s  growth ou tp aces  . th e  c o u n t r y 's  p o p u la t io n
DIAGRAM IV -1
Growth of G.D.R Outpaces Population Increase
In d e x  320  
1950 =  100
'Table I H 5
Index 









1 9 6 0  1!
G.D.P PER CAPITA
1950 100 100 100
1955 122 151 124
1960 146 217 148
1965 173 322 186
S O U R C E  -  Mi n i s t r y  ot  Mi ne s  and H y d r o c a r b o n s  -  V e n e z u e l a  ■“ P e t r o l e o  y O t r o s  D a t o s  
E s t a d i s t i c o s ”  1 9 6 5 ,  p a g e  2
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Table IV -  16
 Com positio n  of Venezue la* s  &.D.P. ( 196b) _ ^
^ m i l l io n s  o f b o l iv a r s  a d ju s te d  to  1957 prices")
&to
A g r ic u l tu re  2 ,*395 7 • 1
Mining 402 1*2
P etro leum   8 *_984 26 .6
T o ta l  P rim ary  S e c to r  * 1 1 f781 34.9
M anufacture 4 .921  14*6
C o n s t ru c t io n  1 T527 4*5
Energy ^ZQ§. 2 .1
T o ta l  Secondary S e c to r  7*150 21 .2
Commerce 4 r730 4*0
T ra n s p o r t  1 .358 14 .0
S e rv ic e s  S .746 25 .9
T o ta l  T h ird  S e c to r  14*834 43*9
T o ta l  G-.D.P. 3 3 f765 100,0
Source: C e n tra l  Bank of V enezuela: ’’Informe Pconor;icoI! 1965j
page 129«
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Tab le  I V -  17
G-ross  Dome s t i c  Frcd u c t  __
^ m i l l io n s  of b o l i v a r s  ad .iusted  to  1957 p r i c e s )
G.D.P. Pe_troleujn £
1950 12,728 3,797 29.8
1951 14,212 4,323 3 0 .4
1952 15,248 4 ,594 30 .1
1953 16,190 4 ,500 27 .8
1954 17,749 4,842 27.3
1955 19,325 5 ,514 28.5
1956 21,366 6,300 29 .5
1957 23,848 7,135 29-9
1958 24 .164 6,708 27.8
1959 26.065 7,154 2 7 .4
I960 26,433 7 .3 8 4 27.9
1961 26,681 7 ,5 5 4 28 .1
1962 28,585 8,279 29.0
1963 29,765 8,403 28.2
196k 32,135 8,807 27 .4
1965 33,765 8 ,9 8 4 26.6
Source: Banco C e n tra l  de V enezuela: :‘La Econoinia y e n e z c lana en lo_s
Ultimo s_ V e i n t i c i noo An o s '1' ,  pages 22 and 24. ;:I r ^ r m e  
Ecjtnoniico:t 1965, page 129
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Ta b le IV -  18
N a tio n a l  I ncome
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Source: M in is t ry  o f Mines and Hydrocarbons -  V enezuela ;
y  O tros P a t  os S s t a d i s t i c o s  '• 1965, page 2.
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in c re a s e  ( t a b l e  IV -  15) •
'7 i th  r e s p e c t  to  f o r e ig n  in v es tm en ts  pe tro leum  h o ld s  p r a c t i c a l l y  the  
t o t a l  f i g u r e  ( t a b l e  IV -  19)- Por 1964 (which a t  the  moment of w r i t in g  
i s  th e  most r e c e n t  f i g u r e  a v a i l a b l e ) ,  t o t a l  f o r e i g n  in v es tm en ts  reach ed  
23,453  m i l l io n  b o l iv a r s  of which approx im ate ly  884 was a l l o c a t e d  i n  the  
pe tro leu m  In d u s t r y .  The same can be s a id  concern ing  e x p o r t s .
Pe tro leum  e x p o r ts  r e p r e s e n te d  934 cf the  t o t a l  v a lu e  of Venezuelan e x p o rts  
i n  1965 ( t a b l e  IV -  20 ) .
The most r e v e a l in g  y a r d s t i c k  of th e  o i l  i n d u s t r y ' s  s ig n i f i c a n c e  to  
th e  Venezuelan economy however, may be i t s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  the  c o u n t r y 's  
b a la n ce  o f  payments ( t a b l e  IV -  2 l ) . By a n a ly s in g  th e  ba lance  of 
paym ents , one th in g  becomes c lea .r ,  and t h a t  i s  how th e  co u n try  l i v e s  on 
o i l*  O il  e x p o rts  have p e rm it te d  to  f in a n c e  th e  h ig h  l e v e l  of im ports  to  
s a t i s f y  i n t e r n a l  demand of b o th  consumer and c a p i t a l  goods which s t i l l  
a re  n o t  produced l o c a l l y .  ITe may a l s o  n o t ic e  t h a t  i n  s p i t e  of th e  heavy 
d e f i c i t  i n  th e  b a la n ce  o f  payments i n  i 960 and minor ones in  1961, 1962 
and 1965> th e  f i v e  y e a r  p e r io d  has produced  a g lo b a l  s u rp lu s  of over 
100 m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  due m ain ly  to  th e  p roceed s  o f  th e  o i l  s e c t o r .  This 
becomes q u i te  s i g n i f i c a n t  co n s id e r in g  the  c a p i t a l  f l i g h t  which has been 
c h a r a c t e r i z in g  the  o i l  i n d u s t r y  i n  Venezuela which fu r th e rm o re  was 
a g g ra v a te d  du ring  th e  beg inn ing  of t h i s  decade w ith  t h a t  of the  r e s t  cf 
th e  economy due t o  p o l i t i c a l  u n c e r t a i n t y .
Venezuela,' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s e rv e s  a re  a l s o  m ain ly  the  r e s u l t  o f  h e r  
pe tro leum  w e a l th .  In  1940 (2 ,yeais after Venezuela became the  w o r ld 's  major 
o i l  e x p o r t e r ,  a p o s i t i o n  which she s t i l l  holds), h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  re se rv e ^  
reach ed  o n ly  31 m i l l io n  d o l l a r s  ( t a b l e  IV -  2 2 ) .  Ten y e a r s  l a t e r  th ey
120
Tab le ; IV -_19
F o re ig n  Invest '.[lent i n  Venezuela
( m i l l io n s of b o l iv a r s )
T o ta l  f o r e i g n Petro leum
Inves tm en t  ^ I n d u s t ry C?’/Ol,~
1°50 8,893 8,245 92 .7
1951 9 f 369 8 ,5 9 4 91 .7
1952 1 0 T209 9,095 89 .1
1953 11,230 9,6?3 8 6 .4
195V 12,437 10,702 86*0
1955 1 3 f328 11,329 85 .0
1956 15,753 1 3 f193 83*8
1957 18,922 15,554 82*2
195V 20,247 16,984 83 .9
1959 20,621 17,449 84 * 6
i960 21,137 18,506 87 .6
1961 21,488 18,708 37 .1
1962 21,142 18,105 85 .6
1963 20,747 18,020 86 .9
196V 23,453 20,512 87.5
Source: Banco C e n tra l  de Venezuela: "La Economia Ven.ezqla.na en lo s
U1 tim os VjqLntieincojhios_If pages 275 and 277 .
M in is t ry  of Mines and Hydrocarbons -  V enezuela: "Fqj^roleo^y 
O tro s Datos^ E s t a d i s t i c o s '1 1965 j page It.
Table IV - 2 0
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... __ 
( m i l l io n s  of
T o ta l
■ j )
Petroleum c'-'
1940 278 262 94.2
1950 1*155 1 ,124 97.3
1951 1,370 1,297 94*7
1952 1  ^446 1 ,38 4 95*7
1953 1,498 l f 428 95*3
1954 1,648 1 ,56 4 94*9
1955 1 ,891 1,791 94*7
1956 2 T211 2,086 9 4 o
1957 2,751 2,570 93*4
1953 2,472 2,299 93 .0
1959 2,317 2,128 9 1 . s
I960 2,384 2,175 91*2
1961 2,453 2,276 92 ,8
1962 2 ,544 2,370 93*2
1963 2 , 464 2,300 93.3
1964 2,480 2,319 93*5
1965 2,436 2,260 92 ,8
S£V-£9' Banco C e n tra l  de Venezuela: “I n f 1°rme^Econoraico*1 1965, pagers 
181 and lc'5* "I,a Ec^nomia^ Venpzolana en lo s  Ultim os 
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Source: Banco C e n tra l  de V enezuela , u.fa Bconomia yenejsqlaiia e_n_los_
U ltjiaos yei_nti_cinc_o Ano s :i 1966, page 208.
1965 , page 234.
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were t e n  t i n e s  a s  much. They p assed  the  b i l l i o n  d o l l a r  n a rk  i n  1957 
and a lth o u g h  th e y  were a f f e c t e d  as d e b ts  of th e  r e c e n t  d i c t a t o r s h i p  
began to  be paid*  they' s tood  w e ll  over 800 M i l l io n  d o l l a r s  a t  th e  end of 
1965 which i s  ab ou t a quitter o f th e  t o t a l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s e rv e s  of L a t in  
A m erica• {56)
The O il i n d u s t r y  a l s o  s u p p l ie s  th e  c o u n try  w ith  most o f  i t s  f o r e ig n  
exchange ( t a b l e  IV -  2 3 ) .  During 1965? l r£99 m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  e n te re d  
V enezuela of which 725 were p ro v id ed  by th e  pe tro leum  in d u s t r y .  Quoting 
th e  C e n tr a l  Bank of V enezuela , " i t  has been due fu n d am e n ta l ly  to  th e  h igh  
p r o p o r t io n  of f o r e ig n  exchange acc ru in g  from the  o i l  i n d u s t r y . . .which 
has enab led  th e  co u n try  to  m a in ta in  ample c o n v e r t i b i l i t y  of i t s  m onetary 
u n i t 5’ - (h?) In  l& c t ,  the  Venezuelan b o l iv a r  seems to  be co n s id e red  as 
one of th e  w o r ld ’ s h a rd e s t  c u r r e n c ie s  and i t  has been a n t i c i p a t e d  t h a t  
the  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  ' 'one ta ry  fund n ig h t  r e g a rd  i t  as  one of the  c u r re n c ie s  
rec o g n ise d  for- use in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s e t t l e m e n ts .  ( 58)
V ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e  exchange r a t e ,  we might m ention a t  t h i s  p o in t  
t h a t  Venezuela i s  c h a ra c te r iz e : !  by a system of m u l t ip le  r a t e s ,  d '.pending 
on th e  o r i g in  of th e  f o r e ig n  c u rre n c y ,  i . e .  p e tro le u m , m ining , a g r i c u l t u r e  
and g e n e ra l  p u b l i c .  Prom 1948 to  1963 the  petroleum, d o l l a r  was pu rchased  
by th e  C e n tra l  la n k  a t  a r a t e  of 3.09 b o l i v a r s .  S ince 1964? however, 
t h i s  r a t e  7/as r a i s e d  to  4*40 b o l i v a r s .  The C e n tra l  Bank thus  buys 
pe tro leum  d o l l a r s  a t  4*40 b o l iv a r s  and p ro v id es  them to  the  Commercial 
Banks a t  4 .485  which in  tu r n  s e l l s  them to  the  p u b l ic  a t  4 .50  b o l i v a r s „(59)
( 56) i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f o n e t a r y  fund  , "Annual Report  -  =1966:i, page 60.
( 57) Banco C e n tra l  de V enezuela , ;' I a Fcononia Venezolana en lo s  Ul t i m os
1966, page 193 .
( 58 ) F i r s t  N a tio n a l  C i ty  Bank, ’’Venezu e l a , An Fponomi c  .Stndy ’f  j u p f  .1966, 
page I?
( 59) Banco C e n tra l  de V enezuela , ”I.a Econoinia Venezolana en lo s  Fi t i n ios 
Xvi hl f k0 '' 1966, page 214.
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Table IV -  23
( m i l l io n  U.S. d o l la r s ^
From Petro leum
T o ta l t r j-^ndust]
1955 1 ,291 916



















7 5 .6  
72.2
Source: m in i s t r y  o f P in e s  and Hydrocarbons -  V enezuela ,
y. r0tiyos Datos. 5Jstc;di^s;fcicos:s 1965 , page 11.
‘ Petrol^eo
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C on side r ing  the  amount of pe tro leum  d o l l a r s  which e n t e r  the  C e n tra l  Bank, 
we can see t h a t  th e  p r o f i t  n a ig in  of 0.085  b o l iv a r  p e r  d o l l a r  a ls o  
p ro v id e s  the  G-overnm.ent w ith  a n o th e r  n o t  to o  n e g l i g i b l e  source of income. 
According t o  th e  C e n tra l  Bank, the  p r o f i t s  made on such t r a n s a c t io n s  
amounted to  106 m i l l io n  b o l iv a r s  in  1965 . ( 60 )
F i s c a l  r e c e i p t s  f ro . ,  the  pe tro leum  in d u s t r y  a l s o  p ro v id e  th e  
G-overnnent w ith  th e  g r e a t e r  propo: t i o n  of th e  t o t a l .  I n  1965 of the  
7 ,2 6 4  m i l l io n  b o l iv a r s  e n te r in g  the  n a t io n a l  t r e a s u r y  as o rd in a ry  
f i s c a l  r e c e i p t s ,  4*630 b o l i v a r s ,  o r  66.5/5, wore d e r iv e d  from th e  o i l  
i n d u s t r y  ( t a b l e  IV -  24 ) .
Fue to  the  e x t r a o r d in a r y  amount o f f i s c a l  r e c e i p t s ,  which as we 
s p e c i f i e d  a re  p ro v id ed  m ostly  from the  o i l  s e c t o r ,  the  Venezuelan 
G-overnnent has been  capable  of d irec ting-  ,! s u b s t a n t i a l ” a llow ances 
tow ards th e  c r e a t i o n  o: the  n e c e s sa ry  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  f o r  economic 
developm ent. ( 6l )  Thus a p p ro x im a te ly  54/7 of th e  G-overnnent' s expend­
i t u r e ,  which rea ch e d  8,250  m i l l i o n  b o l iv a r s  i n  1965 , (623 g e n e r a l l y  goes 
to  e d u c a t io n ,  h e a l t h ,  p u b l ic  works, comm unications, i n d u s t r i a l  development 
and a g r i c u l t u r e .  ( 63)
As wo se e ,  the  o i l  i n d u s t r y ' s  in f lu e n c e  re a c h e s  a l l  se c to rs -  of the  
economy. Even b e in g  a C a p i ta l  i n te n s iv e  In d u s t r y  i t  has  in f lu e n c e  on 
the  g e n e ra l  wage 3_evel of the  c o u n try .  Kany of th e  p r e r o g a t iv e s  g a in e d  
by th e  o i l  sy n d ic a te  f o r  i t s  members a re  soon sought by o th e r  la b o u r
( 60) Banco C e n tra l  de Venezuela . "Inform© Econonico p_1965% page 160.
( 61)Banco C e n tra l  do V enezuela , :i La Economic V epezoiana. en lo s  F I t i n o s  
y e in t ic in c o ^  1966 , page 221 ,
(62) Banco C on tra !  do V enezuela , ;iInljomc^_Economico_-_ 1965’' ,  page 150.
( 63) Banco Centrai__de V enezuela , Ip^pconomic. V enezolana en lo s p l l t im o s  
V ein t i c in c o  An o s ; 5 1966, page 221 ,
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J a b l e l V - ^ V
soapv>jRejde i j j t s w . 
( m i l l i o n  of b o l iv a r s )
T o ta l  fo rm al 
f i s c a l  R e c e ip ts
F i s c a l  R e c e ip ts  
d e r iv e d  from 
O il  I n d u s t r y
1940 330 98 29.7
19 SO 1,917 901 47.0
1955 2,970 1 ,714 57.7
1956 3,598 2,062 60,7
1957 4,263 2,630 62.9
195& 4,705 2,712 57.6
1959 5,441 3 ,22 4 59.3
I960 4,968 3,001 60 .4
1961 5,792 3,236 55-9
1962 5,910 3,226 54.6
1963 6,596 3,597 54.5
1964 7,133 4,766 66,8
1965 7 ,2 6 4 4 ,8  30 66.5
Source: M in is t ry  of f i n e s  and Hydrocarbons -  V enezuela , ’Tej^Eoljso
y  O tros P a t  os 5 s t a d is t_ ic o su , pages 1 and 6.
Banco C e n tra l  de V enezuela , uI n f  orme^ E c^nonico” 19 6 ,  page I f 8 ,
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unions r e s u l t i n g  in  wage in c r e a s e s  in  the  v a r io u s  s e c to r s  o f th e  economy. 
( 6 4 '  As one source  p u ts  i t ,  "wages in  th e  h ig h ly  e f f i c i e n t  p e tro leum  
i n d u s t r y  have ten ded  to  p u l l  up th o se  i n  o th e r  l e s s  p ro d u c t iv e  i n d u s t r i e s ” 
( 65) In  t h i s  way la b o u r  c o s ts  have been a f f e c t e d  to  such an e x te n t  t h a t  
th ey  have rea ch e d  l e v e l s  r e l a t i v e l y  h ig h e r  th a n  th o se  of o th e r  L a t in  
American c o u n t r i e s  making goods m anufactured  i n  Venezuela ( e s p e c i a l l y  
th ose  of la b o u r  in t e n s iv e  i n d u s t r i e s  such as  t e x t i l e s 5 l e a t h e r  p ro d u c ts ,  
and f u r n i t u r e )  d i f f i c u l t  to  compete even i n  h e r  n e ig h b o rin g  c o u n t r i e s .  ( 66) 
I n  t a b l e  IV-25 we f i n d  some r e l a t i o n s h ip s  i n  c o n n e c t io n  w ith  t h i s  
p o in t  which might be of i n t e r e s t .  f i r s t  o f  a l l  we n o t ic e  th e  low 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of th e  Pe tro leum .-Indus try*s  la b o u r  f o r c e  In  the  t o t a l  f i g u r e  
f o r  th e  economy ( l . 3 ?  i n  1964)• However, we a l s o  n o t ic e  t h a t  t h i s  1 .3 ?  
of the  la b o u r  f o r c e  accounted f o r  7 *3?' of the  t o t a l  e a rn in g s ,  i . e .  wages 
and s a l a r i e s ,  r e g i s t e r e d  in  t h a t  y e a r .  Secondly we f i n d  t h a t  the  
e a rn in g s  p e r  cp,p_ita in  th e  pe tro leum  in d u s t r y  a re  q u i te  above the n a t io n a l  
a v e ra g e ,  a lth o u g h  we reco g n ize  t h a t  t h i s  average b e a r s  f a u l t s  due to  the  
very  unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n  ox income t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  V enezuela . ( 67)
In  any c a se ,  I t  can g iv e  us an id e a  of the  h ig h e r  s ta n d a rd  of the  pe tro leum  
worker in  r e l a t i o n  to  th o se  of o th e r  s e c t o r s .  T h i r d ly ,  we n o t ic e  how th e  
Pe_r c a p i t a  e a rn in g s  r i s e  much f a s t e r  i n  the  p e tro leu m  s e c to r  th an  in  th e  
economy on a whole le n d in g  the  way so as  to  say , a s  we mentioned above. 
Taking 1930 as th e  bo.se y e a r ,  wo th u s  o b ta in  f o r  1964 a 262 index  f o r  the
( 64 ) The r e c e n t  Labour C o n trac t  between th e  O il  Companies and the  O il 
S y n d ica te  I s  p u b l is h e d  in  ' 'P e t ro le o  y  Jd iner i a  de Venezue l a 11 August 
1966, page 3 . " - - - - -  —
( 65) f i r s t  r a t i o n a l  C i ty  Bank, Ojc*a. C i t .  page 19.
(66) Pedeca maras ~ V enezuela , "Fedecameras Ante l a  A la ic 11, page 6.
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pe tro leum  worher and a 176 in d ex  f o r  the  g e n e r a l  economy.
vre must conclude re c o g n iz in g  th e n ,  t h a t  i t  has  been due t o  th e  
pe tro leum  in d u s t r y  t h a t  Venezuela en joys a h ig h e r  s ta n d a rd  of l iv i n g  
i n  r e l a t i o n  to  o th e r  l e s s  f o r t u n a t e  c o u n t r i e s .  I n  t h i s  way, a growing 
middle c l a s s  has been emerging which has been capable  of en jo y ing  many of 
th e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  o th e r  c o u n t r i e s  enjoy  bu t  a f t e r  long  p e r io d s  of 
developm ent.
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IV VenezuelePs Petro leum  F o l ic y
V e n e z u e la 's  p r e s e n t  pe tro leum  p o l ic y  was f i r s t  fo rm u la ted  d u r in g
191-3 -  194B when Dr. J .P .  Perez-A lfonzo  was ■i n i s t e r  of Development and a l l
pe tro leum  .m atters were under t h i s  m in i s t r y .  (6 0 1) However, f o r  p o l i t i c a l
r e a s o n s ,  t h i s  p o l i c y  was n o t  a p p l ie d  u n t i l  t e n  y e a rs  l a t e r  (195-) when
th e  same p a r t y  took  o f f i c e  once ag a in  and Dr. P erez -A lfonzo  became m i n i s t e r ,
t :  i s  time of Mines and H ydrocarbons.
Since i t  i s  a f a c t  t h a t  Venezuela depends h e a v i ly  on h e r  pe tro leum
should
r e s o u r c e s ,  i t  i s  no t  s u r p r i s in g  he r  pe tro leum  p o l ic y /em p h as iz e  c o n s e rv a t io n .  
As th e  r e c e n t  o i l  m in i s t e r  s a i d , " t h i s  does no t mean t h a t  wo a re  going to  
h a l t  P ro d u c t io n  and p re s e rv e  i t  f o r  the  f u t u r e  in  d e tr im e n t  of the p r e s e n t  
g e n e r a t io n .  l i a t  i t  does mean i s  t h a t  wo in te n d  to  av o id  waste as much as 
p o s s ib le  f o r  the  b e n e f i t  of both p r e s e n t  and f u tu r e  g e n e r a t io n s '  . ( 69 )
The V enezuelan pe tro leum  p o l ic y  can be summarized in  th e  fo l lo w in g  
p r i n c i p l e s :  ( 70)
1 . The m ax im iza tion  of th e  c o u n t r y 's  o i l  income
2. The d efence  of pe tro leum  p r i c e s  s in ce  the  o i l  income sh a red  depends
u l t i m a t e l y  on th e s e  as w e ll  as on the  volume of e x p o r t s .  The agency 
e s t a b l i s h e d  to  pursue  t h i s  o b je c t iv e  is th e  "C o -o rd in a t in g  Commission 
f o r  th e  C o n se rv a tion  and Commerce of Hydrocarbons'’1 c re a te d  in  1939-
3- The p r i n c i p l e  o f  "No More C onsessions" which r e f l e c t s  th e  Government'
i n t e n t i o n  of g a in in g  a g r e a t e r  c o n t ro l  o f the  c o u n t r y 's  o i l  w ea lth  once 
p r e s e n t  c o n sess io n s  e x p i r e .
(68) Bet a n c o u r t ,  "Romulo; Ojd^ C i t , page 235°
( 69) 1 e re z -G -u e rre r° , Manue 1 ; 0p_ G i t , page 29
( 70) C o rd ip lan  -  V enezuela; '‘Programa de H id ro ca rb u ro s jy H inas '1 October 1963 
page 50.
Banco C e n tra l  de V enezuela ; V em oria  1961 ' , pa.ee 23.
B e ta n c o u r t , R onu lo ; Ip C i t , page 236.
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4 . The s u b s t i t u t i o n  of concess ions  f o r  :i s e r v ic e  c o n t r a c t s "  which would
be awarded to  a p p l i c a n t s  by th e  n a t io n a l  o i l  company Corpora, c ion  
Venezolana d e l  F e t r o lo o 1* (C.V„P0)
3. The. in c r e a s in g  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of the  Government i n  the  a c t i v i t i e s  of
th e  pe tro leum  in d u s t r y  th rough  the  n a t io n a l  o i l  company C.V.P, 
g The c r e a t i o n  of a common o i l  p o l ic y  among th e  d i f f e r e n t  pe tro leum
e x p o rt in g  c o u n t r i e s  th roug h  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n iz a t io n  known as 
J , F o E „C j and
7- A c lo s e r  c o l l a b o r a t io n  among the  d i f / e r e n t  n a t io n a l  o i l  companies
of L a t in  America th rou gh  the  o r g a n iz a t io n  of "ARPEL1’ ( fg ru p a c io n  
.Regional P e t r o l e r a s  E s t a t a l e s  L a tinoam erican as)  which in c lu d e s  K exico, 
Colombia, P e ru ,  B o l iv ia ,  C h i le ,  A rg e n tin a ,  B r a s i l ,  Uruguay and 
V enezuela ,
Below we a n a ly se  th e n ,  some a s p e c t s  o f t h i s  p o l i c y  a lth o u g h  we s h a l l  
leav e  f o r  l a t e r  th e  a n a ly s i s  of i t s  im p l i c a t io n s ,  
jShfpge^jLn O il Jncome
As we s t a t e d  b r i e f l y  i n  our p re v io u s  c h a p te r .  Venezuela has u s u a l ly  
been a b le  to  in c re a s e  h e r  shc..re in  o i l  income th rough  l e g i s l a t i o n  by 
in c r e a s in g  h e r  income t a x  r a t e s  on d i f f e r e n t  o c c a s io n s .
In  a n a ly s in g  the  n a t r o n ’ s o i l  revenue and i t s  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  i n d u s t r y 1s 
n e t  p r o f i t s  ( t a b l e  IV 26) we can see how i t  has v a r ie d  acco rd in g  to  the  
m o d if ic a t io n s  o f the  law , " o r  in s ta n c e  we n o t ic e  how from 1942 to  1957
th e re  was an average  r e l a t i o n  of 55/45 in  fa v o u r  o f th e  cou n try  which v/as 
made p o s s ib le  w i th  th e  i n t r o d u c t io n  of a:u income ta x  law in  1943 a s  we 
s h a l l  see below . A lso , a f t e r  th e  amendment o f t h i s  law in  1952, (71)
( 7 l )  Casado, Eze<3.ni^l H. ; Op Cit_, page 48
Tab le  IV -  26
Fayments to_ t h e l o v e r  nr erit frorn^ the  O il  I n d u s t ry  
■v in  ‘t i l l i io n s  of b o l i v a r s '
^ Income Other
. . . .  £*£_ R oya lty Taxes
1948 479 640 171
1949 272 627 156
1950 394 519 108
1951 525 727 196
1952 594 751 199
1953 507 786 209
1954 585 874 117
1955 712 1,003 126
1956 931 1,138 162
1957 1,199 1,550 241
1958 1,465 1 ,415 137
1959 1,260 1,444- 156
I 960 1,070 1,503 138
1961 1,216 1,552 131
1962 1,462 1,703 143
19 63 1 ,54 4 1,731 142
1964 2,251 2,357 129
1965 2,282 2,551 129
Government i n d u s t r y ’ s
'T o ta l __lh a r e  5 8e_t ’" r o f i t
1 ,290 55.3 1,060
1,055 6 0/4 704
1,021 51. ' 970
1,448 554 1,201
1,544 1- CT 1,262
1,502 545; 1,261
1,576 537' 1,4-12
1,84-1 5 2 i 1 ,710
2,281 524 2,115
2,990 C 9' ^ 2 ,774
3,067 653 1,616
8,860 6(8 ' l , 735
2,711 6876 1,282
2,899 66> 1,477
5,308 66f 1 ,693
4,417 673 1,678
4,937 6?f 2,455
4,962 66'" 2 ,596
s o u r c e : •enoria  1965 , M in i s t e r io  de •■'[ina-s e H id ro ca rb u ro s  , page I  -
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we n o t ic e  how t h i s  r e l a t i o n  ro se  to  65/* 5 to  V enezue la ’ s b e n e f i t .  This 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  was ap p rox im ate ly  th e  same f o r  1963(6 6 /  -U , bu t  as we saw in  
th e  p rev io u s  c h a p te r ,  the new income ta x  law f o r  1967 which r a i s e d  the  
top  t a x  r a t e  to  wight now, a long  w ith o th e r  m easu res , in c re a s e  V enezuela’ s 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  to  723° (72") In  f a c t  th e  h i s t o r y  of th e  Venezuela o i l  
i n d u s t r y  cou ld  be d iv id e d  in to  f o u r  p e rio d s  ta k in g  i n t o  c o n s id e r a t io n  c e r t a i n  
changes i n  l e g i s l a t i o n  or government n o l io y  which have g iv e 1-.; th e  n a t io n  a 
g r e a t e r  shere  i n  p r o f i t s :
1 . "o could  b e g in  i n  1878, y e a r  which wo have chosen  as the  s t a r t i n g
p o in t  o f th e  o i l  in d u s t ry  i n  Venezuela (se-- page S3" , and ex tend  i t  up 
to  1920 when th e  f i r s t  law of hydrocarbons was p rom ulga ted . (73)
During t h i s  i n i t i a l  p e r io d  th o re  was no s p e c i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  or c o n s id ­
e r a t i o n  f o r  hydrocarbons in  Venezuelan law and a l l  pe tro leum  m a t te r s  
were in c lu d e d  in  th e  mining code. (74)
2. The second i n t e r v a l  covers the  o e r io d  from 1920 to  1943 when two 
s i g n i f i c a n t  laws too'.; e f f e c t .  The f i r s t  law was the  f i r s t  Venezuelan 
income ta x  law , (75) and the  second, c r u a l l y  im p o r ta n t ,  was th e  new 
hydrocarbons lav/ which b rough t r a d i c a l  changes i n  the  in d u s t r y .  (76)
3 . The t h i r d  s ta g e  cove:.s yeans of in c re a s in g  n a t i o n a l  pe tro leum  income, 
and b e g in s  w ith  the  s e t  of laws mentioned above , and ex tends  to  1958 
when th e  F e re z -J in e n o z  government came to  an end.
4 . The f o u r t h  p e r io d  covers the  p r e s e n t  moment o f th e  Venezuelan 
in d u s t r y  and i t i s  c h a r a c te r i z e d  by a very  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  pe tro leum  p o l ic y
( ; 2) P e t r oleum. I n t e l l i g e n c e  •vdekly  October 17, 1966, page 1.
(73) R epub lic  of Venezuela" ' l(0wceta O fic i a l "  J u ly  29 , 1920.
(74) Casado, E ze q u ie l  V ., 0p_C it,  page 2*5.
(75) R epub lic  of V enezuela , 1 G-ac e t  a 0 f icj_al !l J u ly  1 7 , 1942.
( 76) R epublic  o f V enezuela , nG-apeta Ofi o i a i H P arch  13 , 1943 .
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which b e s id e s  w anting t o  in c r e a s e  i t s  sh are  m  p r o f i t s  i s  s t r i v i n g  f o r  
an a c t iv e  r o l e  i n  a l l  s ta g e s  o f the  i n d u s t r y .
The p e r io d  b e fo re  1920 was one in  which e x p lo r a t i o n  was very  s c a t t e r e d
and th e  Government d id  n o t  have a ve ry  c l e a r  p i c t u r e  of th e  p o t e n t i a l  o i l
w ea lth  of th e  country,, (?7) Because of t h i s ,  the  s t a t e  d id  no t g ive
Hydrocarbons any p a r t i c u l a r '  l e g a l  c o n s id e r a t io n ,  and a l l  pe tro leum  m a t te r s
were s u b je c t  to  the  p r o v is io n s  of the  f i n in g  Code. The law of 1920 was 
of
t h e r e f o r e / t r a n s c e n d e n ta l  im portance s in c e  i t  made a c l e a r  s e p a r a t io n  f o r  
the  f i r s t  t i n e  between m in e ra ls  and hydrocarbons w ith  the  is su in g  of two 
d i f f e r e n t  l e g a l  t e x t s :
a .  A new mining code
b , A hydrocarbons lav/
fo l lo w in g  th e  law of 1920 th e re  was a s c r i e s  of s^ven lav/s of minor 
im portance c o n s id e r in g  the  changes th ey  in t ro d u c e d  in  Petro leum  P o l ic y .
Thus we a r r i v e  to  the  Pe tro leum  r eform of 1943 which b ro u g h t  a new 
hydrocarbons law t h a t  s e rv e s  u n t i l  t h i s  day as the  b a s i s  of th e  c o u n t r y 's  
pe tro leum  l e g i s l a t i o n .  The Petro leum  Reform of 1943 was th e  c u lm in a t io n  
of a long p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l  and l e g a l  p ro c e ss  th rou gh  which th e  s t a t e  was 
ab le  to  o b ta in  a l a r g e r  sh a re  of the p r o f i t s  made by th e  o i l  i n d u s t r y .
The o i l  com panies, on t h e i r  p a r t ,  a ccep ted  t h i s  reform  a g re e in g  to  ignore  
p rev io u s  c o n ce ss io n  ag reem en ts ,  which in  comparison t o  what was be ing  
proposed  were q u i te  f a v o u r a b le ,  because th e  Government o f f e re d  to  renew 
a l l  co n cess io n s  f o r  f o r t y  y e a r s  s t a r t i n g  in  1943* (78) I n  t h i s  way 
h ig h e r  revenues  were ach ived  th rough  th e  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  ta x  o b l ig a t io n s
(77) B e ta n c o u r t ,  Romulo, Op C i t ,  page 14*
( 78) Oasado, E se q u ie l  M ., Op C i t ,  page 35*
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f o r  th e  d i f f e r e n t  c o n c e ss io n s ,  s in ce  p re v io u s ly  each c o n c e s s io n a ire  p a id  oho 
ta x e s  t h a t  were s t i p u l a t e d  i n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  c o n t r a c t s  which v a r ie d  from 
one to  a n o th e r .  The h ig h e r  sha re  was a l s o  ach ieved  by a g e n e ra l  r i s e  of 
petroleum, t a x e s ;  (79^
A. The r o y a l t y  was r a i s e d  from 7*5 and l6'~ (v a ry in g  betw een th e se  two
i—.
f i g u r e s  i n  th e  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t r a c t s )  to  16 ~/3, o f  p roduction ,, (80^
B. The I n i t i a l  E x p lo i t a t i o n  Tax which i s  p a id  b e fo re  p ro d u c t io n  b e g in s
was- s e t  a t  e ig h t  b o l iv a r s  p e r  h e c ta r e .
C. The E x p lo ra t io n  ta x  which was fo u r  b o l iv a r s  p e r  h e c ta r e  in  th e  law of
1938, was r a i s e d  to  s i x  b o l iv a r s  p e r  h e c t a r e .
h .  S u rface  Tax was s e t  a t  f i v e  b o l iv a r s  p e r  h e c ta r e  p e r  y e a r  during  th e
f i r s t  t e n  y e a r s  o f the  co n cess io n . A f te r  t h i s  p e r io d ,  th e  t a x  would 
r i s e  f i v e  b o l iv a r s  and would hove s i m i l a r  r a i s e s  every  f i v e  y e a r s  
u n t i l  the  maximum of t h i r t y  b o l iv a r s  was re a c h e d ,  amount which would, 
th en  be p a id  p e r  h e c ta re  p e r  y e a r  u n t i l  th e  end of the  con^cocw.on.
- i t h  the  1 9 4 -j r e f e r , : ,  th e  companies a ls o  began to  pay g e n e ra l  t a x e s ,  
such as im port d u t i e s ,  s in c e  by form er l e g i s l a t i o n  th ey  were exempted from 
t h i s  o b l ig a t io n .  And now, w ith  the  newly p ro c la im ed  income ta x  lav;, which 
f e l l  i n t o  t h i s  c a te g o ry ,  the  Government in c re a s e d  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i t s  o i l  
rev enue . O ther b e n e f i t s  from the  1943 hydrocarbons law were th e  ‘' s p e c ia l  
a d v a n ta g e s ’1 f o r  th e  Government. ( h i )  Some of th e s e  p e rm itted  th e  Government 
to  c la im  l a r g e r  payments th an  th o se  s t i p u l a t e d  by law , i f  i t  found circum ­
s ta n c e s  t h a t  would j u s t i f y  such a c la im . (82) Among th e  1 s p e c ia l  
advan tages"  the  most im p o rtan t  one was the  c la u se  which r e f e r r e d  to  r e f i n i n g  
under which i t  was made o b l ig a to ry  f o r  the  eo ipani.es to  r e f i n e  a t  l e a s t  10.9
(79) Casado, E ze q u ie l  A ,,  O p j i i t ,  page 39.
(80 I t  was s t i p u l a t e d  thaf~rbycQ.t3.es could  be p a id  i n  cash o r  k in d .
(81)C asado , E z e q u ie l  I I . ,  0p^  C i t ,  page 4 2 .
(82) I b i d .
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of dom estic  p ro d u c t io n  i n  the  c o u n try .  T his c la u s e  gave a g r e a t  impulse 
to  r e f i n i n g  i n  Venezuela and today  app ro x im ate ly  3 4 /  o f  p ro d u c t io n  i s  r e f i n e d  
in  the  c o u n try ,  ( t a b l e  IV -  l l )
Before 1945 th e  .most im p o rtan t  Government revenue acc ru in g  from the 
o i l  in d u s t r y  was th e  ro y a l ty ?  b u t  s in ce  th e n ,  income ta x  has had a m ajor 
r o l e  and g r a d u a l ly  has become a lm ost as  im p o r ta n t .  I t  has been th roug h  
income t a x  laws t h a t  the  Government has l a t e l y  been  a b le  t '  in c r e a s e  i t s  
sha re  of the  p r o f i t s  from th e  i n d u s t r y .  Since i t s  e s ta b l is h m e n t ,  th e  most 
im p o rtan t  m o d if ic a t io n  has been:
1 , The A d d i t io n a l  Tax (known a s  50/50) hy which th e  Government a ssu re d  
i t s e l f  o f a t  l e a s t  50?"-' the  i n d u s t r y ' s  p r o f i t s .  i s  we saw i n  
a n o th e r  o p p o r tu n i ty ,  t h i s  ta x  would only have w f fe c t  i f  the  company’ s
n e t  p r o f i t  su rp a ssed  the  Government’ s revenue from, the  in d u s t r y .
I f  t h i s  case  would occu r ,  th e n  th e  l a r g e r  p ro p o r t io n  in  the  hands of the  
o i l  ooarany would be d iv id e d  e q u a l ly  w ith  the  Government. T h is  c la u se
was in tro d u c e d  in  th e  income t a x  law in  1948 c ( 83 )
2 . The r a i s i n g  o f  th e  p ro g re s s iv e  income t a x  sch ed u le  in  1958 which 
n e a r ly  doubled th e  maximum ta x  r a t e  from 2 6 /  t o  47 .5 /*  ( 84) T h is
new income t a x  schedu le  made the  50/50  c la u se  co m p le te ly  o b so le te  s in c e  
th e  G overnm ent's  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  became u s u a l ly  over 65/ .
3* The "PAY AS YOU G0:< system , e s t a b l i s h e d  on F e b ru a ry  15, 1961.
B efore t h i s  d a t e ,  income ta x  was c o l l e c t e d  in  th e  y e a r  fo l lo w in g  i t s  
a c c r u a l ,  b u t  t h e r e a f t e r  i t  began to  be p a id  ev e ry  th re e  months d u ring
XsX) R epub lic  of V enezuela , nGace_ta L Offic i a l  216", November 12, 1948 ( fo r  
the  o f f i c i a l  t e x t  see c h a p te r  I I I  page"")*,
( 84 ) P a r r a  A l i r i o ,  " La In d u s t r i a P e t r o l e r a  V / us 0bYig a c io n e s__Fisca le is" 
i n  : "A spestos de l a  I n ' u s t r i a  P e t r o l e r a  en V enezuela , page 794.
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the  f i r s t  f i f t e e n  days a f t e r  th e  end of the  p e r io d .  ( 85 )
4 .  The in t r o d u c t io n  o f  a new income ta x  law f o r  1967 which has r a i s e d
the  top  ta x  r a t e  f r o 47-5/6 to  52/'.. (86)
Although we have seen how th e  Venezuelan G-overnnent h s managed to
in c re a s e  i t s  sha re  i n  p r o f i t s  and how up to  1965 t o t a l  revenue had in c re a s e d
to  4 ,962 m i l l i o n  b o l iv a r s  ( t a b l e  IV ~ 2 6 ) ,  i t  m ight seem of i n t e r e s t  to  tak e
a look  a t  th e  p e r  b a r r e l  income o b ta in ed .
I n  t a b l e  IV -  27 we n o t ic e  t h a t  the p e r  b a r r e l  revenue of the G-overn-
ment reached  i t s  h ig h e s t  l e v e l  i n  1958 ($f 1 .00 ) due to the  a lm ost tw ofo ld  
in c r e a s e  in  the  income t a x  r a t e  seen  above, which c o in c id e d  w ith  th e  p e r io d  
i n  which o r ic e s  were s t i l l  in f lu e n c e d  by the  r e c e n t  Suez c r i s i s .  S ince
th e n  the  G-overnment1 s p e r  b a r r e l  revenue has f a l l e n ,  b u t  s t i l l  i t  i s  g r e a t e r
th a n  what i t  r e c e iv e d  b e fo re  th e  Suez c r i s i s .  I n  o th e r  w ords, no t only 
has t o t a l  n a t io n a l  pe tro leum  revenue reached  a h ig h e r  l e v e l  ( t a b l e  IV- 26) 
b u t  the  n a t io n  has been r e c e iv in g  a b e t t e r  " p r ic e "  f o r  each b a r r e l  of o i l  
t h a t  has l e f t  th e  c o u n try .
I t  i s  ha rd  to  say i f  t h i s  t r e n d  w i l l  con tinue  a f t e r  the  r e c e n t  t a x  
measures s in c e ,  a l th o u g h  th e  p e r  b a r r e l  payment m ight be p r o te c te d  by them, 
t o t a l  revenue might f a l l  as o th e r  sou rces  become more c o m p e t i t iv e .  (hre 
s h a l l  a n a ly se  t h i s  i n  a fo l lo w in g  c h a p t e r ) »
Service^ ^Co n t r a c t s
V ith  r e s p e c t  to  S e rv ice  C o n t ra c ts ,  Venezuelan c o n g re s s io n a l  app ro va l 
seems to  be th e  on ly  th in g  h o ld in g  up t h e i r  s i g n a tu r e .  ( 87 ) Concerning 
t h e i r  a p p ro v a l ,  the  p re v io u s  o i l  m in i s t e r  has made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  he c o n s id e rs
( 85 ) I b i d 9 page 798.
(86) R epub lic  of V enezuela , "Can e t a O fic i a l 1 1 ,0 6 9 ,  December, 1966.
( 87 ) P e t r oleum I n t e l l igence  W eekly, O ctober, 24, 1966, page 8 .
Table IV - 27
P e r  _B a r re l  Share of  Oil  Income 
(IP S „ p e r  b a r r e l  produced)
1 X 0JL j j
Government I n d u s t r y ’ s
_Revenue_ Net JP]
1950 O.63 0 .5 7
1951 0 .68 0 .62
1952 0.68 0 .61
1953 0 .7 0 0 .6 4
1954 0 ,72 0 .66
1955 0.72 0.70
1956 0 .77 0.76
1957 0 .89 0 .88
1956 1 .00 0 .55
1959 0 .87 0 .43
I960 0 ,82 0 .4  0
1961 0 .85 0 ,45
1962 0.89 0 ,4 7
1965 0 .89 0 ,4 6
1964 0 .87 0 .44
1965 0.87 0 .47
Source: M in is t ry  of Mines and H ydrocarbons. :iMemoria 1965" » page 1 .20
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the  fo l lo w in g  c o n d i t io n s  b a s ic  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  S e rv ice  C o n tra c ts  from 
C oncessions: (88)
1 . The o i l  t h a t  may be found  in  areas a s s ig n e d  by C.V.P, to  p r iv a t e  
companies must be c o n s id e re d  as the  p r o p e r ty  of* V enezuela . i t s  
ownership i s  no t to  be t r a n s f e r r e d  in  a ry  form u n t i l  i t  becomes a 
commodity s u b je c t  to  m e rc a n t i le  t r a n s a c t i o n s  a t  " f a i r  p r i c e s '1.
2. The n a t i o n ' s  f i n a n c i a l  sha re  in  th e  b u s in e s s  must be g r e a t e r ,  i n s o f a r  
as p o s s i b l e ,  th an  the  one now d e r iv e d  from the  c o n cess io n  system ,
3 . The G-overnment must be a s su re d  an a c t iv e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  o p e ra t io n s  
th ro u g h  C.V.P,
4° To secu re  a S e rv ice  C o n tra c t ,  p r e s e n t  co n ce ss io n  h o ld e r s  must submit
a programme of e x p lo r a t io n ,  p ro d u c t io n  and development of t h e i r  e x i s t i n g
now
c o n ce ss io n s  s in ce  th e  Government f e e l s  t h a t  e x p lo r a t io n  of a r e a u n d e r  
c o n ce ss io n  i s  f a r  from com plete .
At p r e s e n t  th e r e  seem to  be two ty p es  of c o n t r a c t s  under s tudy  which 
w i r l  in v o lv e  e i t h e r  th e  formertion of mixed companies w ith  C.V.P, as a p a r t n e r ,  
or d i r e c t  s e rv ic e  c o n t r a c t s  w ith  a company b u t  w ith  an o p t io n  f o r  C,V.P, 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  (89) In  b o th  cases  a l l  i n i t i a l  in v es tm en t p r i o r  to  th e
commercial p ro d u c t io n  s ta g e  w i l l  be u n d e rtak en  a t  th e  expense of the
c o n t r a c t o r .  Under the  f i r s t  t3p?e of c o n t r a c t ,  i . e .  mixed company c o n t r a c t s ,  
s t a t e  f i n a n c i a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i s  ob lig a to r;* ,  though th e  e x ac t  share  i s  
s u b je c t  to  agreem ent betw een th e  c o n t r a c t in g  p a r t i e s .
Mixed company c o n t r a c t s  nay be d iv id e d  i n to  two ty p e s .  I n  one, the
f o r e ig n  company w i l l  o p e ra te  j o i n t l y  w ith  C.V.P, w hile  the  development s ta g e  
i s  reach ed , a t  which p o in t  CoV.P. w i l l  hand over an agreed  sh a re  o f crude o i l
(88) P o t ro le o  I n t e r a n e r i c a n o , Ju ly*  1966, page 27.
(89) Pe tro leum  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  December, 1966, page 470
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ou tpu t to  th e  c o n t r a c t in g  company and each p a r t n e r  w i l l  make i t s  own p r o f i t  
in d e p e n d e n t ly .  Under th e  second ty p e , an i n t e g r a t e d  p a r t n e r s h i p  w i l l  he 
formed between C.V.P. and th e  f o r e ig n  company, which w i l l  he e n t i t l e d  to  the  
o i l  produced, and to  i t s  s a le  i n  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m arke t,  The p a r tn e r s h ip  
w i l l  pay ta x  and th e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  w i l l  th en  sh a re  n e t  p r o f i t s  on an agreed  
b a s i s ,  C.V.F. may a ls o  have th e  r i g h t  to  .market an ag reed  p r o p o r t io n  of th e  
o i l  produced i f  i t  w ished .
D ire c t  S e rv ic e  C o n trac ts  p ro v id e  f o r  e x p lo r a t i o n ,  development and 
m arke ting  of crude o i l  by the f o r e i g n  company on b e h a l f  of C .V .P . , the  l a t t e r  
sh a r in g  in  th e  p r o f i t s  on the  ag reed  b a s i s .  Those c o n t r a c t s  w i l l  p rov ide  
f o r  o p t io n a l  c a p i t a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by C.V.P. up to  an ag reed  amount a f t e r  
commercial p ro d u c t io n  has begun. As i n  th e  case  of mixed company c o n t r a c t s ,  
C.V.P. w i l l  r e s e r v e  to  i t s e l f  the  r i g h t  to  m arket a s p e c i f i e d  sha re  o f  th e  
crude produced under the  c o n t r a c t .
A l l  c o n t r a c t s  w i l l  have to  be approved by th o  V enezuelan M in is t ry  of 
Mines and Hydrocarbons b e fo re  s i g n a tu r e ,  and C.V.P. w i l l  be ab le  to  s ig n  
c o n t r a c t s  n o t  on ly  w ith  p r i v a t e  companies b u t  a l s o  w ith  o th e r  s t a t e  companies 
as w e l l  p ro v id ed  th e s e  can g u a ra n tee  o u t l e t s  f o r  Venezuelan o i l .
C o n tra c ts  w i l l  no rm ally  be v a l id  f o r  I f  -  20 .years which w i l l  b e g in  to  
count from th e  s t a r t  of conm erc ia l  p ro d u c t io n  as  long as t h i s  p ro d u c tio n  had 
begun no t l a t e r  th an  f i v e  y e a r s  a f t e r  the  c o n t r a c t  had been  s ig n e d . At th e  
end of th e  c o n t r a c t u a l  period ., a l l  f ix e d  a s s e t s  o f  th e  c o n t r a c t in g  company 
w i l l  become th e  p r o p e r t y  of C.V.P, w ith o u t payment o f com pensation.
The c o n t r a c t i n g  company w i l l  be o b l ig ed  to  s e l l  n o t  only i t s  own share  
of crude o i l  and p r o d u c ts ,  b u t  a l s o  t h a t  p a r t  of C .V .P .’ s share  which the  
S ta te  company may have been unab le  to  p la c e .  Such s a l e s  fo r  C.V.P. would 
have to  be made a t  p r i c e q  ag reed  w ith  C .V .P . , and f o r  t h i s  s e rv ic e  th e
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c o n t r a c t in g  company would be p a id  an ag reed  c o m i s s i o n ,  (90)
Tile n Corpojr ^ c io n  Venezo la n a _ d e l  ^Fetroleje1^
The V enezuelan  n a t io n a l  o i l  company "C orporac ion  Venezolana de l
P e t ro le o "  (C0V0P 0) was e s t a b l i s h e d  on A p r i l  19, I960 , c o n s id e r in g :  (9 l )
1. That the  e x p e r ie n c e  and know-how a c q u ire d  d u r in g  th e  long p e r io d  of 
a c t i v i t y  of the  pe tro leum  in d u s t r y  i n  V enezuela , and the  f a c t  t h a t  the  
o i l  w i l l  co n tin u e  to  be the  b a s i s  of Venezuelan economy f o r  many y e a r s ,  
j u s t i f y  the  c r e a t i o n  of a n a t io n a l  o i l  company.
2. That i n  a r e a s  c lo s e  to  p roducing  f i e l d s  hydrocarbons m ig ra te  by
n a t u r e , and so c r e a te  d ra in a g e  problems which can only  be c o n c lu s iv e ly  
so lv e d  i f  th o se  a re a s  a re  developed .
3. That as th e  n a t io n a l  o i l  company develops th e  a d ja c e n t  a r e a s ,  a more
e f f i c i e n t  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of th e  r e s e r v o i r s  w i l l  be ach ieved  and i t  w i l l  
be p o s s ib l e  to  u n d e rta k e  j o i n t  p r o j e c t s  of seco ndary  re c o v e ry .
4 . That i t  i s  no t j u s t i f i e d  to  l o t  p r i v a t e  i n v e r t o r s  develop proven
a r e a s ,  t h a t  i s ,  whore no economic r i s k s  e x i s t .
5* That the  p o l i c y  of th e  N a t io n a l  Government b e in g  n o t to  g r a n t  more
c o n c e ss io n s ,  i t  i s  s t i l l  conven ien t  to  promote th e  in c re a s e  of th e  
p roved r e s e r v e s  of the  c o u n try ,  n o tw i th s ta n d in g  th e  e x te n s iv e  a re a s  
t h a t ,  under development by p r i v a t e  companies, p e rm it  the normal in c r e a s e  
of th e s e  r e s e r v e s ,
6, That the  law g iv e s  to  tho E x ecu tiv e  the  r i g h t  e x c lu s iv e ly  to  e x p lo re ,
e x p l o i t ,  r e f i n e  and t r a n s p o r t  hydrocarbons and,
7. That th e  c r e a t i o n  of a s t a t e  o i l  company i s  a l e g i t im a t e  a s p i r a t i o n
(90) A ll  in fo rm a t io n  concern ing  S e rv ice  C o n tra c ts  was o b ta in ed  from :f Pfjnyxl eurn 
P r e s s Service*,* December, 1916, page 470
(91) R epub lic  of V enezuela , "Offi c i a l  Gazette , 26/ 2'-'4 A p r i l  22, I9 60 .
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of th e  V enezuelans,
I n  accordance  th e n ,  w ith  i t s  p o l i c y ,  the  G-overnment e s t a b l i s h e d  CoV.P. 
as  the  agency th ro u g h  which p e tro leum  a c t i v i t i e s  cou ld  con tin ue  d ev e lop in g  once 
p r e s e n t  co n cess io n s  e x p i r e ,  .is we saw b e fo re ,  i t  i s  th ro u g h  C.V.P. t h a t  Serv ice  
C o n tra c ts  w i l l  be g ra n te d  and, i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  th e  G-overnment has d e c la re d  i t s  
p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  th o se  o f f e r s  which p ro v id e  f o r  a degree  of C.V.P. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  th e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  of s a l e s  i n  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a rk e t ,  ( 92 )
C.V.P, i n s t e a d  of r e c e iv in g  concess io ns  o p e ra te s  on what have been c a l l e d  
a ss ig n m en ts .  These had reach ed  by the  end of 1965 ap p ro x im a te ly  373*000 
h e c t a r e s .  (93) P ro d u c t io n  averaged  only 9*000 b a r r e l s  d a i l y  in  1965* a lth o u g h  
a t  p r e s e n t  C .V .P ,1 s p o t e n t i a l  p roducing  c a p a c i ty  i s  around 30,000 b a r r e l s  d a i l y ,  
(94) C .V .P . 's  r e f i n b r y  a t  Moron i s  a l s o  only  of a 2 ,300  b a r r e l s  d a i l y  capac ity  
( t a b l e  IV -  12) b u t  th e r e  a re  p la n s  to  in c r e a s e  i t  to  16,300 B/D, and t o  b u i ld  
a n o th e r  r e f i n e r y  of 50,000 B/D i n  th e  w es te rn  p a r t  of V enezuela . (95)
Up to  th e  p r e s e n t  moment, C.V.P. has no t e n te r e d  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
m arket w ith  e i t h e r  crude of p r o d u c ts ,  and m ajor o p e ra t io n s  have been d i r e c te d  
tow ards g a in in g  a g r e a t e r  share  in  dom estic s a l e s  w ith  th e  su p p o r t  o f  
fa v o u ra b le  l e g i s l a t i o n .  ( 96) Thus by d e c re e ,  C.V.P, i s  to  have by 1968 33?° 
of th e  dom estic  m arke t,  (97) According to  a r e s o l u t i o n  o f  the  M in is t ry  of 
Mines and Hydrocarbons in  1965* (98) p r iv a t e  companies had to  r e l i n q u i s h  
t h e i r  r i g h t s  over to  C.V.P, of a s u f f i c i e n t  number o f s e rv ic e  s t a t i o n s  to  
r e p r e s e n t  10/c of the  g a s o l in e  m arket o f th e  p re v io u s  y e a r ,  t o  h e lp  C.V.P,
X92j Pe tro leum  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  December 1966, page 470*
(93) C.V.P, '1 I n f o r me Pnual" , 1965* page 8.
(94) Pe tro leum  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  F eb ru a ry  1967* page 69*
(95) I b id .
( 96) R epub lic  o f  V enezuela , "Decree rTo^ 18*7 " ,  November 1964.
(97) Banco C e n tra l  de V enezuela , "Inform e Economico", 1964* page 226.
(98) M in is t ry  o f Mines and H ydrocarbons, R e s o lu t io n  No. 266, March 1965 ,
"Memoria -  1965"* page 1 - 4 5 *
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meet i t s  g o a l .  However, i n  1965 C .V .P . 's  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  dom estic  s a l e s ,  
i n s p i t e  o f  th e se  m ea su re s ,  reached  on ly  5«7f^* (99) I n  the  sphere  of n a tu r a l  
gas CoV.Po i s  a l s o  c o n c e n tr a t in g  i t s  main e f f o r t s .  S a le s  i n  1965 amounted 
to  an e s t im atec  of 1 ,008 m i l l i o n  cubic  m e tre s .  (100) I t  i s  a l s o  expanding i t s  
gas p i p e l i n e  ne tw ork , and among th e  im p o rtan t  p r o j e c t s  to  be u n d e r ta k e n ,  i s  
a 225 knis. g a s l in e  w ith  a d a i l y  c a p a c i ty  of over 11 m i l l i o n  cu. m etres  from 
Anaco, (90 Ians, sou th  of P u e r to  La Cruz) to  P u e r to  Ordez, i n  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  
a re a  o f G-uayana i n  e a s t e r n  V enezuela . ( lO l)
The_ P e tro ch e m ic a l  I n d u s t r y  i n  Venezu e la
The p e tro c h e m ic a l  i n d u s t r y  i n  Venezuela was founded in  1953 c o n s id e r in g :
( 102)
1 . That th e r e  were fa v o u ra b le  c o n d i t io n s  i n  th e  c o u n t y  f o r  the  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment of such an in d u s t r y  having  a dom estic  p e tro leu m  in d u s t r y  which could  
supp ly  th e  b a s ic  raw m a t e r i a l s ,  and hav ing  a growing m arket f o r  i t s  
p r o d u c t s .
2. That i t  was n e c e s sa ry  t o  d i v e r s i f y ,  th e  economy as f a r  a s  p o s s ib l e .
3 .  That th e r e  was a need of g r e a t  q u a n t i t i e s  of f e r t i l i z e r s  to  c u l t i v a t e
a g r i c u l t u r e  i n t e n s i v e l y  i f  im ports  o f t h i s  s o r t  were to  be s u b s t i t u t e d ;  
and
That i t  would produce a g r e a t e r  o u t l e t  f o r  m in e ra ls  which could  be 
f u r t h e r  e x p lo i t e d .
The p e tro c h e m ic a l  i n d u s t r y  i s  a b ranch  o f  th e  chem ical i n d u s t r y  t h a t  
u se s  n a tu r a l  gas  and pe tro leum  as  i t s  main b a s ic  m a t e r i a l s .  However, 
i t  seeais t h a t  i t  r e q u i r e s  ve ry  heavy in v es tm en ts  i n  o rd e r  t o  o p e ra te ,  and to
(99) C .V .P . , a0 p _ C itn , page 25.
(100) I b i d ,  page 20.
(101) Pe tro leum  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  F eb ru a ry  1967 > page 69.
(102) B a l e s t r i n i ,  C e sa r , "Oja .C it” , page 42.
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o p e ra te  a t  a h ig h  c a p a c i ty  i n  o rd e r  to  be econom ical. (103) A pproxim ately  
1 b i l l i o n  b o l iv a r s  have been in v e s te d  in  th e  p e tro c h e m ic a l  i n d u s t r y  of 
V enezuela , and a l th o u g h  a p o t e n t i a l  m arket was thou gh t t o  e x i s t ,  i t  i s  
p roducing  a t  a " s u b s t a n t i a l  l o s s . . . d u e  to  th e  low c a p a c i ty  a t  which i t  o p e ra te
( l0 4 )  Venezuelan p e tro c h e m ic a l  p ro d u c t io n  c o n s i s t s  m ain ly  of f e r t i l i z e r s ,  
a c id s ,  l i q u i d  c h lo r in e ,  c a u s t i c  soda , araonia, sodium h y p o c h lo r i te  and 
e x p lo s iv e s ,  (105) There a re  a l s o  some p la n s  f o r  f u t u r e  p ro d u c t io n  of 
s y n th e t i c  ru b b e r ,  p l a s t i c s  and d e te r g e n t s ,  i f  o u t l e t s  a re  found f o r  th e s e  
p ro d u c ts  p resum ably  i n  th e  L a t in  American m arke t. ( 106)
(103) B a l e s t r i n i ,  C esa r;  O jaJJit, page 42.
(104) I b i d ,  page 49
( 105) M in i s t r y  of Mines and Hydrocarbons -  V enezuela , "P e t r o l e o 
Datos E s t a d i s t i c o s 5' , 1965 , page 183
(106) B a l e s t r i n i ,  C aser;  Op C i t , page 49*
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V e n e z u e la 1s I n t e r n n t i  ona l Markets 
I n t r o d u c t io n .  The D e te r io r  t i o n  of Venezuela's Position as th e  .s-orld’ s 
Major E x p o r te r  of Pe tro leum : A) Domestic toe sons , B) _»xtornnl Reasons.
The P a t t e r n  of V en ezu e la1s Pe tro leum  E x p o r t s : B pcc iu l  R eference  to  E u e l
O il .
I„ In t ro d u e  t i  on
V e n e z u e la 's  o i l  e x p o rts  rea ch e d  1,187,187 th ousan d  b a r r e l s  I n  196b 
of which ap p ro x im a te ly  72 ,  ^ were o f crude o i l  and th e  r e s t  of p r o d u c t s . ( l )  
E xpo rts  in c r e a s e d  s t e a d i l y  up t o  196b excep t f o r  19b3 and 19b8 (T able  V -  l )  
when th ey  f e l l  due to  th e  r e c e s s io n  of i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y  i n  the  U n ited  
S t a te s  (V e n ez u e la ’ s most im p o r ta n t  m arket) i n  the  f i r s t  c a se ,  and to  a 
r e a d ju s tm e n t  of th e  supply  p a t t e r n  a f t e r  the  Suez c r i s i s  i n  the  s e c o n d .(2) 
L a te ly ,  however, V enezuela  has  been  f a c in g  a v e ry  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n  w ith  
th e  s la c k e n in g  of th e  growth of pe tro leum  e x p o r ts  (o n ly  1/6 i n c r e a s e  was 
r e g i s t e r e d  i n  1965 which i s  the  s m a l le s t  i n  our s e r i e s ) ,  and acco rd in g  
to  an u n o f f i c i a l  e s t im a te ,  even r e g i s t e r i n g  an a b s o lu te  r e d u c t io n  of 3/6 
i n  1966 ( b ) .  T h is  s i t u a t i o n  we in te n d  to  a n a ly se  i n  fo l lo w in g  p ages , b u t  
i t  i s  f i r s t  n e c e s s a ry  to  toko a g e n e ra l  look . -t the  more im p o r ta n t  markets 
f o r  V enezuelan  O i l .
V enezuelan  e x p o r ts  in c lu d e  e x p o r ts  from a rub a • wid Curasao, which 
a re  the  two Dutch i s l a n d s  o f f  th e  c o a s t  of Venezuela t i t  r e f i n e  abou t
(1 )  Only 6b m i l l io n  barrels of r e f i n e d  p ro d u c ts  were consumed i n  the  
c o u n try  i n  196b which i s  ap p rox im ate ly  lb/o of dom estic  r e f i n e r y  o u tp u t;  
(Banco C e n tra l  de V enezuela , *;.Infbrme_ Econoiiii.00u 196b, page 2b0)
( 2 ) P a r r a  and P o c a te r r a ,  O p^C it. ,  page lb
(3 ) P e tro leu m  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Meekly, Jan u ary  9 , 1967; p . l .
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Table V -  1
Ex^orts^ of  ^ Peti"oleurii jh? o m_ V e n e z u e 1 a ( l )
( th ousan ds  of b a r r e l s )
fo O f fo O f %
Crude T o ta l P ro d u c ts ^Total Tot*l i Change
1945 291,393 91.7 26,308 8 .3 317 701
1950 452,437 8 7 .1 67,221 12 .9 519 658 —
1951 502^865 8 5 .4 8 5 ,64-6 14.6 535 511 13.2
1952 530,391 84-. 8 94-, 891 15.2 625 732 6 ,3
1953 488,862 80 .6 117,618
126,250
19 .4 606 4-30 -  3 .1
1954 528,634 80.7 19.3 654- 384 8 .0
1955 590,816 8 0 ,0 147,812 20 .0 738 628 12,8
1956 675,270 7 9 i8 170,981 20.2 848 221 14 .6
1957 758,775 80 .7 181,536 19/3 94-0 311 1 1 .1
1958 - 6877725 77.3 201,855 22.7 289 580 -  5 .4
1959 •719,835 7 6 .5 221 033 23.5 940 868 5 .8
i 960 730,962 7 4 .4 251,74-7 25.6 982 709 4 .4
1961 74-3,711 7 3 .7 265,300 26.3 1 ,009 011 2 .7
1962 810,4-85 73 .6 291,274 26.4 1 ,101 759 9 .2
1963 818,3.25 7 2 .9 303,537 27.1 1 ,121 862 1 .8
1964 .'860,361 7 3 .2 315,421 26,8 1 ,175 782 4 .8
1965 ‘ 651,093 71.7 336,094 28.3 1,187 187 1 .0
( l )  Ex-oort p a t t e r n  as i t  lo av e s  V enezuelan  t e r r i t o r y .
Source: V enezuelan  M in is t ry  of Mines and H ydrocarbons.
" P e t ro le o  y  O tros Dates l i s t a d i s t i c o s 1' 1965 , p a ses  93.94-, 97,
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30fo of the  crude t h a t  leaves t h i s  c o u n try . T h is  i s  due to  s t a t i s t i c a l  
rea so n s  s in c e  V enezuelan  so u rces  u s u a l ly  p r e s e n t  th e  g lo b a l  f i g u r e  as 
of V enezuelan  o r i g i n  s in c e  V enezuelan  crude r e f i n e d  i n  th e se  i s l a n d s  was 
ta x e d  by the  G-overnnent i n  accordance  w ith  wh t  \vjs known * s the  
"Aruba Formula" by which tax es  depended on th e  comprniia.s n e t  e a rn in g s  
d e r iv e d  from the  s a le  of p ro d u c ts  obt un d from t h i s  o i l  ( 4 ; .
Having t h i s  i n  mind, we b eg in  by rnnl'~sirv  th e  d e s t i n a t i o n  of 
V enezuelan  e x p o r ts ,  which we f in d  i n  t  H ie  V-2 f c r  tv:a 'hast twenty y e a r s .  
I t  becomes apparent how the  U nited  S t a te s  has been  by f a r  he r  most 
im p o r ta n t  m arket. T h is  c o u n try  i s  th en  fo l lo w ed  by Canada and the  U n ited  
Kingdom. N orth  America and Europe a re  th e  two m ajor a re a s  to  which 
V enezuela  e x p o r ts  h e r  ne tro leurn . In  1965, a p p ro x im a te ly  43/" ° f  t o t a l  ex­
p o r t s  went to  the  U n ited  S t a t e s ,  ll>o to  Canada, and 9t"= 1° Ihe U nited  
Kingdom. N orth  America a lone  accoun ted  f o r  54/° and Europe f o r  23b> (Table  
V -  3 ) .  Roughly h a l f  of t o t a l  e x p o rts  f o r  1965 wo© r e f i n e d  p ro d u c ts ,  
of which about 6&/q was f u e l  o i l .  (For a p e rc en ta g e  breakdown of e x p o r ts  
i n  crude and p ro d u c ts  by m ajor d e s t i n a t i o n s  see Tabic  V -  4 )
B es ides  th e  th r e e  m ajor c o u n t r ie s  m entioned above, o th e r  im p o r tan t  
V enezuelan  m arke ts  a re  B r a z i l ,  Panama, H o lland , Svreden and F ra n c e .  
T r in id a d  and Tobago a re  a ls o  im p o r ta n t  due to  t h e i r  r e f i n i n g  in d u s t r y ,  
and i n  our t a b l e s  a re  in c lu d e d  i n  "C e n tra l  . .m e r ica " ,
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E xport  P a t t e r n  of_Venezuelan O i l  by Major A reas of D e s t in a t io n  -_1965
E u el O il  ofY
Crude P ro d u c ts Tjotj.il T o ta l  P rod uc ts
U nited  S t a t e s 34 .0 66 ,0 100.0 82 .7
C anada 65*8 34 .2 100 .0 5 7 .4
T o ta l  N orth America 40*5 59.5 100.0 79 .5
C e n tra l  America 7 1 .4 28.6 100 .0 51 .0
South America 7 1 .0 29 .0 100.0 38 .6
U n ited  Kingdom 59 .8 4 0 .2 100.0 57 .3
T o ta l  Europe 59 .3 40 .7 100.0 4 5 .7
T o ta l 4 9 .8 50 .2 100.0 65.7
Souroe: T ab le  V -  3*
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11 T_he_ P e te  r io jrpti_on of Vene 2 uq I  a ' s P o s i t io n  gs th e  "..■'oriel's Me j  or 
Exp_o_rt e r  of Pe t r o l eum: J)pm_o s t  i  c Pprsoris^ iO ,.SxJbornnJ^^G^qns.
Although V enezuela  s t i l l  o ccup ies  th e  f i r s t  p o s i t i o n  among th e  
m ajor o i l  e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s  ( a  p o s i t i o n  which she has ho ld  s in c e  1958(5)) 
i t  has been  under se v e re  s t r a i n  and has d e t e r i o r a t e d  w i th  the  g rad u a l  lo s s  
of m arkets i n  b o th  hem isp heres .  T his s i t u a t i o n  m a n ife s te d  i t s e l f  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  a f t e r  the  Suez c r i s i s  when th e  p e tro leu m  in d u s t r y  began to  
f e e l  th e  p re s s u r e s  of o ve rsupp ly , and m ajors and in d ep e n d en ts  found i t  
more c o n v en ien t  to  draw s u p p l ie s  from o th e r  s o u r c e s . However,
V enezuelan  e x p o r ts  have been a f f e c t e d  by a com bination  of b o th  e x t e r n a l  
and dom estic  f a c t o r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s in c e  I960, and f o r  t h i s  rea so n  our 
a n a ly s i s  ten d s  to  c o n c e n tr a te  more ora 1960-1965.
During t h i s  p e r io d  V enezuelan  e x p o r t s  to  th e  U n ited  S t a te s  f e l l  i n  
1961 and 1963; tho se  to  th e  European market in c r e a s e d  p r o g r e s s iv e ly  l e s s  
each y e a r  u n t i l  a b so lu te  r e d u c t io n s  \ e . ; ao r e g i s t e r e d  i n  I 96A and 
1965 (Table  V -  5 ) .  C onsequent’1)" we f in ' .  n o t  m l .* h a  t  V e n e z u e la 's  
t o t a l  p e tro leu m  e x p o rts  have boon s lacken ing  to  t  e 'extent t h a t  1965 b a r e ly  
p re s e n te d  rn  i n c r e a s e  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  the  p r e v U u s  ye r ,  b u t  a l s o  t h a t  th e  
e s t im a te s  f o r  1966 have a l r e a d y  announced an 3 o lu te  r e d u c t io n  of 3% i n  
h e r  e x p o r t s , (6)
Comparing V en ez u e la ’ s p e tro leu m  e x p o r ts  w i th  th o se  of the  r e s t  of 
the  ‘world, we f i n d  t h a t  V enezuela  has no t k e p t  pace w ith  o th e r  e x p o r t in g  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  su p p ly in g  w orld  m arke ts ,  and t h e r e f o r e  has been  lo s in g  ground 
i n  t h i s  t r a d e  (T able  V -  6 ) .  V e n ezu e la ’ s sh a re  o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
(5) M in is t ry  of Mines and Hydrocarbons -  V enezuela  11 Memorial1 -  1965, 
page 1 - 1 1 2 .
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m arket f e l l  to  22/6 i n  I 965 which compares t o  31/'° j u s t  f i v e  y e a r s  back , and 
36/6 i n  1958 ( t a b l e  V -  7 ) .  I n  the  U nited  S t a t e s ,  which ■ s \;o have 
m entioned b e fo re  i s  V e n e z u e la 's  most im port -at m, x 'kot, e th e r  so u rc es  have 
g ra d u a l ly  been  in c r e a s in g  t h e i r  sha re  !;• 'iotrf imyo‘-ts by t h i s  c o u n try ,  
a t  V e n e z u e la 's  expense . U h i le  i n  I960 V o rezu c l- . supn3ied 48.5- of th e  
crude im ported  by th e  U nited  S t  t o s ,  i n  1965 she on ly  su p p l ie d  34. 94, a 
l o s s  of more th a n  104 of the American im port m arket i n  j u s t  f i v e  y e a rs  
(Tab3.e V -  8 ) .  The Middle B a s t  and A frica  t o g e th e r  in c re a s e d  t h e i r  sh^re  
from 30.9°/° t °  32,4% i n  t h i s  same p e r io d ,  and Canada from  11.1/6 to  23 .84  
l ik e w is e .  The sane c a r  be s a id  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  European m arket. 
V enezuela  s u p p l ie d  i n  1959 10 ,24  of i t s  req u ire m e n ts  o f crude and i n  1965 
t h i s  share  had f a l l e n  to  j u s t  7%. On the o th e r  hand, Middle E a s t  and 
A f r ic a n  so u rces  to g e th e r  in c r e a s e d  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  th e  same p e r io d  
from  82„5n> to  88.0)6 (Table V -  9 ) .  Even i n  V e n e z u e la 's  most im p o r ta n t  
South American m arke t, Brazil), sho has l o s t  ground to  o th e r  so u rc e s .
I n  i 960 V enezuela  su p p l ie d  66 ,34  the  crude im ported  by t h i s  c o u n try ,  
and i n  1965 t h i s  sha re  had g r a d u a l ly  f a l l e n  to  4 2 .2 4  (T-^ble V -  1 0 ) .  The 
Middle E a s t  and R u ss ia  have been  the  major v.rers p e n e t r a t i n g  i n t o  t h i s  
m arke t, r a i s i n g  t h e i r  share  from  27.7/6 i n  I960 to  5 4 .3w i*- 1965. R u ss ia  
a lo n e ,  in c r e a s e d  h e r  sha re  d u r in g  ulus p e r io d  from  1.5/- t °  20,44.
E s t im a te s  f o r  1966 show t h a t  Venezuela f e l l  to  6 th  p ’haco, f t c r  hav ing  
th e  4 th  and 5 th  i n  1964 and 1965 r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  i n  supp ly ing  h e r  most 
im p o r ta n t  European m arket, the  U n ited  Kingdom, a f t e r  Kuwait, I r a q ,
L ibya, N ig e r ia  and Saudi A r a b ia . ( 7 )
( 7 ) P e tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  V eek ly , March 6, 1967; pngo 6*
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Table V -  7
~1Share  of V enezuela  and th e  Middle E a s t  i n  wo r ld  P e t r o l e u m Ex p o r ts
TOIBZUISLA Middle, E a s t O thers
i.Jj£Jr (TTJ
1938 54.3 31.3 14 .4
1948 53 .5 i^O, 6 5 .9
1958 3 5 .9 55 .2 8 .9
I960 31 .0 55.6 1 3 ,4
1961 29.3 55 .1 15 .6
1962 28 .6 54.1 17.3
1963 26.2 53.3 20.5
1964 24.2 52.4 2 3 .4
1965 22.3 51-9 25.8
Source: M in is t ry  of Mines and H ydrocarbons, V enezu e la .  "Memoria" 1965 ,
v  ^  * e ? « s a  n u w u u i B i  *
page I  -  112.
Middle E a s t  
A f r ic a
Sub T o ta l
Canada
VENEZUELA
"Source of U n ited  S t a te s  Crude O i l  Im ports"
0*0
i 960 1961 1962
30.5 31 .2 26.5
0 .4 0 .5 2 .4
30 .9 31.7 28 .9
11 .1 17.5 20.7
46 .3 4 0 .8 4 1 .1
1963 lg64 1965
25.0 24 .8 27 .0
2 .2 4 .0 5 .4
27 .2 28 .8 32.4
21.9 23 .2 23 .8
42 .3 39 .7 34.9
Source: U .S. Departm ent o f  the  I n t e r i o r .  Bureai of Mines
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T-iblo V -  9
Souroe of European Crude O il Imports 
(%)
135 2 1^60 1961 .3-962 1963 1,9,64 1965
Middle B a s t 82.5 79 .2 72 .8 6 7 . A 65 .5 63 .4 60.2
A fr ic a - A. 8 8 .9 13.5 20.8 24.5 28.6
Sub T o ta l 82 .5 8 A. 0 81.7 80.9 86 ,3 8 7 .9 88.8
VENEZUELA 10 .2 8 .1 8 .9 9 .A 8 .6 7 .5 7 .0
Source: P e tro leum  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  .April i s s u e s  f o r  the  v a r io u s  y e a r s .
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Tablo _V_» 10 
"Sou rce  of Crude O i l  Iiaports  by B ra z i l"
 ( 4 ........................................
1260 1961 196? 1963 1964 ■126J>
Middle E a s t 26.2 31.5 38 .6 37.6 35 .4 33 .9
R u ss ia 1.5 J k i t 16 ,0 20s4
Sub T o ta l 27 ,7 3 6 .1 4 2 .0 4 3 .4 5 1 .4 54 .3
VENEZUELA 66.3 5 8 .4 52 .4 46 .5 4 4 .3 42 .2
Souroe: M in is t ry  of Mines and H ydrocarbons, V enezuela . "Memoria" 1965,
page 1 - 1 2 3 .
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There i s  no doubt t h a t  V enezuela1 s p o s i t i o n  i n  aa jo r  m -rk e ts  has 
been  d e t e r i t r a t i n g , However, i ’.ie - b i l i t v  o f V enezuela  to  compete w ith  
o th e r  so u rces  i n  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  : m-rkot i s  .-t p r e s e n t  l i  mi tod  by b o th  
i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  f a c t o r s ,  .among the f i r s t  i s  the p e tro leu m  p o l ic y  
of th e  v a r io u s  G-overnments i n  V enezuela  s in c e  1958 which has reduced  the  
advantage f o r  the  companies to  inasket V enezuelan  o i l ,  and among th e  e x te r n a l  
f a c t o r s  a re ;
1) The weakening of V en ezu e la ’ s g e o g ra p h ic a l  advantage  over o th e r
so u rc es  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  major m arkets due to  a f a l l  i n  ocean 
f r e i g h t s .
2) C om petition  from  o th e r  sou rces  p a r t i c u l a r l y  due to  lower c o s t s .
3) The development of dom estic  i n d u s t r i e s  i n  c o u n t r i e s  which once
depended h e a v i ly  on V enezuela  f o r  p e tro leu m  s u p p l ie s ;  and
k) Im port r e s t r i c t i o n s  o f th e  U nited  S t a t e s ,
In  f o l lo w in g  pages we ana ly se  th en ,  how th o se  f a c t o r s  have been 
a f f e c t i n g  V en ezuela  In  r e c e n t  y e a r s .
161
A) I n t e r n a l  f a c t o r s ;  Domest i c  Petro leum  Pol I c y
V en ez u e la ’ s pe tro leum  p o l ic y  i s  c l e a r .  I f  one of the  main 
t a r g e t s  o f t h i s  p o l i c y  i s  to  maximize o i l  r e v e n u e , (8 ) th e  Government 
w i l l  n a t u r a l l y  t r y  to  squeeze as much revenue as p o s s ib l e  out of the  
o i l  companies f o r  each b a r r e l  of o i l  t h r t  le a v e s  th e  c o u n try  w hile  th ey  
o p e ra te  under the  c o n c e ss io n  system , ( 9 ) s in c e ,  as we saw e a r l i e r ,  t h i s  
system  w i l l  be s u b s t i t u t e d  b y  s e r v ic e  c o n t r a c t s  i n  which, accord ing  to  the  
p rev io u s  o i l  m in i s t e r ,  the  n a t i o n 's  f i n a n c i a l  share  i n  the  b u s in e ss  
must 'even be g r e a t e r .  (10) T h is  argument could even have more f o r c e  i f  
■we r e c a l l  t h a t  a cc o rd in g  to  V enezuelan  g c o lo g i s t s th e  c o u n t r y ’ s p e tro leu m  
re s o u rc e s  a re  d i m i n i s h i n g . ( l l )
\!e saw i n  p rev ious c h a p te r s  how f i s c a l  o b l ig a t io n s  f o r  th e  o i l  
companies wore h ig h e r  i n  V enezuela  th an  i n  o th e r  exp o rtin g  c o u n t r i e s  th u s  
g iv in g  h e r  h ig h e r  r e c e i p t s  p e r  b a r r e l  of e x p o r ts  (ap p ro x im a te ly  17 c e n ts  
p e r  b a r r e l  h ig h e r  th^n  th e  average  fc.r tne l i i d f l e  .ar-.st during  1965). (12)
Me can Imagine t lv - t  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  c . n got to  he q u i te  c o n s id e r a b le  f o r  the  
o i l  companies i f  we r e a l i z e  t h  t  c o s ts  . .ro of 30 h ig h  v in  V . nezuo la  (we sha ll  
see t h i s  p o i n t  i n  fo l lo w in g  p a g e s ) .  .11 the  mo^f i f ,  a cc o rd in g  to  
e s t im a te s ,  th e  new ta x  measures I n  Venezuela r a i s e s  he r  p e r - b a r r e l  
revenue a f u r t h e r  f i v e  c e n t s .  (13) The o i l  companies have s t a t e d  on 
v a r io u s  o c ca s io n s  t h a t  V enezuelan  o i l  has had g r e a t  d i f f i c u l t y  i n
( 8 ) C hapter q  page 131 .
(9 ) C oncessions b e g in  to  e x p ir e  i n  1983; c h a p te r  k , page 135*
(10) P e re z -G u e r re ro ,  lb; " P e t ro le o  I n to r a m ericano” J u ly  1966 , page 27
(11) C hap te r  k , page 93*
(12) C hap ter  3, page 7 8 .
(13) C h ap te r  3 , page 7 5 .
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competing i n  w orld  m arkets due to  nor more "onerous term s" end th- t  
now w ith  ta x e s  an average  f i v e  c e n ts  p-. r  b r r c l  h ig h e r ,  Vonosuolr. w i l l  
be even " l e s s  c o m p e t i t iv e " .(1 4 )  C reole (Jo rs -  y s tand : '.ro ) ,  f o r  in s t a n c e ,  
has c l e a r l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  among o th e r  reasons  i t  has been duo to  h ig h e r  
ta x e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  o th e r  a re a s  7/hy V enezuelan p ro d uce rs  s u f f e r  a 
market d is a d v a n ta g e .  ( 15) I  r e a l i z e  t h a t  such s ta te m e n ts  a re  n a t u r a l  
from o i l  com panies, b u t  th e  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n  seems to  r e f l e c t  t h a t  th ey  
h o ld  some t r u t h .
The u n c e r t i a n t y  of f u tu r e  term s i n  new G-overnmont-Company r e l a t i o n s  
which, as mentioned above, must r a i s e  V e n e z u la 's  f i n a n c i a l  shase i n  the  
b u s in e s s  ( a  goa l which has been repeated ly  ex p re ssed  s in c e  1959), has a l s o  
made th e  o i l  companies, i n  my o p in io n ,  use a l l  t h e i r  b a rg a in in g  powers 
from d r a s t i c  type  propaganda co ncern ing  the  f u t u r e  of the  V enezuelan 
i n d u s t r y  to  a r e d u c t io n  of the c o u n t r y 's  o u tp u t ,  to  prove to  the 
V enezuelan  Government t h a t  i t  canno t or should  n o t  go soak ing  very  much 
more th a n  what i t  was a l r e a d y  g e t t i n g .  I t  i s  hard  to  prove t h i s  l a s t  
p o in t ,  b u t  i t  seems to  me t h a t  I t  i s  too  much of co in c id en ce  t h e t  w hile  
th e  r e c e n t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  between th e  Venezuelan C-ovor nmeat nd th e  o i l  
companies were ta k in g  p i  c e ,  p ro d u c t io n  f e l"  3/- even v*uf ore i.ny s e t t l e m e n t  
had been  reached . And now, once e v e ry th in g  ■ f"s s ig ned  end accep ted  on 
b o th  p a r t s ,  ( l 6 )  p ro d u c t io n  s t a r t e d  to  r i s e  a g a in  d u r in g  the  f i r s t  few 
months of 1967 i n  r e l o t i o n  to  th e  same p e r io d  the y e a r  b e fo r e .  (17) T h is  
a g a in  i s  only  n a t u r a l .  O il  companies do not want to  lo s e  V enezuela , and 
i f  th ey  have come to  a c c e p t  th e  r e a l i t y  of th e  "No More C oncession"
( l lf)  P e tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, O ctober 10, 1966 ; page 6
( 15 ) Pe tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, September 19, 1966; page 6
(16) Pe tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, P e b ru a .y  20, 1967 , Pa Se 8
(17) P e tro leu m  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, March 27, 1967, page 8.
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policy , they  w i l l  t r y  to  ra ke su r  tli t  the  new terms do not ge t to  be any 
more onerous than what r e s u l t s  a f t e r  they hc.ve done t h e i r  . e s t  to  prevent 
them,
Venezuela has been under a s t r a in  due to the encounter of two fo rce s ;  
Government and O il Companies. The f a c t  t h  t  concessions w i l l  soon exp ire  
has determined a c ruc i; 1 moment f o r  the  country. h i th e r  th*. same type 
of arrangements were ac opted again , rno 'o os le s s  o lo iy  the same l i n e s , o r a 
whole new system took t h e i r  p lace. As we ,-ave seen , the Government has chosen 
the  l a t t e r ,  a;id i n i s  i s  why the previous o i l  M in is te r  has described  the  
p resen t period  as one of t r a n s i t i o n  f o r  the o i l  i n c u s t r y .(16) I  would th ink  
th a t  i t  i s  espeei l l y  during  these  perions th a t  p ressu res  between Governments 
and o i l  comp.: n ie s  become g re a te r  * nd I  oelievo th a t  t h i s  lias been one of the  
main f a c to r s  th a t  have co n tr ib u ted  to  the s i t u a t io n  confron ting  Venezuela.,
(18) Petrole-um P ress  Serv ice , November 1966, page 4©3-
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B) Exte rn a l  f a c to r s
1) Diminish in g  F re ig h t  Advantage
Venezuela 's  p r iv i le g e d  geographic,; 1 p o s i t io n  with re sp ec t  to  main 
consuming a reas  ( i . e .  North America and Viestern Gurope) over o th e r  major 
sources o f o i l  ( i . e .  the p id d le  h as t)  has seen g rad u a l ly  d e te r io r a t in g  with 
the  downward trend  of f r i g h t  r a t e s  due to  lower costs  pe r  V r r e l  ox o i l  
t r a n s p o r te d . ( l^ )  'do s.- v in  Chanter I  how the b u i ld in g  of l a rg e r  tankers  
has perm itted  a. considerab le  reduc tion  in  f r e ig h t  c o s ts  due to  lower u n i t  
co s ts  ox’ c o n s tru c t io n  and of f u e l ,  or a a lso  because o f  h igher  speed. (20) 
Creole ( j e r s e y  S tandard’s a f f i l i a t e  in  Venezuela) seems to  have quoted 
in d u s try  f ig u r e s  which in d ie  te  t i n t  t  .niters ope ra ting  in  1954 averaged 
15>000 dea.dweigl.it tons , while in  1964 the average s iz e  was 25,300 d .w . t .  and 
the average s iz e  of v e sse ls  under c o n s tru c t io n  was 53,300 d .w . t .  In  the 
su p e r- tan k e r  ca tegory  (over 100,000 d .w . t . ) ,  5 wore opera ting  worldwide in  
December 1964, while a year 1 t e r  16 were in  ope ra tio n  w ith 5 l  more under 
c o n s tru c t io n .  (21) With 10 to  30,000 d .w .t .  v e s s e ls ,  the  opera ting  costs  
of sh ipping  a ba r r e l  of 35° g ra v i ty  crude from P e rs ian  Gulf to  New York
ranged from $1.01 to  $ 1 .0 6 , But with 30 to  50,000 to n n e is  co s ts  dropped
to 78 cen ts  from 84 c en ts ,  Furthermore, with tanke rs  of over 50,000 tons 
t r a n s p o r t  co s ts  f a l l  to  only 67 cen ts  per b a r r e l . (22)
(19) Petroleum: In te l l ig e n c e  Weekly, September 13, 1966, page 6
(20) Chapter One, page; 1 8 .
(21) Petroleum In te l l ig e n c e  Weekly, September 19, 1366; page 6
(22) Petroleum I n te l l ig e n c e  Weekly, September 19, 1966; page 6
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I t  i s  obvious th a t  s in ce  Venezuela i s  c l o s e r  to  m arkets in  the  United
S ta te s  and Western Europe then i s  the  Middle East, high f r e ig h t  r a t e s  a rc  to
he r  advantage. However, t h i s  f r e ig h t  advent i e has been dim inishing
c o n s t a n t l y  s ince  1957. In  Tabic; V -  11 we sec how t h i s  f r e ig h t  advantage
which was approxim; t e l y  $1.42 per b< r r e l  in  1957 a t  the U.S. e a s te rn  seaboard
was reduced to  $>0.67 by 1965. Although the f ig u re s  of our ta b le  correspond
to  posted F.O.B. p r ic e s  and average f r e ig h t  .rates without tak in g  note ox
d isco u n ts ,  which would give us a more r e a l i s t i c  s i t u a t io n ,  i t  en .h lo s  us to
follow the e f f e c t  of lower f r e ig h t  r--.tes on the  d e liv e re d  p r ic e  oi both
Venezuelan and Middle E astern  crudes. ( 23)
The d im in ish ing  f r e i g h t  advantage- fo r  Venezuelan o i l  i s  ev iden t. However,
i t  i s  necessary  to  ho aware th a t  as the d if fe re n c e  in  d e liv e re d  cost narrows,
Venezuelan o i l  w i l l  be l e s s  a t t r a c t i v e  fo r  o i l  companies which hove lower
cost sources e lsew here , end w i l l  gr- d u a lly  lose  mr rkcts as o i l  from o th e r
sources advances (see  d i .g ro n  V - l ) . This w i l l  r e f l e c t  i t s e l f  in  the
domestic scene by the  gradual e lim in a tio n  of the  h ig her  marginal cost f i e l d s ,
and the  companies ope ra tin g  only where*-the m arginal cost p lu s  f r e ig h t
(m arginal d e l iv e re d  cost) w i l l  allow the o i l  to  meet su p p lie s  from o th e r  
sources in  in te r n a t io n a l  markets.
Only to  g ive 11 i l e a  of how Venezuelan o i l  can bt d is p l  cod from 
in te r n a t io n a l  markets by the  narrowing of he r  f r e i g h t  advantage- we p re se-.it 
diagram V -  1. Assuming th. t  a l l  o th e r  cond itions  remain equal, in  a market 
(such as the U.S. m. rk e t  f o r  example ) supplied  by Venezuelan crude -and 
Middle E aste rn  crude, we f in d  th a t  i i  the o i l  w.-s to  -a supplied  to  t h i s
(23) Using c u rre n t  f r e ig h t  r a t e s .  Creole s t a t e s  th a t  to,- d e live red  cost
from the Middle E ast i s  le s s  than from Venezuela by $0.38 to  A rgentina , 
$0 .35  to  Rotterdam, and $0.07 to  Hew York. (Petroleum  In te l l ig e n c e  
Weekly, September 19, 1966; page 6)
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Table V -  11
D^ecreasin^Advante.^e of V enezuelan  Crudes!i
(U .S.
i? 5 7
$  pe r  
1959
b a r r e l }
A£bl 1331 1965(a)
POB R S Til JURA ( l ) 2.03 1.92 1.80 1.80 1.80
AVjRAGB FREIGHT 133 113 1.12 1^ 93 0,90
GIF U.S. ATLANTIC COAST 3.95 3 .26 2.92 2 . 8A 2.70
POB AIviUAY (2 ) 2.5A 2.3A 2.30 2.30 2 .30
AVERAGE FREIGHT 0 ^ 8 0.36 IkiQ 0 .28 °«l§2
CIF U « S ^ y ; ^ ^ ; i C  CO ALT 3 0 02 2.70 2 .60 2 .58 2.53
DIPPER -NCE 0.93 0.56 0 .32 0.26 0.17
^ K ^ J O T A O T A  GE 1.A2 0.98 0.82 0 .76 0 .67
(1) Saudi Arabia (3A-3A.9°)
(2) V enezuela  (2 6 -2 6 .9 ° )
( a )  E s t im a te d
(* ) Crude P e tro le u m  p r i c e s  when F o0 oB0 a re  th o se  p o s te d  by m ajor o i l
companies, when C .I .F .  th e y  a re  computed by adding  to  p o s te d  p r i c e s  
an e s t im a te  of f r e i g h t  based  on average r s t e s  compiled by th e  London 
T ankers B ro k e rs 1 P an e l.
Source: U.N, Monthly B u l l e t i n  of S t a t i s t i c s ;  December 1963 page 151
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market by co n s id e ra tio n s  or comparative co s ts ,  the  p ro p o rtio n s  oi the  market
supplied  by these  two sources would be determined a t  t i p o i n t  of in te r s e c t io n
ox t h e i r  re sp e c t iv e  d e liv e red  nkirgin--l cost curves, i ’hus i f  i n i t i a l l y  we f in d
th .:t  the two curves ( VEi\ ‘^ ,-nd mE^) i n t e r s e c t  a t  a p o in t  such as "E"? t h i s
p o in t  of in te r s e c t i o n  dctorrr.i. eo t i n t  a q u an ti ty  such as OE be supplied  by
Venezuela, end a q u a n ti ty  such as EC by the Middle E ast.  Assuming now .-an
equal p e rcen tag e  re d u c t io n  i n  f r e i g h t  ra tu  a l l  over th e  w orld , t h i s  would
a f f e c t  the two major sources of imported o i l  to  the  United S ta te s .  Because
of the  g r e a te r  d is tan ce  of the Middle East from the United S t a te s , the nr-.rgirnl
d e live red  co s t  per u n i t  of Middle Eastern  o i l  w i l l  reduce mo- sharp ly  than
t h a t  f o r  Venezuelan o i l .  Although b o th  of th e se  two curves w i l l  s h i f t
downw r d s f the one f o r  the- Middle East w i l l  s h i f t  more than th a t  fo r
2 2Venezuela, anc the  po in t  of i n te r s e c t io n  o i  these  two curves (VEx: and ME )
w i l l  move to  the l e f t  to  p o in t  l,D" With both curves in te r s e c t in g  a t  "D”, we 
f im , th a t  the redu c tion  in  t r a n s p o r t  cost has tnus enabled Middle E aste rn  
o i l  to  gain  a g r e a te r  'ro p o r tio n  of the  market, s ince  now i t  car supply a 
q u a n ti ty  such as A C a t  a lower marginal d e liv e red  cost than Venezuela.
2) Competit io n  from Other  Sources
Not only have tlio v a s t  re se rv es  from the Middle East perm itted  t h i s  
reg ion  to  compete with Venezuelan o i l  in  in tern , t i o n a l  m rh e t s ,  but Iso 
North A fr ica  with he r  proxim ity  to  Europe h. ,s a lso  been competing with 
Venezuela. North A frica  lies been in c re a s in g  he r  exports  s t e a d i ly  not only 
to  Europe but a lso  to the  United S ta te s  since I960, and by 1965 h :s  gained 
a share  in  world n e t  exports  ( in c lu d in g  the Soviet Union) of IpA which i s
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more tli-n  h a l f  of Venezuela 's. (24) The major sources from A fr ica  arc  
A lgeria , Libya, and N igeria , ana most of the. supply i s  so ld  in  the European 
m arket.
The Sovie t Union- has id  so m in ta in e d  a considerable  share- in  world nut 
exports  (6y.) in  s p i t e  of her domestic consumption, e u ,  a lthough her mein 
markets out of nor p o l i t i c . -1 o rb i t  t o  Europe, t . ie Scandinavian c o u n tr ie s  end 
Japan, she h .z obtained a re sp ec tab le  sh. re  oi the  L a tin  Ajncric. n market, 
not only Ix.-cruse o f  the foo tho ld  she h s gained in  Cuba, but a lso  in  im portant 
m rk c ts  such as Argentic,; saci B raz il  which arc going through a pe riod  of 
i n d u s t r i a l  expansion. (25) Russia o f f e r s  the- advantage oi b. r t e r  t r a n s a c t io n s  
which ere v c r ;  appealing f o r  co u n tr ies  with a shortage  oi fo re ig n  exchange. I t  
hoc boon with t h i s  type of com petition t h  t  Russia hasbeen abm to  supply 
markets c lose  to  Venezuela to  too p re ju d ice  of the  l a t t e r  country .
With re sp ec t  to B ra z i l ,  wo saw how Russia a ..... the Middle East ivvo 
pe n e tra ted  in to  t h i s  m r a t  t  Venezuela1 s expense (see  Taelv. V -10) B raz il  
has r e c e n t ly  n o t i f i e d  Venezuela th  t  she m s  not w i l l in g  to  buy Venezuelan o i l  
i f  s ir  could buy cheaper Middle E astern  cruae. (2 6 ) .  In  t h i s  re sp ec t  B ra z i l  
ma.de c le a r  th a t  recen t  d isc o v e r ie s  of s e v e r : !  b ig  o i l  f i e l d s  in  the Middle East 
and A frica  cou led  witA t in  low cost of developing proven re; erves th e re ,  end 
the  nev gas d isc o v e r ie s  in  the  n o r th  woulu. m ko Venezuelan o i l  ovci. l e s s  
com petitive , (27) Wes tore. Europe h: s a lso  estirc. .ted a reduc tion  in  her  
purchases from Venezuela. Accordin, to  the  s p e c ia l i s e d  p re s s ,  by 1970 L atin
(24) M in is try  of Mines and Hydrocarbons -  Venezuela "kgmojriaj1 965, page I -  113
(25) M in is try  o i  Mines and Hydrocarbons -  Venezuela. nMcmoriarf 1965, pf.ge I -  112
(26) Petroleum In te l l ig e n c e  Weeklyj A pril  3, 1967 page 1
(27) Ib id .
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America would only h< ve a 5p  share in  t h i s  market while A frica  w u ld  h. vc 
inc reased  i t s  p-: r t i c ip ,  t io n  to  3 by of t o t a l  in  a r t s .  (28) Evon in  the;
United S taces .new su p p l ie r s  lu.vo been cut tin . in to  i/enez-rola 1 .share of t h i s  
market, Vie s<,w in  Tv bio . -  8 how Kiddle E aste rn , A frican  and Cansdi.u 
sources wei\ in c re a s in g  t h e i r  s ir  r e  of the  crude o i l  imported by the united 
S ta te s ,  b -w i t  seems th. t  Venesuel- 11 a lso  begin to  lo se  he r  share of
ti.Lv, f u e l  o i l  ... rx o t  in  t h i s  country , (29) According to  the p re s s ,  I t a l y ,
Panama, Iro L  no, u n ited  kingdom, Franco> and the  K iddle E ast a re  making 
in roads in to  the ra. rkx t  ol residua.l fu e l  which h<s been supp lied  u n t i l  now
i
almost e n t i r e l y  by Venezuela. (30)
Venezuela as  we see , Ibices com petition from many o th e r  a re a s ,  hut 
th i s  i s  not only duo to  high r  tax e s ,  lo s s  in  f r e i  h t  advantage and new 
sources . Average production  cos ts  in  Venezuela re  iso  h igher  tb .n  in  any 
o th e r  m .jo r  e r- 'o r ti ig  country. (31) P ro fesso r  Adclman I:- m made a
compur. -five study of these  c o s ts  of the main producing a re as  of the b e s te rn  
World., o.cd h s read ied  t h -  conclusion th a t  Venezuela i s  on the  average 
the h ig h es t  cost n e t  ex p o rte r  with a production cost of $ 0 .6 2  per b - r r e l  
(Table V~12). The n in  expo rte rs  of the Middle East do not surpass 10 cc,.ts  
per lvitcI ,  end coots even reach  tno low oi' /O.O--,- p^ r  b o n v l  in  Ir- q.
A frica  v a r ie s  from ^0115 in  .uibya to  $0.46 in  A lge ria  which i s  a lso  below 
the  average cost in  Venezuela.
(28) Petroleum  P ress  S erv ice , October 1966 , page 387
(29) Petroleum In te l l ig e n c e  Weekly, February 13, 1967, page 1 ( t h i s  T*h 11 
be f u r th e r  analysed in  fo llow ing pages)
(30) Ib id
( 31) Advlrv.n, to. A . ; "Oil P roduction Costs in  Four Areas, published  by: P r o c e e d ^  
of the  Council of Economics of the A .I.M .Er, New York, March 1966, p. 209
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’’Average Oi l  Pro^duc t i gn Co s ts  " (1 ) 
( U . S , /  p e r  b a r r e l )
VENEZUELA /  0.62
A lg e r ia 0 .46
N ig e r ia 0 .31
Libya 0.13
Saudi A rab ia 0 .10
Kuwait 0 .10
I r a n 0 .07
I r a q 0.04
( l )  O p e ra t in g  and Development Costs
Source: Adelman M.A. ’’O i l  P ro d u c t io n  C osts i n  Pour .areas'"
page 209.
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\Jc thus sec ' th- t  p roduction cos ts  'do not favour Venezuela e i t h e r ,  and 
as a r e s u l t  h vc a lso  bc-.n a negative  f a c to r  f o r  irr r k c t iu g  o i l  from t h i s  
country,
3) nt„ Domes t i c  I n d u s t r i e s ,
Another f a c to r  vnich In s  not favoured Venezuela! exports  in s  been the
development of petroleum in d u s t r ie s  in  various c n m tr io s  both in  tee  e x t r a c t iv e  
and the  r e f in in g  s ta g e .  Such in s  Seen the case of rumy South American 
co u n tr ie s  where p r iv a te  and n t i o n a l  concerns have been increas ing  production 
and r  f in in g  c ap ac i ty  s t e a d i ly .  v/c mentioned . e a r l i e r  hew i
n a t io n a l " o i l  companies of th  v.- r io u s  L - t ih  American
: c o u n tr ie s a vo boeu u n i te d  under "AdPAL" (Agrupacion Regional P e t ro K rn s  
Estatalc-s Latino American; s) in  o rder to  c o lla b o ra te  in  the  f u r th e r  
development of t h e i r  r e s m c t i ' - x  o i l  i n d u s t r i e s . (32) k i th  re sp ec t  to b r a z i l ,  
i t  h:Q been announced th  t  i t s  import n e e  as a crude o i l  customer w i l l  d ec line  
t h i s  year as the country  in c re ases  production from i t s  loc /1  o i l  f i e l d s . (33) 
Argontin-- a lso  seems to  bo socking s e l f  su f f ic ie n c y  in  o i l  "through :.n 
in te n s iv e ,  f b s t ,  n i l  r a t io n a l  development of lo c - 'l  o i l  re so lv es"  by p r iv a te  
companies:. (34) • nd Colombia’s production i s  ".Iso u k ing  h e r  o i l  i n d u s t r y 's  
outlook " b r ig h t". (35)
(32) Chapter 4 . page 132.
(33) Petroleum In te l l ig e n c e  Weekly, janu.; ry  9? 1967, pa e 1
(34) Petroleum In te l l ig e n c e  Weekly: f : ciuury 6, 1967> page 6
(35) P e tro leo  In teram ericaao , August* 1966, page 30 .
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l&bh respect to  refining c.- pacity, i t  bus boon in  tiu. more developed 
countries oi l e s to r n  Europe where- i t  has boon most accentuated, cluo to the 
p resen t  tendency of locating r e f in e r i e s  in  consuming 'Centres (pee chap ter  1 
page3 l) .  This has a i'ii .c ted  Venezuela’s exports  oi re f in e d  products to  the 
area  end w i l l  continue to do so as su p p l ie s  01 crude o i l  from the f i d d le  
East and Northern A f r ic ,  po n i t  European r e f in e r i e s  to  cover domestic 
doin'nd : t  lower co.. to This .m.s f e u ,  the case 01 I t , - ly  where independent 
retin o r - ru  d a r te rs  ana s t a t e  owned Sif., which together share morv than 40>j of 
t h e  lo c a l  m. r k e t ,  ll ve j -con able to  ob ta in  thvir crude a t  n ;%t  tractive'1 
pricoo duo to  competition more, crude su p p l ie rs  ’■■ho sou : t o  gain  4.n o u t le t  
fo r  t h e i r  o i l  in  t h i s  important European n. ■xknt. ( 36)
In  Franco, lx s id e s  having < a  im portant r e f in in g  in d u s try ,  Go^erimant 
c o n tro l le d  coup m ies ob ta in  su p p lie s  from the. franc-zone , mainly from Algeria, 
in  o rder to  - s s i s t  French companies in  those  -'-rcvis and t. > favour f r ru ic -o i l  
f o r  currency ro, s o n s . (37)
Recently tliore r u  a lso  been .. n im portant t ^ d t n c y  in  Europe to  u n i te  
S ta te  ncl p r iv a te  independent conpciiies from se v era l  cordon mar Ret coun tr ies  
in  o rder  to  f ; cu com petition from tie- m a jo rs .( 38) They ...re as'ring snap ° r t  
from European nvfchoritics a.lledging th a t  wholly f r e e  com petition between s id es  
as  unequally  matened as Majors and Europe's indcpondonts dOvS not favour 
Europe 's i n t e r e s t s .  (3b) ¥h cw  th i s  might e f f e c t  one211 e lan  exports  i s  in
(36) IVtroleum I n tc l l ig o i  iCc Weekly, jan u  .ry 4, 1965, p-age 5
(37) Ibid.
(38) Petroleum. In ti  l l i g u  ce deekly, February 13? 1967: uayo 6
(39) Petroleum I n te l l ig e n c e  Weekly, Fet.au.. rp 13? 1967? page 6.
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th; t  tbs so companies p re tend  to  o b ta in  t h e i r  erode o i l  requirem ents from 
those sources th a t  o f f e r  the b e t to r  p r ice  -:.ud n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  from Majors 
whose i n t e r e s t  ;»e to  move t h e i r  o i l  through i n t e g r t c d  chann e ls . As no h-'vc 
seen, most of Venezuela1 s c<md© i s  produced by th roe  in te r n o t io n a l  majors,
. nd i f  these  were to  be displr- cod by l e g i s l a t i o n  from the European i:v r lw t ,  
Venezuelon exports  could iu d i r e c t l y  affected*
Hot only domestic pet.rolv.aim incus t r i  s hove boui a f f e c t in g  Venezuelan 
exports  to  the Europe* n m rk e t ,  but a lso  the in d u s t r ie s  of indigenous fu e l s  
woich in  some c. scs got p ro te c t io n  from the Go vox :mont . Though indigenous 
coal i s  • ..cominp " le s s  competitive"., o i l  i s  f  cing increasing; r i v a l r y  from 
n a tu r  .1 g.■ s and n u c lo - r  power,(40) vJith re sp ec t  to  co a l ,  although th e re  am
in d ie  t io n s  of an " inev it.P  le  d ec line"  ox i t s  share u i t l u n  trio tot< 1
supply of fu e l  wlfcli w i l l  meet Europe 's energy requirem ents in  the fu tu re ,  
p o l i t i c a l  ‘p ro te c t io n  nay "slow i t  u.own"„ csooci. l l y  in  the  United Kingdom 
and Western Germany. (4 l)
4) Impor t  R e s t r ic t io n s  in  ten. United S ta te s
Venezuela hes been claim ing u n f a i r  trea tm ent by the United. S ta le s  with 
r e l  t io n  to  the  import r e s t r i c t i o n s  of petroleum. In  tlx... l a t e s t  annual 
re p o r t  of the  Venezuelan M in is try  01 Mines and Hydrocarbons t h i s  s i t u a t io n  i s  
described  os "d iscrim in  t in g  with re sp ec t  to  Venezuela", considering  the  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  trea tm ent f o r  imports from Canada and Mexico. (42) The
( 40) Petroleum P ress  Serv ice , Maxell 1967; p°gc 03
( 41) Petroleum P ress  Serv ice , March 1967, page 83
(42 M in is try  of Mines and Hydrocarbons -  Venezuela- 'l ienorig"  19o5> page 1-117
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preferentiq .1  trea tm en t c o n s is ts  in  th- b from 1959 to  1962 the re  was no 
re g u la t io n  of imports of petroleum  wnich en tered  t;.e United St- t e s  by l-.?nd 
from e i tu o r  country , w hile seaborne s /d  pme.it s e n ta riiv . through tne e a s t  coast 
were l im ite d  to  9% ox t o t a l  demand. (43) This system was modiiied fo r  1963 
when the import q u o t- w--s cu.' nged to  1 2 . of  domestic p ro d u c tio n p but 
s t i l l  OaxXc Ua and Mexico iu c. p r e f e r e n t i a l  trea tm ent s ince  from th i s  12.2% open 
to  fo re ig n  im ports, the  es tim ate  of imports of crude o i l  from these  co u n tr ie s  
was deducted from th is  quota. (44) In o th e r  'e-xis , as  in land  im ports 
incre. sed , tne quota f o r  seaoorne sbipm: n t s  would d im inish  in  the  s< me amount. 
As a r e s u l t ,  im ports from the two c o u n tr ie s ,  which in  1959 had 9 . 65k 01 t o t a l  
im ports , reached 24% of the t o t a l  in  1965.(45) V enezuela 's  share , on the  
o th e r  h a  id , f e l l  from 47.1% in  1959 to  34*9 in  1965 (Table V -  8 ) .
The U nited S ta te s  is  in te r e s te d  in  securing  a co n sid erab le  supply  of o i l  
which could be ob tained  from o th e r  North American sources such us Canada and 
Mexico as a p recau tio n  ag.-J.nst in te rn a t io n a l  c r i s i s .  However, Venezuela 
i n s i s t s  th  t  i t  could  be dar<.eroue to  favour otbuT sources wbi-.h do not have 
tnc sc me o i l  p o te n t ia l  as she does fo r  the  same reason  of s e c u r ity  in  supply. 
( 46) Whoever i s  r i g h t  on th is  m - tte r  i s  ;e s ides  the  p o in t,  but i t  does seem 
c le a r  t i n t  Venezuela i s  no t favoured by these  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,
(43) Petroleum P ress  Serv ice . March 1959, page 115, A pril  1959? page 127
(44) Petroleum In te l l ig e n c e  Weekly, A pril 2, 1962; page 3
Petroleum Pn  sf Serv ice , A p ril  1962; page 150
(45) IMS. Department of tne I n t e r i o r ;  Bureau ox Mines.
( 46) Perez-G uerrero , M.; "Petroleos Hechos y Conslderacion e s ", page 17
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We have a n a ly se d  i n  p re v io u s  pages how V e n e z u e la 1ssh a re  of the  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  m arket has been d im in ish in g  f-'nd how t h i s  has l e d  from a p ro p o r t io n a te  
r e d u c t io n  of i t s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  to  an a b so lu te  c o n t r a c t io n  of b o th  p ro d u c t io n  
and e x p o r ts ,  as seems to  be th e  case  f o r  1966e now i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  we 
should  an a ly se  the  p a t t e r n  of V e n e z u e la 's  p e tro leu m  e x p o r ts  and i t s  e f f e c t  
on e a rn in g s  i n  o rd e r  to  a p p re c ia te  the  situ* t i o n  c o n f ro n t in g  V enezuela .
For s t a t i s t i c a l  rea so n s  however, we wild e x c lu d e  1966 from t h i s  a n a ly s i s  and 
we s h a l l  c o n c e n t r a te  more from I 960 to  1969 .
As we can see  from Table V -  13, e x p o rts  of V enezuelan  o i l  a re  composed 
of b o th  crude o i l  and p ro d u c ts .  Of the  l a t t e r  th e  more im p o rtan t  a re  f u e l  
o i l ,  d i e s e l - g a s  o i l ,  g a so l in e  and naphtha , and k e ro se n e .  A lthough t o t a l  
e x p o rts  have increased , (up to  1965) ,  -re ho n o t ic e  t h a t  the e x p o r t  p a t t e r n  
has changed from  1950 to  1965 i n  the sense t h a t  the  volume of p ro d u c ts  has 
been  lo s in g  w eigh t i n  th e  t o t a l  f i g u r e .  I n  t h i s  way we f i n d  t h a t  y/hile i n  
1950 p ro d u c ts  accounted  f o r  63% of t o t a l  e x p o r ts  (T able  V -  14-), i n  1965 
t h i s  p r o p o r t io n  had f a l l e n  to  approx im ate ly  5 0 $ . T h is  i s  due to  th e  v a r i a ­
t i o n  of the  demand p a t t e r n  of th e  more im p o r ta n t  consuming c o u n t r i e s ,  whioh 
as we saw, hav ing  in c r e a s e d  t h e i r  r e f i n i n g  c a p a c i ty  now im port a g r e a t e r  
p ro p o r t io n  of crude (see  C h ap te r  I ,  p a g e 3 l) .  With r e s p e c t  to  p ro d u c ts  
we a ls o  f i n d  th  t  f u e l  o i l  besid.es be ing  th e  major p ro d u c t  e x p o r te d ,  has 
g ra d u a l ly  in c r e a s e d  i t s -  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  th e  t o t -^ 1 volume of p ro d u c ts  
t o  GGfo i n  1965. T h is  i n  t u r n  i s  due to  i t s  h igh  demand i n  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  
c o u n t r ie s  and because  V enezuelan  c rudes , b e in g  of th e  h e a v ie r  type  
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liable X  “...Ait
Venezue 1 a 1 s ^Petro1 eum B xgort Jpatter 'n  
( m i l l io n s  of b a r r e l s )
T o ta l T o ta l F u e l
P e tro leum Crude P ro duc ts O il
1950 494,15 184,41 309,74 193.89
1955 74-7,69 352,49 415.20 250.82
I960 950*42 475,57 474.85 294,49
1961 976,70 481,09 495,61 293,57
1962 1 ,067 ,05 542,14 524,91 309,47
1965 1 ,0 8 9 .7 5 555.84 533.91 315.68
196/f 1 ,1 46 .42 588.33 558.09 351.37
1965 1 ,1 5 7 .0 1 576.74 580.27 381.22
S h a re : — J k F u e l  O i l  ■
of i 'ot,..l ;
1950 100,0 37.3 62.7 62 „ 6
1955 100,0 44 .5 55.5 oO. 4
I960 100.0 50 .0 50.0 62 ,0
1961 100.0 49 .3 50.7 59 .2
1962 1 '0 .0 50 .8 4 9 .2 59 .0
1963 100.0 51.0 49 .0 59 .1
1964 100.0 51 .3 4 .7 63 .0
1965 100 .0 49 .8 50.2 65.7
Source: M in is t ry  of Mines and H ydrocarbons f V enezuela , 




Since f u e l  o i l  i s  V e n e z u e la 's  most im p o r tan t  e x p o r t  p ro d u c t  we s h a l l  d e a l  
mainly w ith  th e  f i g u r e s  of crude o i l ,  t o t a l  p ro d u c ts  and f u e l  o i l ,  and i n  
our a n a ly s i s  we in te n d  to  show t h a t  V e n e z u e la 's  pe tro leu m  e x p o r t  p a t t e r n  
has no t been  fa v o u r in g  h e r  e i t h e r .  (47)
We f i n d  i n  Table  V -  19 n ex t  to  the f i g u r e s  of volume, the  corresponding 
e a rn in g s  or g ro ss  r e c e i p t s  d e r iv e d  from th e s e  e x p o r ts  f o r  1960-1969. These
e a rn in g s  were the ones p r e s e n te d  to  the  V enezuelan  Government i n  the
f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n ts  of th e  companies f o r  t . .x  p u rp o ses .  V/e n o t ic e  t h a t  
i n  s p i t e  o f  the  annual i n c r e a s e  i n  the  volume of e x p o r ts ,  th e r e  have been
annual r e d u c t io n s  i n  e a r n i n g  from 1963 onwards, and i n  1962 the  in c r e a s e  i n
v a lue  was no t p r o p o r t io n a te  to  the  in c r e a s e  i n  volume. I n  o th e r  w ords,
(47) F u e l  o i l  i s  a d e r iv a t iv e  of crude o i l  which i s  used as a major 
source  of energy  i n  many i n d u s t r i e s .  Being i t s e l f  a l i q u i d ,  i t  
o f f e r s  c e r t a i n  advantages over th e  more t r a d i t i o n a l  ty p es  of f u e l s  
(su ch  as c o a l )  s in ce  i t  becomes e a s i e r  to  t r a n s p o r t  and s t o r e ,  
c le a n e r  to  u s e ,  and on the  whole more econom ical o r as econom ical 
as th e se  ( s e e  J,E„ H a r ts h o rn ’ s c h a p te r  "O il  as a G enera l F u e l " ,  
O p .C i t . . page 39 )-  However, i t  seems t h a t  demand f o r  f u e l  o i l  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by be in g  h ig h ly  p r i c e - e l a s t i c  due t o  the  e x is te n c e  
of o th e r  com peting f u e l s  ( p r i n c i p a l l y  c o a l ,  b u t  a ls o  n a tu r a l  gas 
and i n  growing im portance n u c le a r  e n e rg y ) ,  and hav ing  i t s  m arket 
l im i te d  to  some e x te n t  by Government p o l i c i e s  t h a t  tend  to  p r o t e c t  
( o th e r )  dom estic  f u e l  i n d u s t r i e s ,  a ccou n ts  f o r  a lower p r i c e .  
Government p r o t e c t i o n  has been  the  case  of England and b e s t e r n  
Germany (p e tro leu m  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  •torch 19&7 page 83 ) ,  and o f  th e  
U n ited  S t a t e s  i n  which c o u n try  th e  Government i s  "under heavy 
p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  from to p  c o a l  e x e c u t iv e s "  (P e tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  
Weekly, Septem ber 28, 1964 , page 8 ) .  I t  was a ls o  e s t im a te d  t h a t  a 
t a x  of about $0 .8 0  p e r  b a r r e l  was imposed on f u e l  o i l  i n  the  U n ited  
Kingdom, and of $ 1 .0 5  i n  Belgium (O .P .E .C . " E l a s t i c i t y  o f Demand 
f o r  crude O i l .  I t ' s  I m p l ic a t io n s  f o r  E x p o r t in g  C o u n tr ie s"  
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w hile  V enezuela  e x p o rte d  more pe tro leum , which we must r e c a l l  i s  a 
w astin g  a s s e t  each y e a r  th e  e a rn in g s  from th e s e  e x p o r ts  were g e t t i n g  
lo w e r .
There a re  two main re a so n s  f o r  t h i s :
1) lower p r i c e s ;  and
2) th e  V enezuelan e x p o r t  p a t t e r n .
In  Table  V -  16 we see how the  d i f f e r e n t  p r i c e s  f o r  V enezuelan  o i l  
have f a l l e n  betv/een 1960-1965- S ince e a rn  begs a re  a fu n c t io n  of b o th  
volume and p r i c e ,  v/o f in d  t h  t  the  h a t t e r  has had the  s t r o n g e r  in f lu e n c e  
i n  th e  d e te rm in a t io n  of t i l  e a rn in '-s  s in c e  the e f f e c t  of lower p r i c e s  has 
more th an  outweighed the  e f f e c t  of g r e a te r  volume. I t  i s  q u i te  under­
s ta n d a b le  why the V enezuelan Government p u ts  p re s s u r e  on the  o i l  companies 
I t  i s  no t j u s t  a m a t te r  o f t r y in g  to  squeeze more revenue ou t of them 
j u s t  because  of g ree d ,  i t  i s  sim ply t h a t  the  Government f a c e s  th e  r e a l i t y  
of red u c in g  th e  n a t i o n ’ s s to c k  of a w asting  a s s e t ,  which i s  th e  prime 
source  of revenu e , w hile  r e c e iv in g  each y e a r  a low er p r io e  f o r  i t s  s a l e s .  
I t  i s  th e  c r u c i a l  problem of term s of t r a d e  which a f f e c t s  so much the 
c o u n t r i e s  exporting  raw m a te r i a l s  which i s  b e in g  fo u g h t .  (d-8)
P r i c e s ,  however, have been only  one of the  re a so n s  f o r  V e n e z u e la 1s 
low er e a rn in g s  from  pe tro leum . This has a ls o  been  due to  th e  change i n  
th e  "mix” of pe tro leum  e x p o r ts ,  s in c e  as we saw, p ro d u c ts  have been  
lo s in g  w eight i n  th e  t o t a l  volume of e x p o r t s ,  ;.rnd f u e l  o i l ,  which 
a ccoun ts  f o r  a low er p r i c e  among r e f i n e d  p ro d u c ts ,  has  been in c r e a s in g
(/f8) V en ezu e la ’ s te rm  of t r a d e  in d ex  f o r  19-68 (1959 th e  base  y e a r )
had f a l l e n  to  82A ,  (Banco C e n tra l  do V enezue la .  "Informe Economi- 
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a t  th e  same tim e i t s  sha re  i n  the  t o t a l  volume of p ro d u c ts  going  out to  
m arkets (T ab le  V -  I l f ) .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  we f i n d  t h a t  d u r ing  19&5 
th e  average  p r i c e  f o r  V enezuelan  crude was $ 1 .8 6  p e r  b a r r e l ,  compared to  
$"2.08 p e r  b a r r e l  as th e  average  u r i c e  f o r  p ro d u c ts ,  (4 9 ) ,  and f o r  f u e l  o i l ,  
V e n e z u e la 's  most im p o r ta n t  e x p o r t  p ro d u c t ,  i t  was only $ 1 .5 5  pe r‘ b a r r e l .  (50) 
The t r e n d  i n  V e n e z u e la 's  e x p o rt  p-.tt-.-rn c o n t r i b u t e s  to  reduce  th e  
Governm ent's  o i l  revenue s in c e  tno ::vorago p r i c e  of crude o i l  i s  below th--;t 
of the  average  b a r r e l  of r e f i n e d  p rodu c ts  on a w hole, and f u e l  o i l ,  having 
th e  s t r o n g e s t  w eigh t w i th in  th e  p ro d u c t  "mix", c o n t r ib u te s  i n  t u r n  to  
reduce th e  average  p r ic e  o b ta in e d  f o r  t o t a l  p ro d u c ts .  F u r th e rm o re , the  f r e t  
t h a t  V enezuelan  c ru des  o f f e r  a v a r i e t y  w i th in  the  "h ea v ie r"  c a te g o ry  
(se e  C hapter IV p a g e l0 3 ) ,  o i l  companies have been  a b le  to  i n c r e a s e  the  
p r o p o r t io n  of heavy c rudes i n  the  t o t a l  o u tp u t  o f crude ( 5 l )  t o  s a t i s f y  
demand i n  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  p r e f e r  t o  p ro ce ss  t h e i r  own f u e l  o i l  i n  dom estic 
r e f i n e r i e s ,  b u t  s in c e  th e s e  c ru d es  a re  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s u i t a b l e  to  yield lower 
p r i c e  p ro d u c ts ,  th e y  a re  a c c o rd in g ly  p r i c e d .  V enezuela  has co n seq u e n tly  
been  lo s in g  revenue i n  t h i s  way s in c e  o i l  companies v a lu e  the  crude, 
e x t r a c t e d  a c c o rd in g  to  I t s  g r a v i t y  to  pay the  n a t ;* on h e r  r o y a l t y .  Thus 
r o y a l t y  payments which norm ally  va ry  p r o p o r t io n a te l y  to  the  amount of 
crude e x p lo i t e d ,  p re se n te d  i n  1965 a r e d u c t io n  of 0 .2 /o w ith  r e s p e c t  to  
1964 I n s p i t e  of an in c r e a s e  of 2.4% i n  crude o i l  p ro d u c t io n  d u r in g  t h i s  
p e r io d .  (52 )
(49 ) Table  V -  16
(50) Pe t ro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  deek ly ,  A a r i l  4 ,  1986, page 5
(51) M in i s t r y  o f  Mines and Hydrocarbons -  V e n e z u e l a ,  !trlm q i l a " 1965 , 
page IV 29.
( 52 ) Banco C e n t r a l  de V enezue la ,  "Xnforme Fconomico" 1965, page 280
* IW A ^.T,-A iaJI . . . * V * . r -  - t y . t i i n ? a i  " J
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The U n ited  S t a t e s  i s  V e n e z u e la 's  most im p o r tan t  market and has been 
g r a d u a l ly  ab so rb in g  more V enezuelan  f u e l  o i l f im p o r ts  of which 
su rp a sse d  i n  1965 th e  volume of crude and o th e r  p ro d u c ts  to g e th e r
(se e  Table  V -  1 7 ) .  T h is  has been  due to  the i n c r e a s in g  demand f o r  f u e l  
o i l  b u t  .also to  c e r t a i n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  v e ry  p a r t i c u l a r  to  th e  p e tro lu em  
i n d u s t r y  of th e  U n ited  S t a t e s ,  and to  the p e tro leu m  p o l ic y  of he r  G-overnmen 
which a re  r e a l l y  beyond th e  scope of t h i s  s tudy  to  a n a ly s e ,  S u f f i c e  i t  
to  say  t h a t  im port r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  the  Uni. led S t t e s  h ve been more l e n i e n t  
on f u e l  o i l  th a n  on th e  o th e r  forms of pe tro leum , and only  to  g ive  an id e a  
of the  s i t u a t i o n ,  we p o in t  out below c e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  o f th e se  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
on o i l  im p o r ts .
a) W ith th e  p ro m u lg a tio n  of tho Revenue c t  i n  193£ by which th e  American 
Grovernment tax e d  pe tro leum  im po rts  f o r  th e  f  . r s t  t im e , crude o i l  and 
f u e l  o i l  •im p o rts  were fav o u red  by e s t a b l i s i n g  an im port ta x  of 21 
c e n ts  a b a r r e l  on th e s e ,  w hile  g a so l in e  was tax e d  a t  $ 1.05  and 
l u b r i c a n t s  a t  $ 1 .6 8 .  (53)
b) I n  1939 th e  t a x  on crude and f u e l  o i l  was h a lv e d  to  10.5 c e n ts  f o r  
an amount of im p o rts  e q u iv a le n t  t o  5/° of dom estic  supply ; over t h i s  
amount and f o r  o th e r  p ro d u c ts  tax e s  rem ained unchanged, (54-)
c) At the  end of 194-1 th e  U nited  S t a t e s  e l im in a te d  the  r e s t r i c t i o n  on 
th e  amount of crude and f u e l  o i l  which cou ld  e n t e r  a t  10.5 c e n ts  a 
b a r r e l .  (55)
(53) I b e  P e tro leum  I n d u s t r y  R esearch  f o u n d a t io n ,  MUjiIted 3 jy \ te O jL l
Imjports A Qase S tudy  i n  I n t e r n / t i o n a 1. T rade” Hew York 1958, page 24-
(54-) I b i d t page 25
(55) I b i d ,  page 26
T ab leJ^  ~ 17
V enezuelan  JPetroleum jsxjDort^Jb° yth 0 U nited  St,
( thou sand of b a r r e l s d ' i l y )
% of F u e l % of O ther of
Crude T o ta l O il Tot til P ro d u c ts  T o ta l
1955  ^ 388™ k T .T 4 5 .7 “ / .  0
1956 451 4 8 .9 393 4 3 .0 75 ■3.1
1957 539 50.3 429 4 0 .0 104 9 .7
1958 451 4 1 .5 457 42 .0 130 16 .5
1959 456 4 1 .2 517 4 6 .8 133 1 2 .0
i 960 490 4 2 .3 567 4 9 .9 102
1961 436 37 .9 535 50.2 130 111 31962 491 39.6 599 4 8 .3 150 12 .1
1963 500 4 0 ,6 588 4 7 .7 144 11.7
1964 486 37.2 676 51 .6 146 11.2
1965 462 34 .0 743 54 .6 155 11 .4











Source: M in is t ry  6 f Mines and H ydrocarbons, V en ezuela .
de Pe t ro le o ^ y  Produc to s  desde V enezuela , A rub 
C urasao" 1963 , p a g e ' 23 . ■ — —
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a) I n  1952 l i g h t  crude o i l  (25° A .P . I .  and over)  from V enezuela  was
tax e d  a t  10.5  c e n ts  a b a r r e l ,  w hile  heavy crude and f u e l  o i l  was taxed  
a t  h a l f  of t h i s  amount (.5.25 c e n ts  p /b ) .  ( 56 )
e) I n  1959 w ith  Mandatory R e s t r i c t i o n s ,  Im ports o f cande ..rid p ro d u c ts
r e c e iv e d  a quo ta  w ith  the  so le  e x c e p tio n  of f u s t  oi.i. which was n o t  
s u b je c t  to  any r e s t r i c t i o n .  ( 57 )
f )  I n  1962 w ith  th e  e s t a b l i s h i n g  of q uo tas  f o r  a l l  o i l  im p o r ts ,  f u e l
o i l  was a s s ig n e d  a quota  which s t i l l  p o rm ited  to  r a i s e  im po rts  to  a
" re c o rd  f i g u r e "  of over h a l f  a m i l l io n  b a r r e l s  d a i l y .  ( 58 )
g) F o r  1966 the  im p o rt  programme of the U n ited  S t a t e s  e l im in a te d  even
th e  assignm ent of quotas to  th e  im p o r te rs  o f r e s i d u a l  o i l  by p e rm i t t in g  
any company w ish ing  to  im port to  do so "s im ply  by f i l i n g  an a p p l i c a t io n "
( 59 )
These were the. r u l e s  to  which the  companies had to  ab ide , so Venezue­
l a  hav ing  a type of crude which was fa v o u ra b le  ■ o r  f u e l  o i l  p ro d u c t io n ,  
and a ls o  hav ing  geog raph ica l  advan t ges over o th e r  sources of supp ly , she 
soon became th e  major s u p p l i e r  of f u e l  o i l  f o r  th e  American market 
(T ab les  V-18 and V -19). The companies adap ted  them selves to  th e  c ircum stance
as b e s t  th ey  cou ld  b u t  i t  seems th a t  th e  imoric- n Uovernment has been  protect
in g
the  dom estic  pe tro leum  i n d u s t r y  a t  the  expense of tne V enezuelan , s in ce  
w ith  th e  s e t  o f r e s t r i c t i o n s  i t  p ro toc!  s i t s  own by on.iblinp the  
p ro d u c t io n  of h igh  c o s t  c rude (60) v-'hicb. c 'm he r e f i n e d  i n t o  p ro d u c ts  t h a t
( 56 ) I b id  page 28
(57) P e tro leu m  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  March 1959 page 115, A p r i l  1959, page 127
(58) P e tro leu m  P re ss  S e rv ic e ,  A p r i l  1962, page 150
(59) P e tro leu m  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, A p r i l  4 , 1966; page 5.
(60) I t  i s  g e n e r a l ly  a c c e p te d  t h a t  American im p ort  r e s t r i c t i o n s  "have long
been  . . .  e n ab l in g  h ig h  c o s t  m arg inal p ro d u ce rs  to  s u rv iv e " .  (P e tro leum  
P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  November 1966 , page 4 1 5 ) .
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Table V r  18 
S u p p l j  o f F u e l  Qi l _ l n th e  Uni t e d  S t a t e s
Domestic Im ports
1954 53.5 46 .5
1955 4 9 .1 50.9
1956 4 6 .0 54.0
1957 4-i-. 6 55 .4
1958 42 .5 57.5
1959 34 .7 65.3
i 960 3 6 .4 63 .6
1961 34.5 65 .4
1962 31 .1 68 .9
1963 25 .2 74 .8
1964 22 .9 7 7 .1
Source: Bureau of Mines "R es id u a l  P o s i t i o n  by Y ears  Supply and 
Demand". 1954-19 64.
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1965 1 ,065 ,363 84.6






( l )  In c lu d in g  Aruba and Curazao
Source: U.S. D epartm ent of Commerce, Bureau of The Census,
E .T . l lO ,  P .T .1 2 5 .
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o b ta in  a h ig h e r  p r i c e  i n  the  m arke t, w hile  th e  V enezuelan  i n d u s t r y  
s u p p l ie s  the  low p r i c e  f u e l  o i l  so needed i n  th e  American economy. I f  
f o r  any rea so n  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  were n o t  ab le  to  o b ta in  i t s  s u p p l ie s  
of f u e l  o i l  from ab road , " i t  would have immediate d e t r im e n ta l  e f f e c t s  
on th e  consumers of t h i s  commodity" s ince  to  produce i t  l o c a l l y  would 
r a i s e  th e  c o s t  of i n d u s t r i e s .  ( 6 l )  I n  o th e r  words, f u e l  o i l  im p o rts  
f u l f i l  the  im p o r ta n t  economic f u n c t io n  of low ering  th e  p r i c e  the  
U n ited  S t a te s  pays f o r  i t s  energy . (62)
V enezuelan  R e a c t io n  to  th e  S i t u a t i o n .
The V enezuelan  G-overnment r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  Americ n r e s t r i c t i o n s  on 
pe tro leum  im p o rts  were n o t  ver\- s u i t a b l e  f o r  h e r ,  s in c e  th ey  favo u red  
only  th e  e n t r y  of a low p r i c e  p ro d u c t ,  r e a c te d  to  such a s i t u ,  t i o n  
towards the  end of 1965. On December 30, 1965 i t  -nnouncocJ i n  an 
o f f i c i a l  d e c ree  t h a t  i t  would no t reco g n ise  f o r  t a x  purposes  the r e a l i z e d
p r ic e  of f u e l  o i l  I n  f u tu r e  s a l e s . (63) I t  e s i  b l i s h e d  a maximum
d isc o u n t  of 15/'o o f f  the  p o s te d  p r i c e  of $ 2 ,0 0 ,  t ' .u s  estab lish irg  a r e fe re n c e  
p r i c e  o f $ 1 ,7 0  f o r  1966. (64-) V e n e z u e la 's  P r e s i d e n t ,  Dr. Raul L eoni, 
j u s t i f i e d  t h i s  measure on th e  grounds t h a t  the  c o u n try  had been  o b ta in in g  
A5 c e n ts  p e r  b a r r e l  l e s s  f o r  r e s i d u a l  o i l  s a l e s  s in c e  th e  a c t u a l  s a l e s  
p r i c e  had dropped from th e  $ 2 ,0 0  p o s ted  p r i c e  of 1959 , t o  a r e a l i z e d  
p r i c e  of / l . 5 5  i n  1965 . ( 63 ) The in c r e a s in g  p r e p o r t i o n  of f u e l  o i l
(61) P e t r oleum I n d u s t r y  R esearch  F ounda tion , 0£i C i t . , page 53
(62) I b i d  page 37
( 63 ) Pe tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, Jan u ary  10, 1966, page 5
( 6 k )  Pe tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  T"eekly, Janu ary  2 k , 1966, page 5
( 65 ) Quoted by P e tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  U eekly , A p r i l  k ,  1966 page 5. T h is  
same jo u r n a l  s t a t e d  on F e b ru a ry  28, 1966 t h = t  the a c tu a l  p r i c e  f o r  
f u e l  o i l  F o0 oB„ C aribbean  had f a l l e n  to  $1.A5 pen b a r r e l .
190
e x p o r ts  a t  th e s e  low er p r i c e s ,  P r e s id e n t  Leoni p o in te d  ou t, show th-r t  
"Venezuela has been l e f t  w ith  the  l e a s t  b e n e f i c i a l  p a r t  of th e  o i l  
b u s in e s s " ,  . . .  and t h a t  " the  magnitude of damage t h a t  Venezuela has  been 
s u f f e r in g  i s  enough to  j u s t i f y  th e  mea.sure we have ta k e n  i n  d e fe n o e 'o f  an 
a cc e p ta b le  and re a so n a b le  p r i c e  f o r  our o i l " .  (66)
Soon a f t e r  t h i s  a c t i o n  was tak e n  by th e  V enezuelan  Government, the  
Government of the U n ited  S t a t e s  a l s o  announced, a t  the  beg in n in g  of the 
y e a r ,  th e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  of r e s i d u a l  f u e l  Im ports  f o r  1966 , ( 67 ) The 
immediate r e s u l t  of th e s e  two measures was a " p e r c e p t ib l e  s t re n g th e n in g "  
i n  the  p r i c e  of heavy f u e l  o i l .  (68) Spot s a le s  a t  the  beg inn ing  of A p r i l  
were made a t  a p r i c e  of $ 1 ,6 0  which was 10 to  15 c e n ts  h ig h e r  th a n  a few 
months back , and a cc o rd in g  to  th e  pe tro leum  p r e s s ,  " a l l  o f the m ajor 
C a rr ib b e an  s u p p l i e r s . . .  seemed w i l l in g  to  make a st-md on the  / / l . 60 
p r i c e ,  ( 69 ) The p r e c i s i o n  of th e se  two mov^s, however, could g ive r i s e  to  
wonder w hether th e y  v/ere j u s t  a mere co ins ic lence . V enezuela  has been  
c la im in g  b e t t e r  t r e a tm e n t  from the  American Government i n  r e l a t i o n  to  
o i l  im p o rt  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  and to  t h i s  r e s p e c t  various m eetings were h e ld  
betw een th e  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s  of b o th  Governments d u r in g  1965 . (70) 
F u rth e rm o re , P r e s id e n t  Johnson i n  h i s  speech of December 10, 1965 spe­
c i f i c a l l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  " the  U n ited  S t a t e s  rec o g n iz e s  th  t  the  o i l  i n d u s t r y
(66) P e tro leu m  I n t e l l i g e n c e  r e e k ly ,  A p r i l  A, 1966 page 5
( 67 ) I h i d ,  Jan u ary  24, 1966, page 6
(68) I b i d ,  A p r i l  4 , 1966, page 5
( 69 ) I b i d .
(70) frUnisterdode Minas e H id roca rbu ros  -  V enezu e la ,  "Memori a l  1965, 
page I ,  117.
191
i n  V enezuela  has a s p e c i a l  p o s i t i o n  i n  the  c o n t r i b u t i o n  i t  makes to  Y/estern 
Hemisphere s e c u r i ty "  ( 7 l ) ,  so i t  would no t be to o  s u r p r i s in g  i f  the  
American Government i n  i t s  e f f o r t  to  come to  term s w ith  the  V enexeulan, 
and p ro bab ly  r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  the  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were n o t  so fa v o u ra b le  f o r  
V enezuela , ag reed  to  th e  e l im - ' t io n  of th e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on f u e l  o i l  as a 
way of a l l e v i a t i n g  the  s i t u a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  c o u n t r •/.
Although a c c e ss  to  t n e  .•■.merican r '.a .t joc .me f r e e  i n  one any,
Venezuela has  now come a c ro ss  a n o th e r  k in d  o* l im i t - i t  io n  to  ■ r r  f u e l  o i l  
e x p o r ts :  a n t i - p o l l u t i o n  m easures, Air p o l l u t i o n  r e s u l t i n -  from h ig h  
su lp h a r  c o n te n t  f u e l s  induced  new York and Yen J e r s e y  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  make 
r e g u la t i o n s  r e q u i r i n g  the s u lp h a r  co n te n t  of f u e l  o i l  to  be l im i t e d  to  
2.2/c from th e  b e g in n in g  of 1967, w ith  f u r t h e r  r e d u c t io n s  to  2$ a f t e r  
O ctober 1969 and to  1u/'o  a f t e r  May 1971. (72) I t  seems t h a t  about l / 3  of 
th e  volume of V e n e z u e la 's  e x p o r ts  of f u e l  o i l  a re  a f f e c t e d  by th e s e  
measures , ( 7 3 ) ,  and acco rd ing  to  Dr. Jose  .nntonio Mayobre, V e n e z u e la 's  
p r e s e n t  o i l  M in i s t e r ,  in v es tm en ts  t o t a l l i n g  $400 m i l l io n  w i l l  have to  be 
made by the  o i l  companies i f  V enezuelan  f u e l  o i l  i s  t o  meet th e  s ta n d a rd s  
of su lp h u r  c o n te n t  recommended.(7 4 ) .  However, Dr. Mayobre s p e c i f i e d  t h a t
(71) P e tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  v e e k ly ,  December 20, 19^5, page 3 .
(72 ) P e tro leum  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  A p r i l  19&7, page 146.
(73) However, V enezuelan  heavy crudes  ( l4 °A P l)  have an averyage sulphur
co n te n t  of 2 .670 while th e  e q u iv a le n t  crude i n  the  Middle E a s t  has
a su lp h u r  c o n te n t  of 7 .3 a . i t h  r e s p e c t  to  medium crudes (24 API), 
i n  V enezuela  th ey  have an aver'.ge su lp h u r  c o n te n t  of 1.8/-, w hile  
i n  the  Middle P a s t  i t  i s  of 3.3/^. ( k in x s to y  of .lines one 
Hydrocarbons -  Venezue3.a. ''Venczuolan yud O t-r.r .o r ld  i e t r o l e u m s " , 
Page 8 1 .)
(74) P e tro leum  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  A'weil 1967, rage  11.6.
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th e s e  l i m i t a t i o n s  on the  su lp h u r  c o n te n t  of f u e l  o i l  could  be met 
"w ithou t much d i f f i c u l t y "  by the  Venezuelan o i l  i n d u s t r y ,  b u t  t h a t  i f  
s im i l a r  recommendations were adop ted  by the  S t a te s  of New York and 
New J e r s e y ,  V enezuelan  r e f i n e r s  would be com pelled  to  embark on major 
s t r u c t u r a l  changes. (75)
E s t im a te s  f o r  1966 say t h a t  V enezuela  has a l r e a d y  " l o s t  ground" i n  
the  American f u e l  o i l  market due p a r t l y  to  the  " S t r in g e n t  a n t i - p o l l u t i o n  
m easures" of th e  e a s t  c o a s t  c i t i e s ,  by f a l l i n g  from 85/i to  an 81% sh are  of 
t o t a l  im po rts  of t h i s  f u e l  by the  U n ited  S t a t e s . (76) However, t h i s  same 
source  s t a t e s  t h a t  i n  a b so lu te  term s V enezuela  Increased , I t s  e x p o r ts  of 
t h i s  p ro d u c t  to  t h i s  co u n try  by ap 'oroxim ately 14k. I n  any cr.se i t  does 
seem t h a t  th e se  a n t i - p o l l u t i o n  measures might be ra o t / io r  t n r e a t  to  
V enezuelan  e x p o r ts .
(75) Pe tro leum  P r e s s  S e rv ic e ,  A p r i l  1967 , page 146.
(7 6 ) P e tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, March 27, 1967, page 1.
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aaAgri® _six
The fo rm a tio n  of th e  O rg a n is a t io n  of Pe tro leum  E x p o r t in g  C o u n tr ie s  (O .P 6E 0C0). 
O /P .E .C .’ s E f f o r t s  to  I n c re a s e  Member’ s Share of O i l  Income. V enezuela  as 
a Member of O .P .E .C .
I „ The f o rm ation  of th e  O rg a n is a t io n  of P e tro le u m E x p o r  t i ng C o u n tr ie s  
(O .P .E .C .) .
The O rg a n iz a t io n  of Pe tro leum  h x p o r t in ^  C o u n tr ie s  was e s t a b l i s h e d  as a 
r e s u l t  %f a con fe rence  h e ld  i n  Baghdad i n  Septem' c r  19"0 bv the  f i v e  m ajor 
pe tro leum  e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s :  I r a n ,  T rap, ICuvyait S nidi Arabia and 
Venezuela., which became 0 „P.E„C, r s Founder Members, O a ta r , which a t te n d e d  
t h a t  Conference as an o b s e rv e r ,  jo in e d  i n  January  1961, and Libya and 
In d o n e s ia  fo llo w ed  i n  June 1962, b r in g in g  th e  numberto a t o t a l  «f e ig h t  
members, ( l )
The fo rm a t io n  of O .P .E .G .,  however, was by no means an ab rup t 
happening,, C o n tac ts  betw een th e  c o u n t r ie s  whi*h were e v e n tu a l ly  to  form 
O.P.I. ,C, began as f a r  back as 1949. I n  Septem ber o f  t h a t  y e a r  an o f f i c i a l  
V enezuelan  th ree-m an d e le g a t io n  v i s i t e d  Saudi A rab ia , I r a n ,  E gypt, I r a q ,  
Kuwait and S y r ia  w ith  th e  aim of exchanging vievrs and e s t a b l i s h i n g  r e g u l a r  
and c lo se  communication, and d u r in g  the  fo l lo w in g  y e a r s ,  sp o ra d ic  and 
in fo rm a l  m eetings were h e ld  betw een the  Middle E a s te rn  p ro d u ce rs  and 
V enezuela . ( 2 )
(1 )  0 0P 01. . C 0, "Background I n f  wrmation^, page 4 ;  Geneva, S w itz e r lan d
(2) 0 . P , B. C „ ; b a c k g ro u n d  I n f  orm-■ t i o n ’!, p . ae 11.
mI n  1959* fo l lo w in g  the  enactm ent of mandatory im port r e s t r i c t i o n s  
on p e tro leum  i n  the  U n ited  S t a t e s ,  po s ted  p r i c e s  i n  the  Middle E a s t  were 
reduced , " r e f l e c t i n g  th e  growth of c o m p e ti t iv e  p r e s s u r e s  end the  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  of low c o s t  s u p p l i e s " .  (3) T h is  b ro u g h t  much d i s c o n te n t  to  the  
p rod uc ing  c o u n tr ie s  e s p e c i a l l y  to th o se  of the  Middle E a s t  where o i l  revenue 
was b ased  on the  p o s te d  p r i c e .  Thus i n  1959, when the  p o s te d  p r i c e s  of 
Middle E a s t  o i l  -were c u t ,  the  F i r s t  Arab Pe tro leum  C ongress, h e ld  i n  
C a iro  d u r in g  t h a t  y e a r  and a t te n d e d  by o b se rv e rs  from V enezuela  and I r a n ,  
adopted  a g e n e ra l  r e s o l u t i o n  re  com-"lending t h a t  any p roposed  changes i n  the  
p o s te d  p r i c e  of crude o i l  should  f i r s t  be d is c u s se d  w ith  the  coun try  
concerned . On May 13, 19^0, Dr, P e re z -A lfo n z o , th e n  Venezuela*s 
M in is te r  o f Mines and Hydrocarbons, and A bdullah  T n r ik i ,  th e n  Saudi a r - ib i s 's  
D i r e c t o r  G-eneral of P e tro leum  A f f a i r s ,  i s s u e d  .. j o i n t  st- temcnt c a l l i n g  
f o r  a common p e tro leu m  p o l ic y  to  "safeaunrO tne  l e g i t i m  ..to i n t e r e s t s  of 
the  p rodu c ing  c o u n t r i e s " . ( 4 ) However, by m i” 1960, as one source  p u ts  
i t ,  " th e  economic l o g i c  f o r  a f u r t h e r  r e d u c t io n  w-s so s t r o n g " , (3 ) t h a t  
i n  August the  companies ag a in  reduced p r i c e s .  T h is  c a l l e d  f o r t h  an 
immediate r e a c t i o n  011 the  o a r t  of th e  m ajor o i l  e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s ,  and 
i n ih e  fo l lo w in g  month th e  o r g a n i s a t io n  known as O .P .E .C , came in to  b e in g .
Among i t s  r e s o lu t io n s  a re  the  fo l lo w in g :  (6 )
l )  T hat Members com no lo n g e r  remain i n d i f f e r e n t  to  th e  a t t i t u d e
h e re to f o r e  adop ted  by the  O i l  Companies i n  e f f e c t i n g  p r ic e  
m o d i f i c a t io n s .
(3 ) F ran k , Helmut; O p .p i t ,  page 175
( i )  O.P.EpC, “Back g ro und In f o r m a t io n " , page 11
(5 )  F ra n k , Helmut; _0p_._c i t . page 175
(6 ) O .P .E .C .,  "B ackground In fo rm ation*1 page 12
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2) T h a t  Members s h a l l  demand t h a t  O i l  Companies m a in ta in  t h e i r
p r i c e s  s te a d y  and f r e e  from  a l l  u n n e ce ssa ry  f l u c t u a t i o n s , , .
3) . o .T h a t  Members s h a l l  ensure  t h a t  i f  any new c irc u m s ta n ce s  a r i s e  
which i n  th e  e s t im a t io n  o f  the  O il  Companies n e c e s s i t a t e  p r i c e  
m o d i f i c a t io n s ,  th e  s a id  Companies s h a l l  e n t e r  in to  c o r s u l t a t i o n  w ith  
th e  Member o r Members a f f e c t e d  i n  o rd e r  f u l l y  to  e x p la in  th e  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,
i )  T hat Members s h a l l  s tu d y  and formal-.-to a s y s t c .1. to  en su re  ihe
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  of p r i c e s  by , 'nuong o th e r  r o a r s ,  th e  r e g u l a t i o n  of 
p r o d u c t i o n . . ,  t o  th e  n e c e s s i t y  of s e c u r in g  a s te a d y  income to  the  
p ro d u c in g  c o u n t r ie s  . . . .
5) T hat i f  a s  a r e s u l t  of th e  a p p l i c a t io n  of any unanimous d e c i s io n
of t h i s  Conference any sanc tions  are  employed, d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y ,  
by any i n t e r e s t e d  Company a g a in s t  one or more of the  Member C o u n tr ie s ,  
no o th e r  Member s h a l l  a c c e p t  any o f f e r  o f a b e n e f i c i a l  t r e a tm e n t  
w hether i n  the  form of an in c r e a s e  i n  e x p o r t s  o r an improvement i n  
p r i c e s ,  which may be made to  i t  by any such  Company o r  Companies 
vd th  the  i n t e n t i o n  of d is c o u ra g in g  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of the  unanimous 
d e c i s io n  reach ed  bty the  C onference .
6) That t- e p r i n c i p a l  aim o f th e  O rgan ise .t ion  s h a l l  be th e  u n i f i c a t i o n
of p e tro leu m  p o l i c i e s  f o r  the  Member C o u n tr ie s  and the  d e te rm in a t io n  
of the  b e s t  means f o r  sa fe g u a rd in g  the- i n t e r e s t s  of Member C o u n tr ie s  
i n d i v i d u a l l y  or c o l l e c t i v e l y .
The f a c t o r s  th  t  b ro u g h t 0 .ic --„C o numbers tog ;.tw er i n  one o r g a n i s a t io n  
a re  obvious: a p a r t  from b e in g  i ■; roup of dev e lo p !n ;  c o u n t r i e s ,  th e y  a re  
a l l  ne t e x p o r t e r s  of p e tro leu m , and depend a lm o s t e n t i r e l y  on th e  
revenue which a cc ru e s  from t h i s  i n d u s t r y ,  f u r th e r m o re ,  th e s e  c o u n t r i e s
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t o g e th e r  have a s t ro n g  p o s i t i o n  as s u p p l i e r s  of t h i s  commodity. For 
1965 th e y  h e ld  44/t of t o t a l  w orld  p ro d u c t io n ,  65v  of proved r e s e r v e s ,  
and °\5/o of e x p o r ts  (soe  T ab les  VI -  1, and .VI -  2 V ic h  fo l lo w ) .  ( 7)
S ince p e tro leu m  re s o u rc e s  i n  a 31 th e se  c o u n t r ie s  •''re m ain ly  c o n t r o l l e d  
by th e  major i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o i l  corncanics ( f )  vdiose i n t e r e s t s ,  r e c o rd in g  
to  0 DP oI oC„, " a re  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  com patib le  . . I tn  'L,e i n t e r e s t s  of t  \ose 
c o u n t r i e s " . ( 9 ) ,  t h i s  organic- t i o n  f e l t  t h  1 I I  ./.* s im p e ra t iv e h to  assume 
t h e i r  p ro p er  r e s p o n s a b i l i t i e s  an in d u s t r y  on k ic h  th o a r  economies and 
developm ents a re  -almost e n t i r e  l'-r dcnende - t w „ (1 ° )  O J t  i t  f e l t  t h a t  
b e fo re  i t s  fo rm a t io n ,  "an in d iv id u a l  o i l  e x p o r t in g  c o u n try  found i t s e l f  
d e a l in g  a lone .f l th  a s o l i d  f r o n t  o f the  i n t e r r r t i o n a l  m a jo r s " . . .  v-hich 
"sometimes used  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  r e g u la te  volume o f f t a k e  among the  v a r io u s  
p rod uc ing  a re a s  as a weapon to  In f lu e n c e  th e  p o l i c i e s  of any i n d iv i d u a l  
e x p o r t in g  c o u n try  and weaken i t s  b a rg a in in g  power", ( l l )
These have been i n  g e n e ra l  term s th e  o f f i c i a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the  
fo rm a t io n  of 0 , I :#E oC .,  b u t  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  the  main concern  of th e se  
c o u n t r i e s  was and i s  to  in c r e a s e  t h e i r  o i l  Income as  much as p o s s ib l e ,  and 
t h a t  I t  was due t o  the  r e d u c t io n  of the  p o s te d  p r i c e  f o r  crude o i l  i n  th e  
huddle F a s t  i n  1959 and i 960 -which a c c e l e r  te d  i t s  fo rm a t io n  s in ce  t h i s  
d i r e c t l y  a t t a c k e d  the  b a s i s  f o r  th e  c a l c u l  t i o n  of p r o f i t s  which vre.v. to  
be sh '. red .
(7) M in is t ry  of Mines uvl My&roo .ro b s , Vcnoszuol ‘h.iomoria" , 1965;page 1-313
(8) O.P.L.Co ; "Background I nforoy*tion" p.,g;j 6 
( 9) I b i d ; pvage 5
(10 ) I b i d
( 1 1 ) 0 .P .F oC. vrBwigkjground In fo r m s t io n M pnge 5
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Table  VI -_1 
P ro d u c t io n  I n  th e  0 . P Ar e a  -__19§5
( '0 0 0  o f b /d )
V enezuela  3 ,473
K uua it  2 ,350
Saudi A rab ia  2,197
I r a n  1^883
I r aq 1 ,310
Libya 1,226
In d o n e s ia  513
Q atar  218
Q ,P ,E aC. T o ta l  15,160
W q r  Id^ ^ T o ta l  .50,092
/o of 0„P „ I;0C, I n  ' /o r Id  T o t a l : 43.8,->
Source: M in is te r io  de Minas e Hidrooarburos; Yearbook 1965
( in fo rm a t io n  r e c e iv e d  from 0 .P oj;.C . O f f ic e )
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Tcble^YI-2
Prcwen Re; s e r  v e s j  n_ Jdie^O JT 0 7^  . JC 0 _ Are a -  1965 
( B i l l i  on of b a r r e l s )
Km f a i t  63
Saudi A rab ia  60
I r a n  AO
I r a q  29
Venezuela 17
10
In d o n e s ia  in
Q a ta r  3
O.P.P.C „ T o ta l  228
g o r l d  Tota l*  353
/o of O.F.B.C. I n  world T o ta l :  6A.6>5
In o lu d in g  S ovie t  z one„
Source: M in is te r !o  de Minas e H id ro c a rb u ro s ; Yearbook 1965 
( in fo rm a t io n  re c e iv e d  d i r e c t  from  O .P 0S eCc o f f i c e )
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I I  jP_oJg_s_C_y_s_Ef f o r t s  to  I n c r e a se MemborJ^J3hare of jC il  Income
A lthough member c o u n t r ie s  of 0„? »E.C, '.k.vu a l s o  ex p ressed  t h e i r  
d e s i r e  f o r  an a c t iv e  p a r t i c i p  '.tion i n  th e  o i l  i n d u s t r v ,  i . e .  from 
e x p lo r a t i o n  to  m a rk e tin g ,  (12) O .p .E .C . ' s major e f f o r t s  h ve boon d i r e c t e d  
to  i n c r e a s e  th e  sh a re  of o i l  revenue f o r  i t s  members, hox/ever, o f the  
m ajor i s s u e s  which have been  r a i s e d  by 0 0F„E .Co f o r  d i s c u s s io n s  w i th  
the  o i l  companies, t h e r e  ^re  th re e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  which m e r i t  c o n s id e r a ­
t i o n :  A) The m ark e tin g  a llo w ance , B) The e x p en s in g  o f  r o y a l t i e s ,  and 
C) The r e s t o r a t i o n  of th e  l e v e l  of p o s te d  p r i c e s .  A l l  th e s e  were r a i s e d  
a t  O .P . f .C ’ s f o u r t h  Conference h e ld  i n  mid 1962.
A) The M arketing Allowance
O .P .B .C is  r e s o l u t i o n  IV -3A re a d s :  (13 ) The C o nfe rence , C o n s id e r in g
1) T hat n e i t h e r  th e  Members nor1 the Companies o p e ra t in g  i n  t h e i r  
c o u n t r i e s  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  th e  worldwide m ark e tin g  o p e ra t io n s  o f  th e  
O i l  Companies;
2) T hat th e  b u lk  o f  th e  crude o i l  produced by the  O p e ra t in g  Companies 
i s  m arke ted  th roug h  t h e i r  p a re n ts  or p a re n t  a f f i l x i t e s  w ith  no 
b ro k e ra g e  charg es  b e in g  in c u r r e d ;
3) T hat one o f  the  Member Countries (V enezuela) ma'C's no c o n t r i b u t i o n  
w h a tso ev e r  to  th e  s e l l i n g  expenses o f the  O i l  Comp nie:s;
Recommends:
T hat th e  Member C o u n tr ie s  a f f e c t e d  shou ld  ta k e  measures t o  e l im in a te  
any c o n tr ib u tio n  to  th e  m arke ting  expenses  of the  Companies concerned .
(12) 0 .P,SC ; E x p o r t i n g  C o u n tr ie s  and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O i l '1 page 12
(13) O .P .S .C .;  "E x p la n a to ry  Memoranda on the  O .F .E .C . R e s o lu t io n s "
i i f h  i T T  1 ‘ a  i ‘ n  - - -- - 1— r  ~~r r  ~ n  T i - - r n i r » i 111 T -r r T r n m r  i f > m « r -  tri i n m m  tm i ■■ i ■ w m u m  i i j ^ m i i i i f i .  m  t ~ iPage 15.
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I t  \7as i n  June 19&2 d u r in g  0 0P 0E oCo1s f o u r t h  C onference  t h a t  t h i s  
r e s o l u t i o n  was made, s in c e  i n  0 ; P BE oC o member c o u n t r i e s  of tho Middle 
E a s t ,  a c e r t a i n  p e rc en ta g e  of p o s ted  p r i c e s  was dedu cted  b e fo re  de te rm in in g  
ta x a b le  income i n  o rd e r  to  compensate the  o i l  companies f o r  m arketing  
exp enses . Member c o u n t r i e s  i n s i s t e d  t a  1 t h i s  ..--.s u n j u s t i f i e d  s in ce  
m arke ting  c o s t s  were in c u r r e d  in  e x te r n a l  ittq.rk.ets .eac t  \ e rc f  ere  had l i t t l e  
c o n n ec tio n  w ith  the a c t i v i t i e s  of t  oe- company • .1 t h in  the  p roducing  
c o u n try .
0 . P ol oC„ reasoned  th  t  where tho re l-  tioo-s iip  b e t 'w e n  th e  p roducing  
co u n try  and the  o i l  company 'was one of so le  - nd p u rch ase , the  p roducing  
co u n try  s e l l s  i t s  crude to  th e  np u rc h a se r -c o m p a n y " ( lk )a t  w e l l-h e a d ;  and 
to  expec t th e  s e l l e r  to  cover expenses which a re  in c u r r e d  by th e  p u rc h a se r  
was an anom ally . On the  o th e r  fend, where th e  b a s i s  of th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
was a c o n c e s s io n a l  g r a n t ,  tho p roducing  co u n try  g iv e s  the c o n c e s s io n a i re  
th e  r i g h t  of e x t r a c t i n g  th e  crude ‘"on th e  b a s i s  of the  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  
they  a l r e a d y  p o ssessed  a l l  th e  n ecessa ry  f a c i l i t i e s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  en su rin g  
th e  flow  of o i l  th rough  the  v a r io u s  s inges  to  th e  f i n a l  consumer” . ( 15) 
A ccording  to  O .F .E .C . ,  m arke ting  a llow ances were on ly  a 'd i s g u is e d  
d i s c o u n t” o f f  p o s te d  p r i c e s  ( l £ ) .  fu r th e rm o re ,  O .P , r ,C ,  c o n s id e re d  th  t  
s in c e  n p p ro x in r 'te ly  9Q& of the  crude o i l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  were w ith  a f f i l i a t e s ,  
"a, r e a l  s a l e s  commission on an i n t e r - o f f i l i  to  t r  .w sac tien  c-.n have no 
meaning” . ( 17)
(14) pof-e 17
(15) I b i d ,  pc.ge 19 
(.16) I b i d .
(W )  I b i d . ,  pnge 18
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As wo se c ,  0 0P eE 0Co was m ainly  concerned  w ith  what i n  e f f e c t  meant 
a d is c o u n t  o f f  p o s te d  p r i c e s  f o r  t a x  p u rp o se s ,  and th u s  began to  i n s i s t  
on the  e l im in a t io n  of t h i s  allovm nce. A lthough I  h ve been unable  to  
o b ta in  th e  p e rcen tag e  t h a t  was a llow ed f o r  m arke ting  ex penses ,  0 oP o32oCo 
s t a t e s  t h a t  t h i s  r e p r e s e n te d  a y e a r ly  r e d u c t io n  from g ro ss  r e c e i p t s  of 
ap p ro x im ate ly  $6  m i l l io n .  (18) The companies came to  ag ree  a t  th e  
end o f  19&f, to  reduce  th e  m arke ting  allow ance to a  h a l f  c e n t  p e r  b a r r e l ( 19) 
cB ^jrhe__Bxp0n s in g  of  Royal t i e s
0 . ' ' .P .C  *1 s r e s o l u t i o n  IV -33 read s :  (20) "The C onference , considering:
1) T hat th e  Qomuanies en joy ing  i n  bomber C o u n tr ie s  th e  r i g h t  of e x t r a c t ­
in g  pe tro leum  which i s  l a s t i n g  a s s e t  she a I d ,  i n  confo rm ity  w ith  
th e  p r i n c i p l e  rec o g n ise d  and th e  n r  \ c t i c e  observed  g o n e ra l ly  i n  the  
w orld , compensate th e  C o u n tr ie s  f o r  the i n t r i n s i c  v*:3.ue of such 
pe tro luem  a l t o g e t h e r  an a r t  from t h o i r  o b lig e  t -* ons f a l l i n g  under
th e  heading o f  income ta x ;
2) T hat under the  a rrangem ents  a t  p r e s e n t  i n  f o r c e  betw een the Member 
C o u n tr ie s  (o f  the  Middle E a s t)  and th e  O i l  Companies i n  g e n e ra l  no 
com pensation i s  p a id  f o r  th e  i n t r i n s i c  v a lue  of pe tro leum , r o y a l t y
o r  s t a t e d  payment commitments b e in g  t r e a t e d  as c r e d i t s  a g a in s t  income 
ta x  l i a b i l i t i e s ;
3) T hat the  Member C o u n t r ie s '  r i g h t  t o  r e c e iv e  com pensation  f o r  th e  
i n t r i n s i c  v a lu e  of pe tro leum  i s  i n c o n to s t a b l e ;
(18) I b i d ,  page 19
(19) P e tro leu m  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Meekly, Janu ary  18, 1965; page 6
(20) OPEC; “E x p la n a to ry  Memoranda  011 the _Q. I  ^ > Pr-&e
202
Recommends:
T h a t  each Member Country a f f e c t e d  should  • ppro. c.,.i the  Company
o r  Companies concerned w ith  a v le W  to  working ou t fo rm ula
, h e re u n d e r  r o y a l t y  payments sh 11 ho f ix e u  <\.t a uniform  r. t e
which Members c o n s id e r  ©quit h i e , >nc' s..v 7,1 no t he t r e a t e d  os a
c r e d i t  a g a in s t  income tax  l i a b i l i t y . 15
T h is  i s s u e ,  a lso  p r e s e n te d  i n  1962, l e d  to  h a rd e r  b a rg a in in g  s in c e
i t  meant t h a t  o i l  companies had to  in c r e a s e  t h e i r  payments t o  the  h o s t
Governments by 50/t of th e  amount p a id  as r o y a l t i e s .  Por example:
i\) W ithout Expen s in g
R o y a l t i e s
Net E a rn in g s  = 1 0 0
Host &ov, $0/0 sha re
( 5 ($  of 100) = 50
R o y a lty  -  20
Id co b il i ty  l e f t  to  be
p a id  = 30
Com any sh a re  = 50
Government sh a re  = 50
R o y a lty  = 20
Income Tax = 30
As m entioned e a r l i e r ,  th e  r o y a l ty  i s  l e f  t o v :r  irom  the days
b ef oro th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of income tayfgs .d i t s  or i f  i:i i s  to  be found
when th e  Crown claim ed a l l  m inor*! Wo-' 1th* I n  r c t u r n  f o r  the co n cess io n
or p r i v i l e g e  to  e x tr a c t  th e  mi no rod., the  le a s e e  ft/ould pay th e  Crown a
c e r t a i n  p e rc e n ta g e  of th e  p ro d u c t ,  known as r r o y a l t y .  However, the
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of income ta x e s  gave way to  two d i f f e r e n t  "types of payments
t h a t  can be made. Thus i n  th e  U n ited  S t a te s  th e  o i l  companies pay th e
owners o f th o  o i l - b e a r i n g  la n d  a r o y a l ty ,  and th e  Government an income
ta x ,  and i n  V enezuela , 'where a l l  m in e ra l  w e a l th  i s  owned by the  n a t io n
B) E xpensing
R o y a l t i e s
jL
Net E arn in g s = 100
R oya lty = 20
O il  Company's p r o f i t
b e fo re  t a x = 80
Host G-ov. 50% share
(50/5 of 80) = 40
Company share 40
Government sh a re = 60
R o y a lty  = 20
I n c 0mo Tax = 40
2C3
b o th  r o y a l t y  and income ta x  a re  o d d  to  th e  G! o v o r n ^ e l ,  (20-...) The 
id e a  however, t h a t  r o y a l t y  i s  c- " co nyuas :' tu o u  f o r  t/w i n t r i n s i c  va lue  
of p e tro le u m ” i s  a m i s t -k.e, because t. icro i s  no such t h in :  s the  
" i n t r i n s i c ” v a lu e  of crude b u t  a m r k e t  vaJtso-, °"d t h i s  i s  why Governments 
never tak e  t h e i r  r o y a l ty  i n  k in d  . t o j s to r e ,  b u t  i n  cash , and when th ey  do 
accep t i t  i n  k in d ,  i t  i s  on ly  because th ey  f e e l  t h a t  th ey  m ight g e t  more 
out o f a b a r t e r  t r a n s a c t i o n  o r  by s e l l i n g  i t  them se lves  due to  i t s  
market v a lu e .
W ith th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of the  5Q/50 p r o f i t  s h a r in g  agreem ents i n  th e  
M iddle E a s t ,  th e  r o y a l t y  became in c lu d e d  i n  th e  5Qk> sha re  r e c e iv e d  by the 
h o s t  Government and tho d i f f e r e n c e  was p a id  as t a x e s .  But 50/> became 
th e  e s t a b l i s h e d  l i m i t  o f  the  payments which v.rou ld  be made to  the  Govern­
ment f o r  the  c o n ce ss io n s  g ra n te d  under the  5 0 /5 0 ,  T h is  a g a in ,  i s  the  
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  th e  V enezuelan  c a se  where th e  Government can r a i s e  t a x e s  any 
tim e i t  w ish es .  As O .P .E .C , sees  i t ,  " th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  power i n  a 
so v e re ig n  S t a t e ,  -within th e  l i m i t s  of th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  may pass  any law 
im posing or changing  th e  r a t e s  o f any t  .x, 1 o v e r t . p l e s &, i n  most
Middle S s t e r n  co n cess io n s  tiu,-v\; i s  a f ix e d  income t a x  rc tv., f o r  the 
d u r a t io n  of th e  c o n c e s s io n s . . .  a (21) one of teVwc'; ( i n  hua/a.il;) ends i n  
th e  y e a r  2026, and none of th e  o th e r  ma(i or conc-.ssio.vis b e fo re  19% . (22) 
T h is  mokes one t h in k ,  as we m entioned in  C h a r te r  T h ree , t h \ t  the  50 /50  
m ight have been  o f f e r e d  to  the Middle E a s te rn  c o u n t r i e s  by the  o i l  
companies i n  t h e i r  e f f o r t  to  r e a c h  an agreement w ith  th e se  c o u n t r i e s  i n
( 2 0 -A )Ib id ,  page 13
(21) O .P .E .C .*  "Background In fo rm a t io n "  page 10 (my u n d e r l i n e ) .
(22) I b i d ,  page 9
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o rd e r  t o  p re c lu d e  tho  a d o p tio n  of lo rd  s i  - t i v e  r ro c c  u o u c  l i k  . th o se  of 
V enezuela  ( se e  page 6k ) .  I f  t h i s  v.s t ’w c so , o i l  companies i n t r o ­
duced th e  50/50  w ith  a v e ry  forw ard  view of the  s i t u  t i o n ,  s in c e  
i t  managed to  chock th e  e s ta b l is h m e n t  of g r e a t e r  paym ents , by tho 
Governments concerned , f o r  ap p rox im ate ly  f o u r t e e n  y e a r s  (1950-19% ) f o r  
c o n c e ss io n s  t h a t  wure g r a n te d  under t h i s  typo  of agreem ent. The 50/50 
was b ro ken  w ith  lieu 'grcem ents as o th e r  c o n ce ss io n s  were g ra n te d ;  and w ith  
tho  f a l l  i n  market p r i c e s  and u s in g  p o s te d  p r i c e s  as the  b a s i s  f o r  c a l ­
c u l a t i n g  p r o f i t s ,  Governments u s u a l ly  go t more th a n  tho 5Q,o sh a re  of 
a c t u a l  p r o f i t s .  However, s in c e  too Governments cou ld  n o t  e a s i l y  i n c r e a s e  
t h e i r  tak e  by r a i s i n g  th e  nom inal 501  s h a re ,  O .F . l i .C . dev ised  th e  fo rm ula  
of r o y a l t y  expen sing  as a v ry  of in c r e a s in g  the  sh r c  of o i l  revenue f o r  
i t s  members.
To sum up, r o y a l t i e s  were t r e a t e d  i n  Middle •. st-.ro co, n t r i e s  as a 
d i r e c t  c r e d i t  a g a in s t  Income t a x  o 'f . i f  .-,t.Lons n :  c „ 'c... v w -c n t s  
betw een companies and th o se  c o u n t r i e s  s t . ' ?: s' ■ ■ ■ .. 5. /5 0  L. r  ■.i c i p  t i o n  
i n  p r o f i t s .  T h is  b e in g  so , tnc- r o y l t y  o :. 1 ' .  ■1; 'v.c+O'* from th e
t o t a l  t a x  l i a b i l i t y  of tho  companies -nd the  remainder -s n r i f  as income
ta x e s .  A ccording  to  0 eP oI oC ,,  the  c o u n t r i e s  core rn ed  v/c re th e n  e i t h e r
n o t r e c e iv in g  a r o y a l t y ,  o r ;c re  n o t  r e c e iv in g  f u l l  payment of a corpora to
ta x  a c c o rd in g  to  u s u a l  r ^ t e s .  ( 25)
F o r  the  s c t t lo m e n t  of t h i s  d i s p u te ,  a compromise emerged. Tho 
companies a g re e d  to  pny r o y a l t i e s  as an a d d i t i o n  to  income t a x e s ,  
c o n s id e r in g  th e  r o y a l t y  as an expense i n  c a l c u l a t i n g  the  p r o f i t s  t h a t
( 23 ) 0 . P , C 1 (Exyyytiyig 6 ountri_es_ and 11 n t e r nc:t i o n a l  __pil" , page 11 
( u s u a l  r a t e s  a cco rd in g  to  O.P.E.C. were 5Ok)
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were to  be sh a re d  wi h the  h o s t  Government. On th e  o th e r  hand, th e  
Governments t h a t  a ccen ted  (some Governments d id  no t a ccep t  the  o f f e r  as 
we s h a l l  see l a t e r )  ag reed  to  a more r e a l i s t i c  bus. s i n  tn e  c a l c u l a t i o n  
of p r o f i t s .  The compnnd.es would be t Ivon an . . l i e  narco of 3 ,5 %  o f f  the  
p o s te d  p r i c e  f o r  the f i r s t  y e a r  of the  reov-tv i t  ( 1964) , 7 . 5% f  or th e  
second, and 6.5h> f o r  the t h i r d .  T h e r e a f t e r  th e  ,!u: s t i o n  would be 
r e c o n s id e re d .  The a f f e c t  re s  t o  .r- i s e  tho w•;r - b r r r e l  revenu es  of tho 
Middle E a s te r n  Governments by an average of 3*5 c e n ts  i n  tho  f i r s t  y e a r ,
4 c e n ts  i n  tho second, and 4 -5  c e n ts  i n  the  t h i r d .  ( 24)
G l  T'ho Re s t o r a t io n _ o f  _tl ie,  hove l .RosfcA Pr i c e s
O .P .E .C 's  r e s o l u t i o n  IV-32  re a d s :  (25) "The C onference , c o n s id e r in g
1) T hat th e  Member C o u n t r ie s .............duly  p r o t e s t e d  a g a in s t  th e  p r i c e
r e d u c t io n  e f f e c t e d  by tho  O i l  Companies i n  August 1% 0.
2) T hat th e  O i l  Companies have so f a r  ta k e n  no s te p s  t o  r e s to r e  p r i c e s  
to  th e  pro-A ugust i 960 l e v e l ;  . . . . .
Recommends:
T hat Member C o u n tr ie s  should  f o r th w i th  e n t e r  i n t o  n eg o ti .  . t io n s  w ith  
the  O i l  Companies c o n c e r n e d . . . .  w ith  a view to  e n su r in g  t h - t  o i l  
pr,oduced i n  Member G a n t r ie s  s h a l l  be po&id f o r  on the  b a s i s  o f p o s te d  
p r i c e s  n o t  lower th a n  th o se  v.,ic h  a f f l i o d  pr:_ov \ •... .August i 960 .
I f  w i th in  a r e a s o r a  -le p e r io d  a f t e r  in... con...naoe^&vvt of tho 
n e g o t i a t i o n s  no s a t i s f a c t o r y  -.rr.-v,* o I s  rea ch e d , t  Member 
C o u n tr ie s  s h a l l  c o n s u l t  .1 th  one- o th e r  th  a view to  ta k in g  
such s te p s  as they  deem a p p ro p r ia te  i n  o rd e r  to  r e s t o r e  crude o i l  
p r i c e s  to  the  l e v e l  which p r e v a i le d  p r i o r  to  .august 9, 19%  * - *"
(24) Petro3.eum P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  Feb ruary  19% page 42 .
( 25 ) O .P .E .C , " E x p la n a tory  Memoranda on th e  O.P.E.C R e s o lu t io n s " ,  page 3-
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The r e s t o r a t i o n  of p o s te d  p r ic e s  tn  the  1 ave l  p r i o r  to  th e  r e d u c t io n  
o f August i 960 was the main concern  when G.-AE.C, r= s founded . However, 
t h i s  demand has been g r a d u a l ly  tran s fo rm ed  i n t o  •?. r e q u e s t  th" t  th e r e  he no 
f u r t h e r  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of a c t u a l  p r i c e s  o r ,  i n  o th e r  w ords, f o r  the
q u o ta t io n s ,  and th e se  a re  h ig h e r  th an  the  a c t u a l  s a l e s  p r i c e  i t  would 
seem d i f f i c u l t  h o w ev er ,fo r  the  o i l  companies to  r e t u r n  to  an even h ig h e r  
t a x  b a s i s  w hile  market p r e s s u r e s  were d e t e r i o r a t i n g  a c t u a l  s a l e s  p r i c e s ,  
and a f t e r  th ey  had a c t u a l l y  managed to  reduce  the t a x  r e f e r e n c e  q u o ta t io n .  
I 11 any c a s e ,  O.P.T'.C. r e a l i s e s  t h a t  as long  as th e r e  i s  a su rp lu s  p roducing  
c a p a c i ty  a t  p r e v a i l i n g  p r i c e s ,  and as long  as i t  i s  u n c o n t r o l le d ,  p r i c e s  
w i l l  ten d  t o  f a l l .  A ccord ig  to  C .P .E.C , "one of th e  re a so n s  why crude 
o i l  p r i c e s  a re  d e t e r i o r a t i n g  . . . .  i s  the  f a c t  t u  .t o i l  companies are  
incapah^e  of acting. c o l l e c t i v e l y '1, cuxl t h a t  i t  it> j .  or t h i s  ro r s o n  t h - t  
" the  e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s  Iv ve l i t t f . e  choice  . . .  h u t  to  a p t  c o l l e c t i v e l y " ,  
among o th e r  wavs, "by e x e r c i s in g  e f f e c t i v e  c c n i r o l  on p r o d u c t io n ’1. ( 27 ) 
Thus the  n in th  Conference of Q ’-old in  J u ly  1965 , p a sse d  the
fo l lo w in g  r e s o l u t i o n  by unanimous v o te :  (28)
"The C onference , . . .  w ith  a view to  c o u n te r a c t in g  the  c o n t in u in g  
e ro s io n  of crude and p ro d u c t  p r i c e s ;  c o n s id e r in g  t h a t  one of th e  c o n t r i ­
b u t in g  f a c t o r s  to  th e  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of crude and p ro d u c t  p r i c e s  i s  the 
u n r e s t r i c t e d  c o m p e t i t iv e  use of th e  excess p rod uc ing  c a p a c i ty ;  . . .
it s t a b i l i s a t i o n "  of o i l  p r i c e s . ( 26) S ince  p o s te d  p r i c e s  a re  ta x  r e f e re n c e
( 26) O .P .E .C . "Background In fo rm a t io n " ,  page 16
(27) O .P J ' ,C 0 " E l a s t i c i t  of Demand f o r  Crude O i l ; I t s  Ijp p l i c a t i ons 
for^Ejxjdotting_C o u n t r ip s " . page 20 
(28) 0 oF 0BdCd "]Jot£_^qn R e s o lu t io n  IX 61" page 3 .
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R eserves :  to  adopt as a t r a n s i t o r y  measure p ro d u c t io n  p la n  c a l l i n g
f o r  r a t i o n a l  in c r e a s e s  i n  p ro d u c t io n  f r . /n  th e  O.P.-b,C. area to  meet 
e s t im a te d  i n c r e a s e s  i n  world dem and.. . . "
T h is  p la n  co u ld  he reduced  to  fo u r  m o o r  p o in t s :  (29)
1) A l l  dompanies operating; i n  th e  0 , 7 7 , 0 .  a re a  '"113 ho asked to  p rov ide  
t h e i r  p ro d u c t io n  e s t im a te s .
2) Each c o u n try  w i l l  add the  f ig u r e s  su b m itte d  by th e  companies i n  t h e i r  
t e r r i t o r y  and send the  n a t io n a l  t o t a l  to  O.F.B.C. which d l l  compare 
th e  sum of th e  n a t i o n a l  p lan s  w ith  th e  f o r e c a s t  of the market made 
by O fP .L .C . 's  economic s e c t io n .
3) I f  a c t u a l  p ro d u c t io n  ru n s  h ig h e r  th a n  the  market f o r e c a s t ,  O .P.E.C . 
w i l l  ask the  member co u n try  to  j u s t i f y  i t s  p ro d u c t io n  r a t e s  and the  
a b i l i t y  o f the  companies o p e ra t in g  i n  t h a t  c o u n try  to  d isp o se  of 
t h e i r  o i l  a t  s a t i s f a c t o r y  p r i c e s ;  and
k) I f  p ro d u c t io n  r..,tes can n o t  be j u s t i f i e d ,  th e  member co un try  d l l  
ask  th e  p roduc ing  companies to  hold  down o u tp u t .
T h is  w"’s th e  f i r s t  a ttem p t of the orgvaii ?--‘. t i o r  to  proiv. t e  ‘p ro d u c t io n  
among members, on id e a  which can  be a t t r i b u t e d  no a o d a l l .n .  i v r i k i  - nd \.*hic> 
he p re s e n te d  as e a r l y  as .lay i 960 ( p r i o r  to  t i e  fo rm a t io n  of C .P .E .C , ) to  
the  'A ssoc i ' t i o n  of In dependen t P ro ducers"  i n  T e x -s .  ( 30 ) His t h e s i s  
recommended t h a t  p r o r a t i o n  shou ld  be t - s e d  on a fo rm u la  which ;rould  ta k e  
i n t o  c o n s id e r a t io n  th e  proven r e s e r v e s  of e'-ch p ro d u c in g  co u n try .  However 
i n  o rd e r  to  p re v e n t  an a b ru p t  change i n  the  sh a re  of v a r io u s  c o u n t r i e s  i n  
the  i n t e r n a t i o n  1 m arke t,  ho made c l e a r  th - .t  some form  of " f a c t o r  o f 
c o r r e c t i o n 1' would have to  be c o n s id e re d  In  the  a l l o c a t i o n  of q u o tas  to
(29) Pe tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, September 6 , 19^3; page 3
(30) O i l  and Gas J o u r n a l ,  Hay 9, I960; page 99
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avoid  an ab ru p t  f l u c t u a t i o n  i n  the  o i l  e a rn in g s  of c o u n t r i e s ,  such as  
V enezuela ,  which h 'v c  a l a r g e  sh a re  i n  th e  market  i n  s p i t e  of  a lew 
propoifeion of  world r e s e r v e s ,  Abdullah T a r i k i  gave no f u r t h e r  e x p la n a t i o n  
houever ,  on wh- t  t h i s  !' f a c t o r  of c o r r e c t i o n "  would he ,  nor  how i t  -would
be a p p l i e d ,  and j u s t  l i m i t e d  h im s e l f  to  /-resent, a./ th e  ude.. of p r o r a t i o n
f o r  the  o i l  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  rad  i d s  beHref  t  , 1 two •''robloins which
could a r i s e  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  h i s  ^ropos*. 1 could ho no 1 '■*o n / k ' h  a " f a c t o r
of c o r r e c t i o n 51.
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  of  su r p lu s  p ro du c in g  c a p a c i ty  
c o m p e t i t io n  could  t e n d  to  be v e ry  f i e r c e  among th e  v a r i o u s  s u p p l i e r s  
u n l e s s  p ro d u c t io n  i t s e l f  could  be b rough t  under  some c o n t r o l .  T h e r e fo r e ,  
a p r o r a t i o n i n g  system t h a t  would cover  a l l  the major  e x p o r t i n g  a r e a s  would 
t e n d  t o  l i m i t  t h e  degree  of  c o m p e t i t io n  i n  f a v o u r  o f  tue  producing  
i n t e r e s t s .  However, how s u c c e s s f u l  p r o r a t i o n  on the  d i f f e r e n t  e x p o r t i n g  
a r e a s  can be ,  became a p p a re n t ,  t h a t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  conce ive  i s  t h a t  i f  
i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  “the  o i l  companies arc  in c a p a b le  of a c t i n g  c o l l e c t i v e l y " ,  
how tho e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s  though t  th ey  could  do so ,  Venezuelan 
o f f i c i a l s  admit  t h a t  OoP.E.C' s  a t t em p t  to  c o n t r o l  p r o d u c t io n  "has 
no t  been  v e ry  s u c c e s s f u l "  and have a l r e a d y  announced t h a t  "a new more 
e f f e c t i v e  scheme may soon be a d o p te d " . ( 3 1  ^ i n  any c a s e ,  the  r e s u l t s  
of the  f i r s t  a t t e m p t  seem to  prove t h a t  p r o r a t i o n  i s  q u i t e  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  among d i f f e r e n t  n a t i o n s .
The q u o ta s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by 0 0F „ . G, f o r  tho incremo t s  i n  p ro d u c t io n  
f o r  th e  tw elve  month p e r io d  J u lv  19,yf3- June 196^ over th e  r r e v io u s  tw elve
(31) P e tro leu m  I n t e l l i g e n c e  weekly, v p r i l  3, 1967, 3
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months, and tho  a c t u a l  r a t e s  of in c r e a s e  c..n be ssen i n  t a b l e  VI -  3. 
be im m edia te ly  become aware t h a t  none of the  q u o tas  was met. Saudi 
A ra b ia  and Libya su rp a ssed  t h e i r  q u o ta s ,  and th e  r e s t  of tho c o u n t r i e s  
d id  no t even re a c h  i t ,  which shows t h a t  p rodu c in g  c o u n t r i e s  can d.o l i t t l e  
to  de te rm ine  and a l l o c a t e  the  volume of o u tp u t  among tho v a r io u s  so u rc e s .  
T h is  i s  only n a tu r e !  s in c e  o i l  companies w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  c o n s id e r  c o s t s  
( in c lu d in g  t a x e s ) ,  commitments to  n a re n t  companies or a f f i l i a t e s ,  q u a l i t y  
of th e  o i l  and company s t r a t e g y ,  be t ore th ey  d m ,  s o o p l io s  from 
particular source  to  satisfy demand. P r r t c e m o r o , eveu  i f  r. quotas 
had been met, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  see ho ,- lory  the.- e x r o r t i : ^  c o u n t r i e s  
would h v e  l im i t e d  them selves to  a "quo ta" .
I n  a l l  th e se  c o u n t r i e s  economic p la n s  depend l a r g e ly  on tho revenue 
which a cc ru e s  from  t h i s  i n d u s t r y  and i n  a l l  c ase s  i t  i s  t h e i r  p r i n c i p l e  
s in g le  source of f o r e i g n  exchange and budge t rev e n u e .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  
n a t u r a l  t h a t  th e se  c o u n t r i e s  would want to  develop  t h e i r  o i l  i n d u s t r i e s  to  
tho maximum and a s s u re  them selves of tho  income i t  p ro v id e s .  Some of the  
member c o u n t r i e s  have s o t  h ig h  p ro d u c t io n  t a r g e t s  and encouraged f u r t h e r  
e x p lo r a t i o n  i n  o rd e r  t o  expand the  i n d u s t r y  as q u ic k ly  as p o s s ib le ,  and
e s t a b l i s h  them selves i n  a p o s i t i o n  as s t r o n g ly  as t h e i r  o th e r  f e l lo w
members of th e  o r g a n i s a t io n .  I r a n ,  f o r  example, i s  r e p o r t e d  to have a 
goa l of re a c h in g  4 m i l l io n  b a r r e l s  d a i l y  by 1970 (3 2 ) ,  w h ile  Libya 
ex p ec ts  t o  r e a c h  an o u tp u t  o f 3 m i l l io n  b a r r e l s  d a i l y  by th e  same y e a r .  (33) 
New1 c o n c e s s io n a i r e s  have e n te r e d  i n  S^udi A ra b ia ,  Kuwait, end I r a n ,  and 
Libya has been  c o n s id e r in g  a p p l i c a t io n s  f o r  l e a s e s  from a lm ost f i f t y
(32) P e tro leu m  I n t e l l i g e n c e  . eok l\ , a ea zu i 'c r  19, 1965
(33) I b i d , September 6, 19^5, P^ge 5
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tlXlLQ.-reAls_s1 t_n P ro d u c tio n  i n  th e  0 0F QIk  C „ t Are
JTune _ 1S>65 t r : 4. 15-''5 .7, Qun
Quote Assigned 
Saudi A rab ia  12 .1
•.Ctu^-l I ’
~ T C l
Kuwait 6 .5 0 .2
I r a n 17.5 16.5
q4£
t-i 10 .0 K.3
Q atar 3 2 .0 18 .1
L ibya 20 .0 26.6
In d o n e s ia 10 .0 K.6
V enezuela 3 .3 CO•0
m f^ rr. tj- ' 10 .0 7 . 3
Source: P e tro leu m  I n t e l l i g e n c e  P e e k ly ;  August 1 % 1966 , page 5 .
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com panies. (34-) L ib y a 's  o i l  M in is te r ,  Fuad K abasi had oven s t a t e d  t h a t  h i s  
c o u n try  cou ld  "n o t  a c c e p t  l o s s  th an  r a r i t y  w ith  the  m ajor Middle E a s t  
p ro d u ce rs  such as K uw ait, Saudi A rab ia ,  I r a n  and I r a q , "(35 ) I  r e a l l y  
doubt t h a t  i f  c o u n tr ie s  were a f t e r  h ig h e r  p ro d u c t io n ,  th ey  would have 
su b m itte d  them selves i n  the  len g  run  to  th e  a ss ig n e d  q u o ta s .  Sooner 
o r l a t e r  OeP 0L 0C# would have had to  fa c e  the  problem of f i t t i n g  a l l  the  
e s t im a te d  i n c r e a s e s  of th e  v a r io u s  c o u n t r i e s  to  th e  m arket f o r e c a s t ,  and 
f a i l i n g  to  do so would have g iv en  way to  c o m p e ti t io n  among so u rc es .
V enezuela  v - s  th e  only  c o u n try  which seemed t o  be c o n te n t  w ith  h e r  
quo ta . T h is  was because  she b e l i e v e s  t h a t  i f  the  o i l  e x p o r t in g  
c o u n t r ie s  c o o rd in a te  and c o o p e ra te ,  ' p la n ,  such .s t e e  -production p la n ,  
would enab le  a l l  the  p a r t i c i p a n t s  to  h .vc  i sin. r c  of the  mr. r k c t  -while 
s t r e n g h th e n in g  p r i c e s .  For coun try  ; i t h  :• ha h ■ 'r e d u c t io n  (3 .5  m i l l io n  
b a r r e l s  d a i l y )  p r o r a t i o n  on a l l  the  e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  p r o p o r t io n  to  
e x i s t i n g  p ro d u c t io n  would fa v o u r  h e r  i n t e r e s t s  s in c e  t I f  s would s t a b i l i z e  
p r i c e s .  However, th e  s i t u a t i o n  d id  no t seem to  be so f a v o u ra b le  f o r  
V enezuela  s in c e  -with he r  a s s ig n e d  quo ta ,  and th e  r e s t  o f the  e x p o r t in g  
c o u n t r ie s  p r e s s in g  f o r  h ig h e r  p ro d u c t io n ,  she was p e rm i t t in g  h e r  
c o m p e t i to rs ,  b o th  i n  and out of th e  O.P.E.C. a r e a ,  to  c o n s o l id a te  t h e i r  
p o s i t io n s  i n  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  market a t  h e r  expense .
I t  would be d i f f i c u l t ,  however, to  say how f a r  O .F . l .C .  has been 
s u c c e s s f u l  i n  h e r  a c t i v i t i e s .  I t  I s  t r u e  t h a t  the  Middle E a s te r n  
c o u n t r i e s  and L ibya  have b e n e f i t e d  from t h i s  o r g a n iz a t io n  because  of 
th e  ha rden ing  of p o s te d  p r i c e s  (on  which t h e i r  t a x  payments a re  b a s e d ) ,
(3A) Petro leum  P r e s s  S e rv ic e ,  Septem ber 1965
(35) Pe tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  ~7e e k ly ,  September 6, 19^5; page 5-
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and the  more r e c e n t  r o y a l ty  e x p o a s in ' <j*.<$rec-out welch \o&s of normal 
p r a c t i c e  .in V enczuo la . i t h  r e s p e c t  to  the  revo l t -  expensing  fg reoraen t, 
wo must m ention t i n t  i t  .as no t a c c e p te d  by "!'rv q  nor Kuwait bo cons e 
th e s e  c o u n t r ie s  c o n s id e re d  t h a t  i t  went " g n in s t  " p r i n c i p l e s  of s t ' / t e  
s o v e r e i g n i ty " . ( 36) The c la u s e s  which th e s e  two c o u n t r i e s  went a g a in s t  
were th e  fo l lo w in g :  (37)
1) The "no a d d it i -o n a l  ta x "  c la u s e ,  7/hereby th e  C-overnmont a g re es  no t
to  impose any o th e r  new ta x e s  on any o p e ra t io n s  connec ted  7/1 t h  o i l ,  
u d th o u t  w r i t t e n  agreem ent from the o i l  companies.
2) The " q u i t  c la im " c la u s e ,  which s t i p u l a t e s  t h a t  the  r o y a l t y  expensing
agreement i s  i n  f u l l  and f i n a l  s e t t le m e n t  o f  any and a l l  p a s t  
r o y a l t i e s  and ta x e s  due to  th e  Government.
3) The "most fa v o u re d  company" c la u s e ,  which s t i p u l a t e s  t h a t  the
companies w i l l  n o t  be r e q u i r e d  to  pay the  a d d i t i o n a l  revenues th ey  
a r e  o f f e r in g  under t h i s  agreem ent, . f  t .  o verms _.f o th e r  con­
c e s s io n  g ra n te d  by the  Govr rriiiiont to  ww ot '.or coiir wn'-' would r e s u l t  
i n  lower payments I f  a p p l ie d  to  : s ig n a to ry  coup n ie s .
4 ) P a r t  of t h e  a r b i t r a t i o n  c l a u s e , which s p e c i f i e s  ih-"i d isp u te  
in v o lv in g  t a x  m a t te r s  should  be r e f e r r e d  to  an I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
a r b i t r a t i o n  com m ittee . Kuwait demands thw t th e y  should  go to  
Kuwaiti c o u r t s  c
I t  I s  v e ry  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  th e  o i l  companies i n s i s t e d  on the 
"110 a d d i t i o n a l  tax"  c la u s e  which i n  e f f e c t  i s  a c la u s e  l im i t i n g  the 
S t a t e ' s  l e g i s l a t i v e  power. The c o u n t r i e s  which a c c e p te d  tho r o y a l ty  
exp ensing  agreem ent c o n tin u e  then  to  be l im i t e d  to  a c e i l i n g  over which
( 36 ) P e tro leu m  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Meekly, March 21, 1966 ; page 6
(37)  rb id .
s i t u a t i o n  -as be-fore , i n  as  much as tho p0 /50  i s  nom irw H r tho sh a r in g  
p r i n c i p l e  f o r  th e  d u r a t io n  of th e  con cess io n s  in v o lv e d .  The o i l  companies 
have a g re e d  to  expense r o y a l t i e s , h u t  th ey  made su re  t h a t  t h e i r  t a x  
payments would n o t  be r a i s e d ,  .' g a in ,  t h i s  i s  due to  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of 
th e  5Q/50 agreem ents i n  tho  Middle E a s t  which, as  vie no ted  e a r l i e r ,  has 
l i m i t e d  th e  S ta te * s  l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t i o n  from tho v e ry  b eg in n in g .  The 
c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  a c c e n te d  th e  agreement d id  g e t  more money, b u t  i t  i s  n o t  
su re  t h a t  th ey  cou ld  n o t  have o b ta in e d  the  same r e s u l t s  by b a rg a in in g  
d i r e c t l y  w ith  tho  o i l  companies i / i  t h  out the  b a c k in g  o f  O .P .E .C , An 
ach ievem ent i t  would have been , i f  0,P.33.C. had been  a b le  to  e l im in a te  
th e  c la u s e s  i n  q u e s t io n .
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V en ezu e la ,  b e s id e s  b e in g  fv founder ‘i n k '. r , could be c o n s id e re d  as 
one of th e  c h ie f  prom oters of O .P J r .C . .  s in c e ,  -s m entioned e a r l i e r ,  
t h i s  c o u n try  bog~n to  c o n ta c t  the  r e s t  c f  th e  jo r  ox--.nrting c o u n t r ie s  
as f  ' r  back as 1949 However, i t  as d i f f i c u l t  t o  soy t h • t  she has 
r e a l l y  b e n e f i t e d  by h e r  a s s o c i a t i o n  -with t h i s  group. T h is  i s  so , p a r t l y  
because  OaP 0B0C0 has been  m ainly  concerned  w ith  th o  s i t u a t i o n  of Middle 
E a s te rn  c o u n t r i e s  v i s - a v i s  th e  o i l  com panies, s in c e  th e s e  c o u n t r ie s  havo 
been u n der  l e s s  ffavourable  c o n d i t io n s  th a n  V enezuela  duo th e  the  l i m i t a ­
t i o n s  imposed on them by t h u i r  co n cess io n  agreem ents w ith  the  o i l  
com panies, and p a r t l y  b ecause  V en ez u e la ’ s p e tro leu m  i n d u s t r y  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  t h e  o i l  
i n d u s t r y  o f tno Middle E a s t ,
•H th r e s r o c t  to  the  f i r s t  p o in t ,  I  th in k  i t  has  been  obvious how 
the  ru d d le  h a s t  has been under a d isad v an tag e  w ith o u t b e in g  ab le  to  
modify u n i l a t e r a l l y  lier p e tro leu m  l e g i s l a t i o n  as V enezuela  does every  
tim e she- c o n s id e r s  i t  n e c e s sa ry .  In  my o p in io n ,  V enezuela  has been  
more of a s ta n d a rd  f o r  o th e r  ex p o rtin g  c o u n t r i e s  tu .f , t r  t o  re a c h  many 
of tho  p r e r o g a t iv e s  she has long  been  ongoyin; # .o th u s  sc..., f o r  
example, t h a t  i s s u e s  which had lo  be b a r jo iA o d  f c : tho  . id d lo  leas t ,  such 
as th© expensing  of r o y a l t i e s  and th© ro d u c t i  rr. o f the m ark e tin g  allov/ance 
d id  n o t in v o lv e  V enezuela  because  her  p e tro leu m  l e g i s l a t i o n  had .• l re o d y  
tak e n  them i n t o  a cco u n t.  R e c e n t ly ,  V enezuela  changed h e r  whole t a x in g  
system  a f f e c t i n g  th e  o i l  com panies,by  e s t a b l i s h i n g  re f e re n c e  p r i c e s  
to  v a lu e  e x p o r ts .  T h is  she d id  by b a rg a in in g  d i r e c t l y  w ith  the 
o i l  companies (even  i f  i t  mount u s in g  t h r e a t s  of b ick ta x e s  and e x cess
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p r o f i t s  tax )  and succeeded  i n  an a t te m p t ,  which to  me i s  comparable 
t o  O .P .E .C . ’ s u n c o s s e s f u l  and f o r g o t t e n  i s s u e  of r a i s i n g  p o s te d  p r i c e s  
i n  th e  Middle E a s t  f o r  t a x  p u rp o se s . I f ,  <ts wb s h e l l  sea 1 t e r ,  t h e r e  a re  
o p in io n s  tha t  Venezuela * s r e d u c t io n  i n  o r tp u t  c u r ra n   ^9 th  w, o due to  
r e t a l i -  t i o n  on tho  p a r t  of the o i l  comtw ml os t.;C 'Uso of h ig h -a  Lexes, and 
p a r a l l e l  t o  t h i s  t h e r e  was -ni in c r c  so i n  p ro d u c t io n  i n  ai;» the  o th e r  
m ajor a re a s  d u r in g  t h a t  y e a r ,  v/h t  b e n e f i t  d id  V enezuela  g e t  ou t of
O .P .S .C . f s r e s o l u t i o n  which s t ' t e s  t h a t  th e  Org n i z c t i o n  would r e a c t  to  
such c a se s?
Tho second reason  why V enezuela  does n o t  seem to  b e n e f i t  much by h e r  
a s s o c i a t i o n  w ith  O .P.E.C, i s  because  he r  p e tro leu m  i n d u s t r y  o p e ra te s  under 
ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  c o n d i t io n s  th a n  t h a t  of the  o th e r  member c o u n t r i e s .
B a s i r ly ,  i t  i s  the d i f f e r e n c e  i n  the  amounts of r e s e r v e s  an?, of th e  d i f f e r e n t  
l e v e l s  of p ro d u c t io n  between V enezuela  and h e r  f e l l o w  members, v/hich 
makes th e  f i r s t  i n s i s t  more on c o n s e rv a t io n  w h ile  th e  r e s t  look  fo rw ard  
to  f u r t h e r  ex p an s io n . T h is  to  me i s  one of th e  main re a so n s  viy V enezuela  
canno t c o m p le te ly  i n t e r g r a t e  h e r s e l f  w ith  t h i s  o r g a n iz a t io n .  The m a jo r i ty  
of the  members p u rsu e  an o b j e c t i v e ,  which i s  n o t  co m patib le  v i t h  V en ezu e la ’ s 
dom estic  p o l ic y ;  a c l e a r  example o f  t. d s ,  I s  the  r e c e n t  a ttem p t t o  con­
t r o l  o u tp u t .  V enezuela  ag reed  to  p ro r  t i e . '  w h ile  most o th e r  members 
p re s se d  f o r  h ig h e r  p ro d u c t io n ,  l ' t  i s  obvious t h a t  Venezuela w i l l  no t 
b e n e f i t  by a s s o c i a t i n g  h e r s e l f  w ith  cl group o\ c o u n t r i e s  which b e s id e s  
outnumbering h e r ,  have d i f f e r e n t  immediate o b j e c t i v e s .
I t  I s  t r u e  t h a t  V enezuela  has b e n e f i t e d  i n d i r e c t l y  from O .P .E .C . ,  
s in c e  as  Middle E a s te r n  and A f r ic a n  c o u n t r ie s  r a i s e d  t h e i r  shore  of o i l  
r ev e n u e ,  t h i s  narrow ed th e  c o s t  advantage  of th e se  r e g io n s ,  Hov;ever,
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I  an of tiio o p in io n  t h a t  I t  would be p r e f e r a b le  f o r  V enezuela  to  fo lio?? 
a more in d ep en d en t l i n o  a s id e  from  t h i s  o r g a n iz a t io n  so as no t to  bo too  
dependent on 0 , F oE 0C . * s success, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  j o i n t  programmes of any 




V e n e z u e la 's  o i l  i n d u s t r y  i s  i n  a c r i t i c ,  1 p o s i t i o n  c.t t h i s  moment due 
to  th e  convergence of v a r io u s  c ircum si .n c es  t n  >t h..ve p la c e d  th e  co un try  
a t  a d isa d v a n ta g e  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  o th e r  producing  are: s .  I t  seems, however, 
t h a t  th e  c o u n t r y 's  d i f f i c u l t i e s  could  he ^ r e . t l y  .m it ig a te d  ‘by a dom estic  
pe tro leum  p o l ic y  t h a t  a d ju s te d  i t s e l f  more c lo s e ly  to  r e a l i t y .  Fo llow ing  
a re  th e  t h r e e  main c o n f l i c t i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  which have p la c e d  V enezuela  i n  an 
u n f o r tu n a te  p o s i t io n ;  i f  we tak e  n o t i« e ,  we can  see t h  t  i n  each case one 
of th e  d e te rm in a n ts  r e f l e c t s  c o n d i t io n s  i n  which th e  p e tro leu m  in d u s t r y  
u n avo idab ly  has to  o p e ra te ,  w hile  the  o th e r  i s  the r e s u l t  .#f a dom estic  
p o l ic y  t h a t  i s  n o t  a p p ro p r ia te  to  the  s i t u a t i o n .
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I  E x p ir in g  of Concessions
i n  1983
No system  has y e t  (mid 1967) 
been  e s ta b l is h e d ,  to  a llo w  o i l
companies to  o p e ra te  a f t e r  1983
I I  Much of V enezeulan  o i l  i s Dom estic Pe tro leum  P o l ic y  i n c r e a s e s
n a t u r a l l y  h ig h  c o s t . c o s t  t o  o i l  companies
I I I  O versupply  of o i l  i n  w orld V enezuela  c o n s id e r s  o i l  a n a t i o n a l
m arkets  a t  c u r r e n t  p r i c e s ; a s s e t  t h - ' t  should  be conserved
Middle E a s te r n  and A fr ica n u n t i l  p r i c e s  ..rc h ig h .
c o u n t r i e s  eage r  to  expand 
p ro d u c t io n .
At p r e s e n t  th e re  i s  i n  V enezuela  a h ig h ly  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  Government 
headed by a l e f t - w in g  pc.rty  tho-t has ach ieved  im port n t  changes i n  o i l  
p o l ic y  d u r in g  the  tim es i t  has come to  o f f i c e .  I n  19A§ i t  was r e s p o n s ib le  
f o r  the  i n c l u s i o n  of the  30-50 c la u se  i n  th e  income t a x  law and announced 
i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  p o l ic y  of no more c o n c e ss io n s .  During i t s  p r e s e n t  term  
i n  o f f i c e  i t  nas i n s i s t e d  on the  s u b s t i t u t i o n  f o r  th e  c o n c e ss io n  form ula  
t h a t  of s e rv ic e  c o n t r a c t s ,  and j u s t  r e c e n t l y  (end  of 1966) has come to  an 
agreement w i th  th e  o i l  companies i n  the  c o u n try  to  change th e  whole b a s i s  
f o r  the  c a l c u l a t i o n  of income ta x e s  by e l im in a t in g  th e  use of th e  !,r e a l i z e d  
p r ic e "  f o r  a more s t a b l e  " r e fe re n c e  p r i c e " .  I t  i s  a ls o  of i n t e r e s t  t o
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mention t h a t  w h ile  t h i s  p a r t y  was i n  o f f i c e  i n l 960 the  "C orporac ion  
Venczolana de P e t ro le o "  (C .V .P .)  t* \s founded and Venezuela a c te d  
as a c h ie f  m o tiv a to r  i n  the  c r e a t i o n  c f  O . f .h .C .
Since th e  p r e s e n t  Government i s  ch , r ' c t o r i  zed bv i r v in g  a s o c i a l i s t  
tenedency  and thus b e l i e v e s  t h ' t  '1 1  n~,ior induur-rios  should  be c o n t r o l l e d  by 
th e  S t a t e ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  de term ine  7/he the  r  i t s  pe tro leum  p o l i c y  has had 
i t s  f a u l t s ,  o r ,  w hether on th e  c o n t r  ry ,  the  Government i s  managing to  g a in  
c o n t r o l  of the  p e tro leu m  in d u s t r y  w ith o u t  hav ing  to  t u r n  t o  o u t r i g h t  
n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n .  As one source words i t ,  "Venezuela i s  no e x c e p t io n  to  the  
r e c e n t  tendency  of sub-developed  c o u n t r ie s  i n  th e  f r e e  w orld  to  fav o u r  
n a t i o n a l i s t i c  id e a s  of tho s o c i a l i s t  ty p e ,  ( a n d ) . . .  d u r in g  th e  l a s t  few y e a rs  
th e  Government has e x p re ssed  i t s  i n t e r e s t  i n  c o n t r o l l i n g  tho b a s i c  in d u s t r y  
and p u b l ic  s e r v i c e s  i n  the c o u n t r y . . . . " ( l )  The e l im in a t io n  o f  th e  
c o n cess io n  system  'w ithout p ro v id in g  any o th e r  system  to  t  ike i t s  p la c e  by 
which the  p r i v a t e  companies cou ld  o p e ra te ,  the  p a s s in g  over to  th e  
n a t i o n a l  o i l  company (C .V .P ,) of p r iv a t e  companies' a s s e t s  i n  1983, the  
a c q u i s i t i o n  of c o n t r o l  of the  i n t e r n a l  m .rlcet by dec ree  and tho i n c r e a s e  
i n  the  c o s ts  o f th e  p r iv a te  i n d u s t r y  nxth c la im s of b .-.ck t cxes and ta x  
reform s cat a time when p r iv a te  concerns i:iud i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  m?-ke 
V enezuelan  o i l  compete w ith  t  l a t  o f  o t  wr a reas ,  make* us aondv.r i f  the  
Government i s  no t o b ta in in g  i t s  g o l  w ith o u t  cau s ing  a g r e a t e r  d i s r u p t io n  to
( l )  D ia z ,  L„J„ ; '1V enezug l a ’1, P ro ceed ings  of th e  C ouncil of Sconomics of 
the  New York, March 1966, pages 35A, 357.
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th e  i n d u s t r y .  W hatever the  case  might h e , th e  Government has to  f a c e  the 
f a c t  t h a t  i t  depends on the  o i l  revenue p ro v id ed  Tiy th e  o i l  companies to  
f u l f i l  th e  needs of the  c o u n try ,  and t h i s  i s  what i t  must f i n d  most 
d i f f i c u l t  to  r e c o n c i l e  w i th  th e  c u r re n t  p o l i c y .  I t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s in g  
t h a t  the  newly e l e c t e d  o i l  M in is te r ,  Dr. Jose  A ntonio Hayobre, has come 
to  the  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  " i t  i s  of maximum urgency  f o r  V enezuela  t o  overcome 
th e  problems t h a t  have caused  -petroleum  e x p o rts  to  d e c l i n e " . *(2) However, I  
do no t b e l i e v e  t h a t  o i l  b a r t e r s  w ith  c o u n t r i e s  s h o r t  o f f o r e i g n  exchange 
would be the  a n sw e r .( 3 )
The aim of o b ta in in g  f o r  the  coun try  * h ig n e r  s n . r e  i n  i t s  o i l  income 
can n o t  be c r i t i c i z e d  by anyone ••/ho does n o t h .we opposing i n t e r e s t s .  On 
the  c o n t r a r y ,  one should  f i n d  l a u d :a l e  such * n a t i o n a l i s t i c  p o l i c y .  Such has 
been th e  a t t i t u d e  of th e  U n ited  N a tions  which passed  a r e s o l u t i o n  say ing  
t h a t  dev e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s  should have more c o n t r o l  of and g e t  more p r o f i t  
from n a t u r a l  re s o u rc e s  t h a t  a re  b e in g  developed by f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l . ( h )  
However, no m a t te r  how praiseworthy th e  a t te m p ts  o f a n a t i o n a l  Government 
to  o b ta in  b e n e f i t s  f o r  i t s  coun try  may be , one shou ld  nev e r  ig n o re  th e  
r e a l i t i e s  of the  s i t u a t i o n ,  and by t h i s  I  mean th e  Economics of the  
s i t u a t i o n .
(2 ) P e tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, Jan u ary  9, 1967, page 1
(3) liiS
(hr) P e tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Meekly; December 12, 1966 , page 1
( i  have been unab le  to  o b ta in  th e  o r i g i n a l  sou rce  to  q u o te ) .
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I .  The e x p ir in g  of c o n ce ss io n s  i n  i r e  n e a r  fu tu re  (.1983) h; s n o t  u r a l l y  
made th e  o i l  companies aware th  .t by t h i s  d ic  they  l l ' i  h. vo to  leave  the  
c o u n try ,  p a s s in g  a l l  a s s e t s  to  C .V .F .,  and t h a t  t h e i r  b u s in e s s  i n  V enezuela  
ends th e n  and th e r e  u n le s s  some o th e r  form of agreem ent can he s e t t l e d  between 
them and th e  Government, They Iv-ve asked f o r  new c o n ce ss io n s  b u t  because  of 
the  "no concess ion"  p o l ic y  th ey  have been u n s u c c e s s fu l  i n  o b ta in in g  new a c r e ­
age, The Government has i n s t e a d  prom ised o new system i n  the  form of 
s e rv ic e  c o n t r a c t s  under which the  p r iv a t e  concerns w i l l  be ab le  to  work i n  
the f u t u r e  i n  c o o p e ra t io n  w ith  the  n a t io n a l  o i l  company. However, no new 
system  has y e t  been p u t  i n t o  p r a c t i c e ,  s in c e  a cc o rd in g  to  Governmental 
op in ions  " th e r e  i s  no ru sh  to  implement the  se rv ic e  c o n t r a c t s . " ( 5 ) T h e re fo re  
the  companies have fo llo w ed  a p o l ic y  of a m o r t iz in g  as f. s t  as p o s s ib le  
t h e i r  f i x e d  a s s e t s  and have l im i te d  t h e i r  new in v es tm en t  to  a minimum. T h is  
le d  to  th e  d is in v e s tm e n t  of the  pe tro leum  in d u s t r y  i n  V enezuela , and o th e r  
r e g io n s ,  such as  th e  Middle E a s t  and A f r ic a  became fav o u re d  f o r  t h e i r  
in v e s tm e n ts .  This i s  on ly  n a tu r a l  i f  the  o i l  companies havo a sh o r t  
p e r io d  l i m i t i n g  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  the c o u n try ,  s in c e  neo in v es tm en ts  f o r  
e x p lo r a t io n  and development vou!d only be j u s t i f i e d  i.f th ey  were fo llo w ed  by 
a p e r io d  of tim e tlv  t  would a l i o  f u tu r e  pro-’1 n o t io n  to  am o rt ize  them.
(5) Manuel Perez  Giiferrnro, M in is te r  o f Mines and .Hydrocarbons: Petro leum  
i n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, March Ik ,  1966; page 1.
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The co n ce ss io n  system  might h /ve  proved to  he a good one, h u t  I  agree 
t h a t  a n o th e r ,  such as S e rv ice  Contr c t s ,  could  he fo rm u la te d  to  he even 
b e t t e r .  However, th e  f a c t  t h a t  a new system  hes n o t  been d e f in e d  has been 
h ig h ly  un favourab le  f o r  the coun try  and t  i s  i s  one of th e  main f a u l t s  of 
the  Government i n  r e l a t i o n  to  o i l  p o l ic y .
I I .  The o i l  companies, l ik e  any o th e r  commercial e n t e r p r i s e ,  a re  a l s o  out 
to  make p r o f i t s .  They w i l l  norm ally  c o n c e n tra te  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  the  more 
prom ising  a r e a s ,  and w i l l  le a v e  o th e rs  i f  a cc o rd in g  to  t h e i r  s ta n d a rd s  th ey  
a re  l e s s  p r o f i t a b l e .  T h is  degree o f  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  depends on the  c o s t s  of 
the i n d u s t r y  and on th e  r e tu r n s  i t  g e ts  from the s a le  o f  th e  o i l ,  which i n  
tu r n  depend on the  demand and supply  of p ro d u c ts .
As the  s i t u a t i o n  has evo lved , and as we have seen  i n  p re v io u s  c h a p te r s ,  
th e  oversupp ly  of pe tro leum  a t  e x i s t i n g  p r i c e s  c r e a t e d  a Buyevs Market t h a t  
f o rc e d  the  o i l  companies to  g r  art major d is c o u n ts  i n  o rd e r  to  s e l l  t h e i r  o i l .  
I n  o th e r  words, i f  c o s t s  rem ained unchanged t h e i r  margin of p r o f i t s  would he 
reduced . Thus the  p re s e n t  s i t u a t i o n  of the m arket makes i t  c.11 the  more 
n e c e s sa ry  to  c o n c e n tr a te  i n  the  low er c o s t  a re a s  as f a r  as p o s s ib l e .
As we have seen , V enezuela  occupies th e  h ig h e r  c o s t  b ra c k e t  of the 
e x p o rt in g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  O .P .E .C . ,  w hile  the Middle Jir s t  and A f r ic a  ga in  fav o u r  
due to  t h e i r  low er c o s t s .  (6 )  I n  t h i s  sense we have a l r e a d y  seen  how o i l  
from th ese  so u rces  competes w ith  Venezeutin o i l  i n  some of h e r  more t r a d i t i o n a l  
m arke ts , and how th e  i n d u s t r y  i s  respond ing  to  th e  s i t u a t i o n  of the market by 
g ra d u a l ly  s h i f t i n g  to  low er c o s t  a re a s .  O .P.B .C, c o u n t r ie s  reco g n ize  t h i s
(6 )  See page 171.
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phenomenon as n a tu r a l  to  pe tro leum  economics. “I f  th e  -producer 's  p r i c e s  
( i n  one re g io n )  a re  h ig h e r  th an  the poin£ l e v e l  t h r u  o f f ta k e  volumes w i l l  
s h r in k ,  n o t  because  th e  o v o r e l l  consumption of o i l  i s  reduced , h u t  because 
o th e r  a re a s  become more economic-'!. S im i la r ly ,  i f  h i s  p r i c e s  ere  low er, 
o f f ta k e  volumes w i l l  i n c r e a s e  r a p id ly  a t  the  expense of p ro d u c tio n  i n  o th e r  
a r e a s .  " (7)
Thus we have an e x t e r n a l  s i t u a t i o n  ch:*t i s  not i n  th e  power of 
V enezuela  to  change and to  which she must a d j u s t  h e r s e l f  as b e s t  she can . In  
th ese  c irc u m s ta n c e s ,  the  normal p rocedure  to  fo l lo w  i n  o rd e r  to  m a in ta in  
Venezuela* s p o s i t i o n  i n  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ma k e t  w tuld  be to  t r y  to  c o u n te r ­
a c t  i n t e r n a l l y  th e  d isa d v an tag e s  t h a t  V enezuela  has w i th  r e s p e c t  to  o th e r  
p roducing  a r e a s .  This c o u ld  be done p a r t l y  by d e f in in g  th e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  
which the  o i l  commutes w i l l  be p e rm it te d  to  o p e ra te ,  th u s  red u c in g  u n c e r ta in ly  
and p o l i t i c a l  r i s k ,  b o th  of which a re  c o s t s ,  and p a r t l y  by no t p re s s in g  f o r  
h ig h e r  p e r  b a r r e l  revenues i f  t h i s  would l e s s e n  t o t a l  revenue by le a d in g  
to  a lower r - t e  of p ro d u c t io n .  . .t a time of oversup p ly  i t  I s  ex trem ely  
dangerous to  attem pt to  maximize p*r b a r r e l  revenue , s in c e  i t  may have 
n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t s  on p ro d u c t io n ,  fr-w tify in- thciv  h h igh  p e r  b c r r e l  revenue 
may be , V e n e z u e la 's  f i n a n c i a l  probclms - ill .  no t bo so lved  by a d d i t i o n a l  per 
b a r r e l  income i f  p ro d u c t io n  l e v e l s  con tinue  to  d e c l in e .
I n  s p i t e  of V e n e z u e la 's  d isad van tage  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  o th e r  r e g io n s ,  
and i n  s p i t e  of m arket p r e s s u r e s ,  the  G-overnment chose th e  p re s e n t  moment 
to  make a new ta x  refo rm  seek ing  h ig h e r  o i l  revenues , .-hich i n  the  p re s e n t
( 7 ) "T axation  Economics i n  Crude Pe tro leum "; page 7; Paper p re s e n te d  by
O.P.L.C. a t  th e  V th Arab P e tro leum  Congress, C a iro ,  Harch 16 th  -  23rd,
1963-
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s i t u a t i o n  of u n c e r t a in ly  and d is in v e s tm e n t  of th e  o i l  companies i n  the  
co u n try  proved to  be q u i te  in o p p o r tu n e . The whole s i  tin. t i c  n p r e v a i l i n g  i n  
V enezuela  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  u n c e r t  i n t /  i n  o i l  p o l i c / ,  b ck t a x  c la im s, and 
t a x  re fo rm s , p lu s  i t s  d is a d v a n t  we in  c o s t s  -'ere to  a g rc u i  e x te n t  th e  rea so n  
f o r  a y/o r e d u c t io n  i n  i t s  o u tp u t  ir. 1966 h i l e  r v x w  o th e r  major p roducing  
a re a  had " s h a rp ” i n c r e a s e s . ( 8 )
I I I  As to  V e n e z u e la 's  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  O.F.B.C X f in d  th.-1 she has benefite<  
only i n d i r e c t l y  from t h i s  O rg a n iz a t io n  w hile  - c t i n g  as a s ta n d a rd  f o r  the  r e s t  
o f the  member c o u n t r i e s .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  i t  seems i n t e r e s t i n g  to  quote 
Dr. J . P 8 P e rez  A lfonso*s o p in io n  on the m a t te r :
"One must i n s i s t "  he says , " t h a t  th e  a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  V enezuela  
w ith  o th e r  p roducing  c o u n t r i e s  h a s n ' t  been  p roduc in g  any b e n e f i t s  
f o r  our c o u n t r y . " ( 9 )
We must r e c a l l  t h a t  D rc P eres  A lfonzo was one of th e  c h ie f  i n s t i g a t o r s  i n  the  
fo rm a tio n  of 0 0P „B„C. w ith  Abdulah TarildL of Saudi A rab ia . What has 
happened i s  t h a t  O.P/I-.C. has d i r e c te d  i t s  e f f o r t s  towards a c h ie v in g  f o r  the  
Middle E a s te r n  and A fr ic a n  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a g r e a t e r  f i n a n c i a l  sho-re i n  t h e i r  
r e s p e c t iv e  p&roleum i n d u s t r i e s  seek ing  many of ta-.. p r e r o g r t i v e s  V enezuela  
had been a l r e a d y  en joy ing  such ex the  expensing 01" r o y a l t i e s .  In  t h i s  
s en se , many of th e se  c o u n t r ie s  wore able  to  in c r e a s e  t h e i r  o i l  revenue w ith  
the  s o l i d a r i t y  and backing  of th e  group. Mo, ove r ,  V enezuela  h a rd ly  r e c e iv e d  
t h i s  k in d  of b e n e f i t .  She ga in ed  i n d i r e c t l y  "fLth th e  f i n a n c i a l  ga in s  of he r
(8) Pe tro leum  P re ss  S e rv ic e ,  Jan u ary  1967 , page 7<- I  d e c l in e  to  b e l i e v e „ 
however, t h  t  the  3lA r e d u c t io n  was due s o l e ly  to  market c o n d i t io n s .  I  
make f u r t h e r  o b se rv a t io n s  on t h i s  p o in t  i n  fo l lo w in g  x^g®s -
( 9 ) Pe tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly; September 16, 1963, page 1 .
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fe l lo w  members of th e  group on ly  i n  as much as t h i s  in c re a s e d  the  c o s t  of 
Middle E a s te rn  and A f r ic a n  o i l  to  the o i l  companies anc thus narrowed the  c o s t  
advant'. ge of th e s e  re g io n s ,  fu r th e rm o re ,  the d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r r a  between 
V enezuela  and the  r e s t  of tho 0,1- . members cone :ru in g  p ro d u c t io n  r a t e s
d id  no t p a r t i c u l a r l y  s u i t  V enezuela  e i t h e r .  T h is  -r s due to  th e  “d i f f e r e n t  
p h ilo so p h y ” , as the  sp e c ia liz ed .  ->ross n u ts  i t ,  w ith  which V enezuela  and the  
r e s t  of 0 eP ,L oC, c o u n tr ie s  appro*'ched the  I'noblam. (10) V enezuela  c o n s id e rs  
o i l  as a n a t i o n a l  a s s e t  th ? /  shou ld  be conserved  and so ld  only when - .r ice s  
-  and thus revenues  -  a re  h ig h ,  while- the  Middle E a s te rn  c o u n t r i e s  use t h e i r  
o i l  r e s o u rc e s  to  g e t  money q u ic k ly .
Dr„ P erez-A lfo nzo  has ex p ressed  the  o p in io n  t h a t  the  p re s e n t  l e v e l  of 
o i l  rrevenue a c c ru in g  t o  the  n a t io n  i s  “ s u f f i c i e n t ” to  enab le  the  whole 
economy to  con tin u e  i t s  expansion , and t h a t  i n  o rd e r  to  make tho optimum 
use of o i l  income, i t s  r a t e  of f lo w  over time to  the  n a t io n  should  be re g u la ­
t e d ,  and the  revenue should  be channeled  i n t o  in v e s tm e n ts  which would produce 
an in c r e a s e  i n  th e  N a t io n a l  P ro d u c t .  He th e r e f o r e  c o n s id e r s  t h a t ,  " th e  
p r e s e n t  l e v e l  of o i l  p ro d u c t io n  shou ld  be s t a b i l i z e d  and even a - r a d u ' l  r e d ­
u c t io n  could  be c o n s id e re d  as h ig h e r  o i l  p r ic e s  a re  ach ieved .” ( l l )
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  say i f  inv es tm en t o p p o r tu n i t i e s  i n  Venezuela a re  a t  
p r e s e n t  l im i t e d  due to  tho lack  of s k i l l e d  la b o u r ,  e n t r e p r e n e u r s ,  or m arket, 
b u t  i f  t h i s  were the  case  i t  mi lit be p r e f e r a b le  to  o b ta in  the o i l  income 
and i n v e s t  i t  abroad th an  to  choc \ o i l  p ro d u c t io n  d-.ich mi-Hit r e c e iv e  
a lower p r i c e  i n  the  f u t u r e .  As '-rc s w ,  Dr. F e re z -$ l fo n z o  coun ts  on 
ach iev in g  a h ig h e r  " p r ic e "  f o r  o i l  ( t h a t  f o r  the  1 t i o n  means a h ig h e r  p e r
(10) P e tro leu m  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, December 12, 1966, wage 6.
(11) V e r t i c e ,  Ju ly -A u g u s t,  1966 (C a ra c a s ) j  page 15,
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b a r r e l  re v e n u e ) ,  which i n  e f f e c t  the  co u n try  has heen o b ta in in g ;  and on 
m a in ta in in g  th e  c u r r e n t  l e v e l  o f  t o t a l  o i l  income, which might n o t  have been 
th e  case  f o r  1966 , or v e ry  c lo se  to  not b e i n g . (12) Venezuelan o i l  p o l ic y  r e s t  
on the  assum ption  t h a t  o i l  has an i n t r i n s i c  v a lu e  and t h ' t  i t  may be s to re d  
u n t i l  the  " p r i c e ” p a id  by the  o i l  companies i s  " r e a s o n a b le " , (13) which seems 
to  f i t  q u i te  w e l l  to  Dr. P erez -A lfonzo*s th e o ry  above. However, s in c e  o i l  
has a market va lue  and th e re  i s  an <.vo rsupp ly  a t  . r e s e n t  p r i c e s ,  i t  seems 
q u i te  d i f f i c u l t  to  expect n i n c r e a s e  i n  tho p e r  b a r r e l  revenue- f o r  Venezuelan 
o i l  and a t  th e  same time m a i n t a i n  th e  carrr, ,;.t l e v e l  of r e d u c t io n ,  w hile  o ther  
e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s  a re  anxious to  expand p ro d u c t io n  which fu r th e rm o re  i s  of 
low er c o s t .
Obviously, each has  a r i g h t  to  choose i t s  own "p h ilo so p h y " , b u t  Venezuela 
should  r e a l i z e  t h a t  th e  lo n g e r  she m a in ta in s  h e r s ,  tho f u r t h e r  she w i l l  be 
d r iv e n  out of ma k e t s  by the  r e s t  of th e  e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s .  The experim ent 
of the p ro d u c t io n  p la n  proved many th in g s ,  b u t  the  f a c t  t h a t  I  w ish to  p o in t  
out h e re  i s  t h a t  th e  Middle h a s t e m  and A fr ica n  c o u n t r i e s  d id  no t  h e s i t a t e  to  
make demands f o r  the  h ig h e s t  p o s s ib le  ou tpu t w hile  V enezuela  accep ted  to  
l i m i t  h e r  p ro d u c t io n  i n  view of the  "g en e ra l"  p r o r a t i o n  p la n .  T his showed 
c l e a r l y  t h a t  V enezuela  could n o t  i d e n t i f y  h e r s e l f  w ith  h e r  f e l lo w  members of 
th e  a s s o c i a t i o n  w ith o u t  r e c e iv in g  the  s h o r t  end of th e  b a rg a in .  They were
(12) According to  D r. Krez-G-uerrero, V e n ez u e la 's  p re v io u s  o i l  M in is te r ,  
th e  n a t io n  l o s t  an e s t im a te ^  Sft-f? A  m i l l io n  i n  o i l  revenues as  a 
r e s u l t  o f th e  3% r e d u c t io n /e x p o r t s  i n  1966. (P e tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  
Meekly, Ja n u a ry  9, 1967, pago l )
( 13 ) Term used  by Venezuela 1 s Fro s ide  n t ,  Dr. x-. .ul T-coni, ..hen the re fe re n c e  
p r ic e  f o r  f u e l  o i l  7/as e s t a b l i s h e d ,  ( j u t t e d  Ir. : ic t ro lo u m  I n t e l l i g e n c e  
Weekly, A p r i l  A, 1966, p ,?lgs 5)
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out to. i n c r e a s e  t o t a l  revenue as f a s t  as p o s s ib l e ,  and V enezuela  was a f t e r  s i  
s t a b l e  p r i c e s .
The r e s u l t  of th e  experim ent i s  known by a l l .  Not only  th e  f a i l u r e  
of th e  p la n  became p u b l i c ,  b u t  a l s o  the  i n c o m p a ta b i l i ty  of the  two 
"ph ilosoph ies" . V enezuela  cou ld  n o t b e n e f i t  by k eep in g  h e r  o i l  i n  th e  ground 
l i k e  she expec ted  because  the  o th e r  e x p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s  wore only to o  eag e r  
to  expand t h e i r  p ro d u c t io n .  I t  i s n ' t  nocessv.iy to  say  ./ho a-ot the  b e s t  pr r t  
of th e  d e a l  i n  t h i s  c a se .
V enezuela  has to  r e a l i z e  t h a t  i n  o rd er  to  re v iv e  her  p e tro leu m  in d u s t r y  
she w i l l  have to  be more r e a l i s t i c  pith, r e s p e c t  to  the  i n t o r n - ' t i o n a l  
s i t u a t i o n  of the  in d u s t r y ,  f i r s t  she - i l l  have to  r e a l i z e  t h a t  p r e s e n t ly  
she has need of the  o i l  companj.es to  m rrkot h e r  o i l ;  second, t h a t  th e re  i s  
an ove rsup p ly  of pe tro leum  i n  the  world a t  e x i s t i n g  p r i c e s  which acco rd ing  
to  i m p a r t i a l  o b se rv e rs  w i l l  p e r s i s t ;  t h i r d ,  t h a t  the Middle E a s t  and A f r ic a n  
c o u n t r ie s  a re  on ly  too  w i l l i n g  to  expand p ro d u c t io n ;  f o u r t h ,  t h a t  h e r  p re se n t  
pe tro leum  p o l i c y  i s  no t  com patib le  w ith  t h a t  of h e r  f e l lo w  members of O .P .E .C . 
and t h a t  f i f t h ,  t h a t  h e r  p e tro leu m  p c l i c 5~ i s  n e t  a p p ro p r ia te  to  the  s i t u a t i o n  
of th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  market*
I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  b o th  companies and h o s t  governments assume a t t i t u d e s  
and ta k e  a c t io n s  so as to  b o l s t e r  t h e i r  b a rg a in in g  p o s i t i o n  v i s  a vi-s one 
a n o th e r .  T h is  i s  normal and u n d e r s ta n d a b le , b u t  we shou ld  always keep  I n  
mind t h a t  t h i s  i s  a p a r t  of the  p rocess  of n e g o t i a t i o n s .  I t  would be absurd  
i f  we sa id  t h  t  V enezuela  d id  n o t  have need of th e  o i l  conrp; n io s  to  market 
h e r  o i l  to d a y .  However, i t  would ...Iso bo absu rd  i f  vo s< i d  t h e t  the  o i l  
companies were n o t  w i l l i n g  to  come to  term s w ith  V enezuela . _ r .  John Loudon,
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a D i r e c to r  of S h e l l  O il  Company s t a t e d  i t  c l e a r l y :  "O utside of N orth ■
America, V enezuela  i s  hy f a r  the  most im p o rtan t  co u n try  to  us i n  the  
Yfestern H em isphere. "(id-) T his i s  why a s o lu t io n  t o  satisfy b o th  p a r t i e s  
vrould no t be im p o s s ib le .  Both th e  G-overnment and th e  companies p la y  the  
ca rd s  t h a t  th ey  have, and v d l l  a l s o  have re c o u rse  t o  a c e r t a i n  degree  of 
" b lu f f "  i n  o rd e r  to  in tim ida te  th e  p a r tn e r .  T h is  i s  n a tu r a l  and no t so 
i n f r e q u e n t  when two p a r t i e s  <re b a rg a in in g .  As a r e c e n t  example, we have 
V e n ez u e la 's  t h r e a t s  to  impose an excess p r o f i t  t a x  and to  c la im  a f a n t a s t i c  
sum of money as back ta x e s  i n  o rd e r  to  make the  companies compromise to  the 
new system  of c a l c u l a t i n g  income t - x e s ; ( l 5 )  md on the o th e r  hand the  
con tinuous w arnings from the  o i l  companies of the  dark  f u t u r e  t h a t  aw aits  
the  V enezuelan  in d u s t r y .  Even the  o i l  p r e s s  adm its  t h a t  every  tim e 
Venezuela has changed i t s  t a x a t i o n  s t r u c tu r e  th e r e  h >ve v-een "p ro p h e ts  of 
doom" f o r  the  o i l  i n d u s t r y .  ( l 6 )  Thore rn o  o p in io n s  a ls o ,  t h a t  the  
companies make 'use of t h e i r  o f f t a k e  p a t t e r n s  f o r  rea so n s  "which go beyond 
p u re ly  commercial c r i t e r i a . "  (17) According to  Dr. Perez A lfonzo , the  o i l  
companies i n  V enezuela  were red u c in g  p ro d u c tio n  i n  I 966 as 0 b a rg a in in g  
weapon i n  th e  n e g o t i a t io n s  w ith  the  G-overnment over back ta x e s  and ta x  
r e f o r m s . (18) One th in g  seems c l e a r ,  and t h i s  i s  th; t  i t  i s  ve ry  d o u b tfu l  
t h a t  the  Jf/o r e d u c t io n  i n  Venezuela* s o i l  o u tp u t  du r in g  1966 was due e n t i r e l y  
to  th e  market s i t u a t i o n  when th e  in d u s t r y  on a whole "ach ieved  the  b ig g e s t  
annual in c r e a s e  so f a r  reco rded  i n  h i s t o r y " . ( 19 ) V e n e z u e la 's  co m pe ti t ive
(14) Pe tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly; May 31, 1965, cage 6
(15) I t  seems t h a t  Venezuela ag reed  to  a ccep t  1 /3  of what she c la im ed  as back 
ta x e s .  P e tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, O ctober 10, 1966.
(16 ) P e tro leum  P r e s s  S e rv ic e ,  Jan u ary  1967, page 7.
(17) O .P .E .C ."N otes on R e s o lu t io n  IX 6 l " ,  page 1 \  T r i p o l i ,  J u ly  19&5
(18) Pe tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, May 9, 1966, page 6
( 19) P e tro leum  P re s s  S e rv ic e ,  Jan u  ry  1967, pape 7 .
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s i t u a t i o n  could  n o t  have v a r i e d  so i n  a ye-"r i n  which, fu r th e rm o re ,  the  new 
ta x  measures were n o t  o p e ra t iv e  s in c e  th e s e  were s t i l l  under d i s c u s s io n .
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  prove t h a t  the  o i l  companies reduced  Venezuelan o f f t  eke as 
a weapon, h u t  as th e r e  can  he o p in io n s ,  I  a ls o  f e e l  i n c l i n e d  to  b e l ie v e  t h a t
th ey  u sed  t h i s  a b i l i t y  i n  the  Venezuelan case .
be h-.ve seen , hov/ever, t h a t  the  o i l  companies have a g r e a t  ooncern f o r  a
wide d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of p roducing  a re a s  p a r t l y  t o  l e s s e n  p o l i t i c a l  r i s k  and
and a ls o  f o r  s t r a t e g i c  r e a so n s .  The l o c a t i o n  o f  V enezuela  i n  the  Yfestern 
Hemisphere a lm ost a t  th e  d o o rs te p  of the U nited  S t a t e s ,  adds v a lue  to  h e r  
o i l  and makes V enezuela  a. conv en ien t  p lace  i n  which to  m a in ta in  a fo o th o ld .  
T h is  i s  one ca rd  t h a t  V enezuela  has i n  he r  fav o u r  and she knows i t .
A l l  th e se  c o n s id e r a t io n s  ?.re t r u e  however, up to  a c e r t a i n  p o in t .
The o i l  companies w i l l  n o t  want to  leave- .-„n wva t i n t  g iv es  them a good
m argin of p r o f i t s ,  b u t  as soon as t h i s  m r- i n  beg in s  to  bo th re a te n e d  th ey  
w i l l  i n t e n s i f y  t h e i r  o p e ra t io n s  whore th e re  a-’o b e t t e r  p ro s p e c ts .  T h is  i s  
the  r e a l i t y  t h a t  V enezuela  must a c c e p t .  The o i l  companies, l ik e  any o th e r
commerical E n te r p r i s e ,  a re  ou t f o r  p r o f i t s  and th ey  w i l l  ope ra te  where they
can do b u s in e s s .  V enezuela  has a l r e a d y  seen  the r e s u l t s  of he r  p o l ic y  w ith  
the  d is in v e s tm e n t  of tho o i l  i n d u s t r y  and a ls o  w ith  the  r e d u c t io n  of h e r  
o u tp u t .  T h is  s i t u a t i o n  should  induce  the Government to  r e v i s e  i t s  p e tro leum  
p o l ic y .
t h a t  i s  u rg e n t ly  needed i s  to  d e f in e  the  grounds on which the o i l  
compand*os w i l l  o p e ra te  a f t e r  t h e i r  co ncess ion s  e x p ire  i n  1983 &nd to  ensure  
t h a t  the  r u l e s  w i th in  which th ey  w i l l  have to  p la y  a llow  V enezuelan  o i l  to  
compete w ith  t h a t  from o th e r  so u rc e s .  I f  the  V enezuelan  Government vmnts
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to  do aw ay w ith  tho con cess ion  s/sr-om, t h a t  Is t h e i r  p r i v i l e d g e ,  b u t  l e t  
us have som ething ready  to  tak e  i t s  p iece  to  a s su re  the  i n d u s t r y  i t s  
c o n t in u i ty .
I n  r e l a t i o n  to  V enezuelans most im p o rtan t  m arke t,  the  U n ited  S t a t e s ,  I  
do b e l i e v e  t h a t  V enezuela  can i n s i s t  and o b ta in  b e t t o r  term s f o r  h e r  
i n d u s t r y .  Towards th e  end of c h a p te r  f i v e ,  I  em phasised  the  need f o r  an 
agreem ent between th e  U n ited  S t a te s  and Venezuela i n  which V enezuelan  o i l  
would be t r e a t e d  w ith  the  same c o n s id e ra t io n s  as  C anadian  and Mexican o i l .
T h is  i s  of prime im portance  f o r  V enezuela  and v e ry  f e a s i b l e  i f  the  U n ited  
S t a te s  r e a l l y  c o n s id e r s  V enezuela  as s t r a t e g i c  f o r  W estern  Hemisphere s e c u r i t y  
Having the  American market e q u a l ly  open to  V enezu lan  o i l  would be an In c e n t iv e  
f o r  the  o i l  companies to  op e ra te  i n  Venezuela . By do ing  t h i s ,  the  U n ited  
S t a t e s  ’would n e t  be going a g a in s t  dom estic  p ro du ce rs  b u t  only  p la c in g  Venezu­
e l a  i n  a p r e f e r e n t i a l  s t a tu s  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  p ro d u ce rs  of th e  E a s te r n  
Hem isphere, I  a ls o  b e l i e v e  th ~ t  t h i s  k in d  of r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  
U n ited  S ta le s  and L a t in  American c o u n t r ie s  x s f a r  more e f f e c t i v e  th an  any 
a id  programme i n  tho  form of long term  lo a n s ,
V enezuela  should  a l s o  be more r e a l i s t i c  wi.tn r e s p e c t  to  C .F .E.C . Not 
only i n  r e l a t i o n  to  the  power t h i s  o r c a n i z “t i o n  might have v i s  a v i s  the  
companies rind of th e  c o n t r o l  i t  coule ga in  of th e  m arket, b u t  a ls o  to  the  
advantages i t  can o f f e r  V enezuela . An I n t e r n a t i o n a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  can be 
v e ry  p ro m is in g , b u t  many tim es the  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  or id e a s  of the  
members makes i t  r a t h e r  i n e f f i c i e n t .  A l l  the  more when the  d i f f e r e n t  members 
f i n d  them se lves  competing w ith  one an o th e r  £o f i l l  t h e i r  t r e a s u r y  as  f a s t  
as p o s s ib l e .  I n  such a c a so ,  Venezuela r a t h e r  th an  subm it h e r s e l f  to  an
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o rg a n iz a t io n  where she i s  outnumbered by members who hove t h e i r  pe tro leum  
i n d u s t r i e s  under ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  c irc u m s ta n c e s ,  end co n seq u en tly  w ith  e n t i r e l y  
d i f f e r e n t  id e a s  o r t h e o r i e s  as to  hoe to  ob win t.iO most b e n e f i t  from the 
i n d u s t r y ,  and where up to  the  - 're sen t moment she has r e c e iv e d  l i t t l e  b e n e f i t  
by h e r  a s s o c i a t io n ,  i t  would s-..:j.n more conv en ien t  f o r  h e r  to  fo l lo w  a more 
in dependen t l i n e  so she would no t have to  dooond on the  r e l i c i e s  of th e  
o th e r  members to  moke h e r  own succeed. I  th in k  thwt tho f a i l u r e  of the 
p r o r a t io n  scheme, and s t i l l  more im p o r ta n t ,  the am bitions  of many of the  
member c o u n t r i e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  t h i s  p la n ,  i s  enough to  make t h i s  w orth  
c o n s id e r in g .  One Arab member of O .P.E.C, fa v o u r in g  p r i c e  c u ts  as a way of 
in t ro d u c in g  Arab r o y a l t y  o i l  i n to  the  marker a c t u a l l y  "su g g es ted  t h a t  
c o m p e ti t io n  w ith  non Arab members of 0*PoPiCo i s  no p a r t i c u l a r  c r im e ."(20) 
V enezuela  can c o n tin u e  p la y in g  an im p o r ta n t  p a r t  i n  0*F.3s.C, b u t  l e t  
no t  V enezuela  depend on 0*P .E 6C#, s su c ce ss .
(20) S u g g es t io n  a t t r i b u t e d  to  A.shrof L u tfy , K uw aiti .  D e lega te  c t  0 , P . £ oCo, 
Pe tro leum  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly, March 22, 19^5, page 6.
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